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FOREWORD 
As a premiere after a series of nine volumes of comparative literary stud-
ies in Hungarian, the Department of Comparative Literature at Szeged 
University proudly presents this latest edition: a volume of comparative literary 
studies in English. The present collection of works serves as a record of both 
departmental research and of the tendencies in literary theories and histories that 
are well worth to explore, popularize, teach and draw on by all students at the 
department. The volume thus serves as a list of topics for potential PhD disser-
tations and as a list of approaches that have been open for discussion at 
departmental seminars, debates and conferences. This is all the more so, since 
this volume's studies are all results of research that follow the changing tenden-
cies of comparative literature, including the growing interest in textuality, the 
juxtaposition of intertextualitv and intermediality and the rethinking of herme-
neutical hypotheses through modem recording systems. 
Comparative literature naturally seeks a 'contextual' approach to human-
kind's accumulated achievements between Ancient times and the Post-modem. 
In other words, it requires the synchronicity and diachronicity of individual 
ouvres, pieces of works or genres to be themed not as mutually exclusive 
features but rather as mutually complementary sets. Hence this volume attempts, 
first, to read together Hungarian and non-Hungarian literature and culture, 
second, to confront literature with its related arts and, third, to analyze recent 
issues of ever-debated authorship (cf. "the death of the author") and the relation-
ship between fiction and reference. The studies of the present volume are all 
clearly indicative of the wide scope and openness of the authors. The school—or 
rather schools—of hermeneutics and deconstruction both claim the integration— 
and not the exclusiveness—of individual schools into the context of the history 
of arts, a scene that all of us, including the authors, are parts of. Works are not to 
serve theories but rather the opposite: theories are to help researchers with more 
reliable systems of categorization, accurate terminology and consistent articula-
tion. Theory and histoiy mutually presuppose each other; subject and approach 
change in relation to each other. 
This volume is sending a message about promising academic careers, 
conclusions and partial results, research hypotheses and analytical procedures. 
We hereby present it for all to enjoy and discuss. 




TREASURE, LITTLE PLEASURE 
FOLKLORE AS RELIC 
„Everybody's looking for a reason to live 
If you're looking for a reason 
I've a reason to give 
Pleasure, little treasure " 
(Depeche Mode: Pleasure, Little Treasure) 
Montaigne writes in his essay on experience: "I have a special vocabulary 
of my own; I »pass away time,« when it is ill and uneasy, but when 'tis good I do 
not pass it away: »1 taste it over again and adhere to it«" (italics mine).1 This 
attitude to time (taste it) is quite important in the history of Hungarian folklore 
studies: their mechanism can be observed in almost every aspect of the discourse 
on folklore. The development of the discipline itself is connected to the aspect of 
clutching to time, to the need for collection, formulated in the classic call from 
1782 of the Magyar Hírmondó expressing the preference for collection: follow-
ing the foreign (especially French, English and German) effects Miklós Révai 
urged the collection and publication of Hungarian folklore products. 
The metaphoric denomination of folklore is very common in the writings 
from the 19th century in treating (or referring to) the relationship between folk-
lore and literature and sustaining the importance of folklore. The most important 
tropes designating folklore in this period are spark,2 spring,3 treasure4 and relic. 
1 Michel de Montaigne, "Of experience," Charles Cotton trans., in William Carew 
Hazilitt ed., The Essays of Montaigne, Complete, available: 
http://wwvv.gutenberg.Org/files/3600/3600-h/3600-h.htm#2HCH0106, access: 23 March 2006. 
In the French text: "J'ay un dictionaire tout à part moy: je passe le temps, quand il est 
mauvais et incommode; quand il est bon, je ne le veux pas passer, je le retaste, je m'y 
tiens". Michel de Montaigne, "De l'experience," in Alexandre Micha éd., Essais. Livre 
III. (Pans: Gamier-Flammarion, 1979), 323. 
2 Cf. Ferenc Kölcsey, "Nemzeti hagyományok," in Ferenc Kulin ed., Nejnzet és sokaság. 
Kölcsey Ferenc válogatott tanulmányai (Budapest: Múzsák, 1988), 60.; In accordance 
with Kölcsey Arany uses it too: János Arany, "A magyar népdal az irodalomban," in Pál 
S. Varga ed., Tanulmányok és kritikák (Debrecen: Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó, 1998), 85. 
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The essay of Róbert Milbachei^-the first chapter of which is on the folk idiom of 
literature-examines in detail the 19th century approaches to the relationship 
between folklore and poetry. Milbacher too emphasises that the folklore is repre-
sented in the works of that period as a source or mine to exploit, needs improve-
ment. pruning, polishing, refining. However, beside the common features there 
are differences too in the perception of folklore by different groups. These 
differences were examined mainly by János H. Korompay in his study entitled 
Kritikatörténet, népköltészet és népiesség (History of Criticism, folklore and 
popular trends). Korompay distinguishes four standpoints: (1) the two areas are 
in a hierarchic opposition, where folklore is inferior; therefore the delimitation 
between literature and folklore is striking and allows no passing (the circle of 
Ferenc Császár, Honderű); (2) the relationship between literature and folklore is 
hierarchic, but they are not strikingly delimited (Bajza, Toldy). (3) Some sus-
tained their equality (late works of Erdélyi, Arany, Petőfi); (4) and there were 
authors who thought that folklore was perfect (Pulszky, early Erdélyi, Pesti 
Divatlap-Fashion Magazine of Pest-and its circle).6 
The opposition-namely between hierarchy/equality-defining even today 
the folkloristic thinking on the status of folklore is present in the 19th century 
notion already. The research on the relationship between these two corpuses is 
structured by a second opposition between one-sidedness and reciprocity. 
According to the sustainers of the one-sidedness the passing between literature 
and folklore is one-sided (meaning that only literature has the right and possi-
bility to access folklore), while the second group thinks that the relation between 
the two areas is mutual, meaning that the folklore derives, borrows, takes over 
from the literature, as this one does from folklore. Of course, it is obvious that 
all approaches (no matter on which side they were) served different purposes in 
the narrative of folkloristics. In the above sketched early stage of folkloristics, as 
a discipline both the outline of equality and the emphasis on difference sup-
ported the legitimization and identification efforts of the discipline taking shape 
3 Cf. János Erdélyi, "[Felterjesztés]," in Ilona T. Erdélyi ed., Nyelvészeti és népköltészeti, 
népzenei írások (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1991), 224.; Pál Gyulai, "Magyar népmesék," in 
idem Bírálatok 1861-1903. (Budapest: Franklin-Társulat, 1912), 16, 17. 
4 János Erdélyi, "Előszó [Népdalok és Mondák, I. kötet]," in Ilona T. Erdélyi ed., 231.; 
Pál Gyulai, "Adalék népköltészetünkhöz," in idem Kritikai dolgozatok 1854-1861. 
(Budapest: Franklin-Társulat, 1908), 308. 
5 Róbert Milbacher, "A liliom és a mocsámövények (Az irodalmi népiesség mint 
akkulturációs folyamat)," in idem „...földben állasz mély gyököddel..." A magyar 
irodalmi népiesség genezisének akkulturációs metódusa és pórias hagyományának 
vázlata (Budapest: Osiris, 2000), 25-59. 
6 János H. Korompay, "Kritikatörténet, népköltészet és népiesség," Holmi 11 (1995): 
1620-1628. 
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just in those times. The persistency of the spring metaphor (and the above men-
tioned similar synecdoche-like metaphors) also meant that the folklore-literature 
relation (from the aspect of one-sidedness and reciprocity) was still perceived as 
one-sided. 
Since the call published in Magyar Hírmondó the importance of collecting 
folklore products and the fact that this could not be postponed have been stressed 
in many forms. The repeated urging can be observed in the 19th century dis-
course as well as in folklore studies of the 20th century, thus the constraint of 
collecting manifested in folklore in different forms, but with the same strength. I 
would mention just two important authors with reference to the problem of being 
in the 24th hour: 
One can observe mainly in these times of changing and decisive 
transforming of the peasant culture, that where the relevance of 
popular beliefs is decreasing or ceasing, [...] the practice of its 
transmission is fading and weakening too.7 
I quoted the words of Ortutay from the introduction to the tales of 
Mihály Fedics published by him in 1978; they represent metonymically the 
need of the folklorist for collecting. Linda Dégh, the disciple of Ortutay for-
mulates this even more expressively with reference to the collection of tales: 
We should collect much more now, that the change of rural life 
abolishes the events of telling tales before our very eyes, for all that 
the Hungarian catalogue of folktales (which is in making) finally 
should ensure a real image of the rich treasure of hungarian folk-
tales compared to that shamefully slight collection which has been 
gathered yet.8 
At the same time fear of missing the opportunity, the assault of the 24th 
hour is not a neurosis of the Hungarian folkloristics alone. George E. Marcus 
defines two frequent ethnographer position in the first, long note to Contempo-
rary Problems of Ethnography in the Modern World System published in Writ-
ing Culture-, one is the salvage mode, and the other is the redemptive mode.9 
7 Gyula Ortutay, Fedics Mihály mesél (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1978), 71. 
8 Linda Dégh, "Az egyéniségvizsgálat perspektívái," Ethnographia 1960: 30. 
9 „The two most common modes for self-consciously fixing ethnography in historic time 
are what I shall call the salvage mode and the redemptive mode." (italics mine) George E. 
Marcus, "Contemporary Problems of Ethnography in the Modem World System," in 
James Clifford and George E. Marcus ed., Writing Culture. The Poetics and Politics of 
Ethnography (Berkeley—Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 1986), 165. 
According to Marcus the researcher, on the one hand, positions himself as a 
rescuer and presents himself as "before the deluge", moreover, he believe, on the 
other hand, that he would be able to salvage a changing cultural condition being 
just before a deluge. This rhetorical strategy results in the fact that the researcher 
generations following each other attach the same importance to their role. In the 
case of the redemptive mode (which is almost the same) the researcher diagno-
ses the survival of cultural conditions despite significant changes, so he regards a 
culture in its continuity despite all changes. This problem of continuity deeply 
influences folklore studies, as permanence and change (or tradition and nov-
elty,10 if you like) is a definitive opposition in ethnography. Apart from these 
connotations the way how Marcus uses the terms sets in motion the sacral meta-
phoric too, which defined-from the beginning of folklore-the idea of 24th hour 
that has repeatedly been occurring in its discourse, and the pressure of collection 
arising from this idea. 
The famous volume of Thomas Percy, the Reliques of Ancient English 
Poetry (1765) can-due to the formulation of the title (reliquesf-be considered 
the overture to this sacral relationship. Among the theorists of the 19th century 
of Hungarian folklore mainly the works of János Erdélyi show the salvage and 
redemptive mode presented by Marcus. Erdélyi uses strikingly frequently a cer-
tain metaphor for denominating folklore; it is characteristic for his writings to 
use and let flow metaphors abundantly, therefore it is possible that some remain 
unnoticed by the critics. However, some metaphors are repeated so persistently 
that it is no longer possible to ignore them. One of these metaphor is (as men-
tioned before): folklore as relic. He introduces it in his study entitled Népkölté-
szetről (On Folklore) dated 1842 already: 
If some words have such a great capacity to retain the attention of 
scientists, how much more could earn the national self-knowledge 
thanks to the relics of folklore (italics mine)11 
and it is a frequent trope in his late writings between 1850 and I860.12 The relic 
metaphor appears in a writing of József Bajza from 1846 extended to language: 
10 In Hungarian the word for tradition ('hagyomány') also means 'heritage, share'. 
11 János Erdélyi, "Népköltészetről," in Ilona T. Erdélyi ed., 108. [„Ha egyes szavak is 
ennyire buják a tudósok figyelmét, mennyivel többet nyer a nemzeti önisméret a 
népköltészet ereklyéiben"] 
12 Cf. "népköltészeti ereklyék" (folklore relics) (János Erdélyi, "Népköltészetünk a 
külföldön," in Ilona T. Erdélyi ed., 250.; "a magyar népirodalom ereklyéi" (relics of the 
hungarian folklore [folk-literature]) (János Erdélyi, "Előszó [Magyar Népmesék]," in 
Ilona T. Erdélyi ed., 258. 
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"Yet people do not have more saint relic and more protected treasure, than their 
language and truly written history" (italics mine).13 The rhetorical analysis of 
Erdélyi's use of metaphors gives reason for treating more in extent the func-
tioning of the cult of saints and relics. "It is well-known that the cult of relics 
doesn't shrink back from anything, yet the demand for authenticity is not indis-
pensable for it (that is why there are so many copies)."14 - says in a marginal 
remark Ernő Marosi in one of his studies. We could add to this remark that it is 
also well-known that the cult of relics doesn't shrink back from anything to such 
a degree, that the cultic perception of objects interprets the umpteenth piece of 
wood as a remain from the crucifix of Christ precisely as a result of uncondi-
tioned belief in authenticity. This cult is so reckless that relics as tools of power 
were sold, even stolen, if needed. They tried to put under erasure the paradox 
feature of stealing relics by creating a specific type of medieval legend justifying 
it, the furta sacra}5 And the cult of relics is so hard to scare that according to 
medieval legal practice (as Gábor Klaniczay writes) touching the relic meant the 
authentication of the oath16 (alike later the Bible). Beside the fact that the cult of 
saints and relics as a narrative sets in motion several oppositions (saint/profane, 
life/death, clean/unclean etc.), its tropological connections are also interesting. 
As the fetish object is connected to the terms of power, memory, rescue 
and substitute in the writings of Freud on the fetish and its function, the meaning 
of the fetish used in religious context before Freud also makes use of the same 
terms. The fetish in its religious (and ethnographic) sense, namely the objects of 
tribal communities received a religious respect (stone, wood etc.) and the cultic 
objects of Christianity (like relics) don't differ these from a structural point of 
view. Keeping up continuity is a basic feature of these fetishes and one can 
prove in both types the difference. 
The relic is the remaining trace, witness, reminder, sign of a once-present. 
Considering the bones and parts of the body of saints attracting a religious 
respect the relic acts as a synecdoche of what it refers to, and the use of the 
clothes of saints and other objects connected to them as relics can be interpreted 
13 József Bajza, "Nemzetiség és nyelv," in idem Válogatott müvei (Budapest: 
Szépirodalmi, 1959), 416. ["Azért a népeknek nincs szentebb ereklyéjük és félhetőbb 
kincsök, mint nyelvök és híven jegyzett történetök."] 
14 Ernő Marosi, "A magyar középkor művészete a Nemzeti Múzeumban a 
millecentenáriumi év kiállításain," BUKSZ 2 (1997): 165. 
15 Gábor Klaniczay, "Rex iustus - a keresztény királyság szent megalapítója," in idem Az 
uralkodók szentsége a középkorban. Magyar dinasztikus szentkultuszok és európai 
modellek (Budapest: Balassi, 2000), 131. 
16 Gábor Klaniczay, "Szentkultusz a középkori Magyarországon," in idem A civilizáció 
peremén. Kultúrtörténeti tanulmányok (Budapest: Magvető, 1990), 223. 
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as a metonymic relation. No matter what kind of relic we are talking about, the 
relic (as a fetish) is a tie through which the saint, thus the sanctity can always be 
reached (by touching it directly or at least indirectly). Gábor Klaniczav mentions 
in his writing on the medieval cult of saints (referred to above), that "The relic 
was considered to be identical with the saint itself, like the wafer and the wine is 
identified with the body and blood of Christ (italics mine)."17 Thus, according to 
Klaniczay the relic and the saint are not different for the participants in the cult 
(that is why they could appeal for help directly to the relic). 
As we can see, the topic of complete difference, opposition, and its oppo-
site: the identity has already come in. De Man demonstrates in the functioning of 
the metaphor the differences that the identity and identification try to hide, the 
aporetic character of the literal and figural meanings of the metaphor. The 
resemblance, which is at the basis of topological play, drives de Man too often 
to the problem of identity-difference (particularly: opposition): "resemblance is 
»loved« because it can be interpreted as identity as well as difference and is 
therefore unseizable, forever in flight."18 He notes this in his study, Self (Pygma-
lion), but similar phrases occur in other de Man texts too. He shows with refer-
ence to the Second Discourse that the result of the explicit statement of 
Rousseau, according to which the (proper) noun has a temporal priority against 
the term, is that Rousseau connects the tropological (metaphoric) function to 
conceptualization,19 though the replacement, the displacement can be shown out 
in the act of naming itself too - that is what de Man does.20 De Man outlines the 
feature of displacement that the displacement characteristic to all tropes is real-
ised provided that the two things basically differ: 
The crossing of sensory attributes in synaesthesia is only a special 
case of a more general pattern of substitution that all tropes have in 
common. It is the result of an exchange of properties made possible 
by a proximity or an analogy so close and intimate that it allows the 
17 Ibid. 221. 
18 Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading. Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke 
andPmust (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979), 168. 
19 Cf. „The text yields information on this point, though not in a simple and straight 
forward way. It describes conceptualization as substituting one verbal utterance (at the 
simplest level, a common noun) for another on the basis of a resemblance that hides 
differences which permitted the existence of entities in the first place." Ibid. 144-145. 
20 Cf. „But if all entities are the same, namely entities, to the extent that they differ from 
each other, then the substitution of sameness for difference that characterizes, for 
Rousseau, all conceptual language is built into the very act of naming, the »invention« of 
the proper noun." Ibid. 148. 
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one to substitute for the other without revealing the difference 
necessarily introduced by the substitution.21 
This short but necessary digression becomes important in the understand-
ing of the relic metaphor, as we will soon see. It is trivial that different cultures 
have a cultic respect for different (or similar) signs. Through the transfiguration 
of the object, the hierophany, a basically profane object becomes something 
totally other than it was (saint), and yet it remains an object. Thus, the sacred, 
the divine can be manifested, embodied only through its opposite, the profane; 
the appearance of the sacred always repeats the above mentioned functioning of 
the metaphoric displacement. The cult of saints and relics thus represents a nar-
rative, where the act of embodiment can be interpreted as the fulfilment of a 
metaphoric displacement, through which the relics of saints attached metonymi-
cally to them become metaphoric too. Not forgetting that the metaphor hides its 
métonymie character through identification,22 the cult of saints is seen as a narra-
tive setting in motion a series of metonymies. 
The expression 'relics of folklore' refers to the term relics of saints, and 
lets us conclude that relics here mean the contemporary remains of the one-time, 
old folklore, so the term 'relics of folklore' refers in the writings of Erdélyi. 
Thanks to the relic metaphor it becomes clear that as the relic establish a con-
nection to the body of the saint, and through this to the sacred, by means of the 
collection and touch of the contemporary remains of folklore one can establish a 
connection to the old folklore, and through this to a sacred signified, which can 
be equivalent with the sacred according to the narrative of the cult of saints and 
relics. Besides the above quotation many parts of texts indicate that Erdélyi finds 
it possible to reach a sacred and final signified through the research of folklore. 
He calls the songs preserved through the oral tradition "a saint heritage",23 but 
we can understand his demand too, that we should accept all products of the 
folk-language as "the divine manifestation of the folk's spirit".24 He emphasises 
that "the vocation, noble duty of today's poets is to learn about people, the life, 
to step into the sea, like Jesus, when receiving the grace of the spirit in the Jor-
dan. [emphasis in original]".25 
21 Ibid. 62. 
22 Cf. „The relationship between the literal and figural senses of metaphor is always, in 
this sense, metonimyc, though motivated by a constitutive tendency to pretend the 
opposite." Ibid. 71. 
23 János Erdélyi, "Népköltészetről," in Ilona T. Erdélyi ed., 101. 
24 Ibid. 103. 
25 Ibid. 109. 
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The metaphoric and metonymic net around the saint and relic cult covers 
exactly the notion of folklore that can be discovered in the narratives of Erde-
lyi's studies on folklore, and the structure of the old-popular relation. The meta-
phor of Erdelyi is important because it allows us to examine the relationship 
between two apparently distant narratives, and through this analysis it can be 
proved that one narrative models, narrates metaphorically the other, and the 
tropological structure of the two narratives can be compared with each other. 
The fact that the recollection (or 'tresure up'), the testimonial and the sup-
plement are connected in such a way in the fetish, in the relic (as fetish), and are 
connected in Janos Erdelyi's writings to folklore, lets us conclude that the relic 
should not be understood alone as the contemporary remains of the former, old 
folklore, through which a sacred signified can be tasted (by the participants). 
Furthermore, it is true, on the one hand that the functioning of the fetish, the 
narrative of the saint and relic cult model the attitude towards folklore. On the 
other hand, that if testimony is required only when doubt arises, and if this signi-
fied postulated as the final one (as we can read at Bajza: the language) can be 
reached always only in its remains and supplements (as a result of the supple-
mentary logic), then it is easier to understand why the endless repetition of the 
importance of the collection of these supplements, fetishes becomes in most of 
the folkloristics studies an urgent task, and why the change, vanishing and the 
continuous postponement is so fearful in folklore studies. 
Translated by Eva Incze 
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Miklós Sághy 
THE EFFECT OF FILM REPRESENTATION ON 
L I T E R A T U R E 
( A N EXAMPLE: RHETORICAL ROLE OF THE CAMERA IN THE 
NOVEL FILM BY MIKLÓS MÉSZÖLY) 
/ 
"The medium is the metaphor" 
Neil Postman 
In the novel Film (1976) by Miklós Mészöly—an outstanding figure of 
post-war Hungarian literature—the question of who is the seer and who is the 
narrator has been divided on the level of metaphors as well, since the camera, as 
a mechanical focalizor, emphasizes the questions of seeing and making to be 
seen beside the act of verbal storytelling. The camera, as a trope of the narrator, 
signifies the intent to strive for accuracy and representation without the 
"knowledge of emphases". And it indeed seems that due to its mechanical 
automatism the recording device really fulfils the requirement of unbiased, 
undistorted representation. A further advantage of the camera is that with the 
adjustment of its lenses, or if you like focusing, it is able to penetrate into the 
details of the image and make them visible and analyzable by this blow up. The 
novel that is reliable and that intends precise representation often uses this 
method, as the narrator, in a somewhat reflexive way, says a few times: if "from 
the rastered background we only focus and make an at least double close-up of 
two faces (...)—then we are able to study the anatomy of a traction beyond all 
passion from a micro-close point of view" (33);1 "with our usual method: close-
up to the pores" (45); "For a second, we bring it as close as to be able to see the 
wooden rack of crates" (80); "we show the edge of the furniture in an enlarged 
close-up" (89); "we bring the face so close that one is unable to think of 
anything else" (119), etc. These are only examples of the explained occurrences 
of the procedure in question, while the method itself, i.e.: close-up "to the pores" 
is always present in the novel's representation technique. 
However, whether the focusing operation of the camera's object-lens does 
indeed results in more objective representation? Bringing something into micro-
closeness is often paired with viewing the enlarged image out-of-context: "if this 
1 MÉSZÖLY Miklós: Film. Jelenkor, Pécs, 2002. (my translation) 
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image had been detached from its context and the process of its direct 
precedents", i.e.: through blow up, then—we could add—we would get a picture 
that contradicts the intention of unemphasized and unbiased representation. Or 
the result of accentuation from the background is that the skin of the Old 
Woman becomes smooth, younger as the close-up image is able to show a face, 
"which can be eighteen or seventy-nine years old." (120). According to these 
latter examples the focusing of the camera not only refines but also reorganizes 
the image, by taking it out of context as the first step. 
How does the reorganizing process of the camera's closing-up procedure 
take place? For the analysis, let's turn to the following excerpt: the Old 
Woman's "neck is pigmented. It is white as dough, although she is stringy and 
does not seem as shaking. A few longitudinal thews push up the loose skin with 
the uncertainty of half-open umbrella's steel wires and let them fall back on both 
sides. This excerpt can be seen as a landscape from micro-closeness. (...) The 
Old Man (...) jerks sometimes with his sore nasal bone, shaking the baggy flesh 
and setaceous eyebrow-bush. The shelf-bone above the eye is hardly longer than 
a toy-house's flowerbox, plugged with wire-like toy-stalks" (6). Making the 
bodies of the old persons seen from up close results in the organization of focal 
surfaces and protrusions becoming similarity relations. In the above excerpt, the 
following similarity formations can be seen: "her skin is white as dough", "the 
thews on her face are uncertain as the wire-frame of half-open umbrellas", "the 
flesh on his face is loose as a bag", "the shelf-bone above his eye is almost as 
long and as plugged (with eyelashes) as the flowerbox of a baby-house". The 
metaphor "face as landscape" is at the same time summarizes the method of 
making the body seen from micro-closeness, namely that the "close up to the 
pores" first brings the focus as close as tearing it out from its context and make it 
into an undefined, contourless patch. This uncertainty, the close-up dissolving 
contours makes it possible to reorganize the picture as when the things seen 
cannot be identified then they can be ordered into one of the existing perception 
categories based on the associating abilities of the perceiver. In the case of the 
face, for example, the method changes its curves and depressions into real hills 
and valleys with the pores being craters. Or as Susan Sontag says in her work On 
Photography. Due to the close-up effect of the photography, now everyone can 
imagine the formerly merely literary metaphor, geography of the body; to make, 
for example, the body of a pregnant woman to be seen as a hill and a hill to be 
seen as the body of a pregnant woman. We can say that the method of close-up 
forces the application of the similarity theory, which realizes itself on the 
rhetorical level of the text as a formation defined as a trope of similarity, namely 
a metaphor. 
From this point of view, bringing something into micro-closeness can be 
regarded as a process that draws our attention to the basic organizing principle of 
the text, i.e. it zooms on it. Interpreters of the novel Film agree upon the view 
that the main structuring process of the novel is "striving for a universal 
analogy", which projects events happening in different points of time and their 
different locations related onto each other along the relation of similarity. At the 
same time, the metaphoric principle operated/forced by close-up fundamentally 
differs from the analogical process of ordering levels of time and space together 
because as the latter relates narratives—spoken or read stories—into associative 
networks, the former with, the focusing process of tearing details out of their 
context models the formation of a contourless image back into linguistic form. In 
other words, the so called "principle of universal analogy" creates relations 
between linguistic media, while the close-ups depict the process of the 
experience of seeing turning into language. In this sense, the novel Film presents 
a (basic) metaphoric principle working on—no fewer than—two levels. At the 
same time I find it important to point out that the tropes of similarity, which can 
be ordered to the focusing process of the camera are emphasized at least to the 
same extent as the "universal principle of analogy" analyzed deeply by 
professional literature, since the most used (almost exaggerated) method of 
depicting the Olds is close-up to the pores. And if we consider the feature of 
Meszoly's text, namely that one of its most important (and explicated) objectives 
is to "find out the logic of an unrepeatable act" (63), meaning that the players of 
the act, the Old Man and the Old Woman, are in the center of "recording", we 
can see that the closing-up and depicting technique appears again and again as 
the old persons get into focus, that is throughout the whole text. 
What can be said about the similarity formations that are related to the 
method of close-up? First of all—the formerly mentioned—shift of media, 
which takes place between the image created by lighting conditions and its 
conceptual determination and that this formation into language is not at all 
without obstacles as the method of close-up obstructs the automatic process of 
recognizing categorization itself and forces the perceiver to try to name an 
experience of seeing with an undefined content based on his/her former naming 
categorizations. This naming is carried out with the help of the metaphor, which 
trope makes different experiences of seeing identical through their similarity in 
perception. 
The formation of the shift between the world of seen objects and the 
sphere of language has a definition in the literature of rhetoric: sensory meta-
phor. This notion is used to depict the shift between stimuli transmitted by 
organs of perception and mental processes, namely bringing the "outside" 
experience "inside". This way we can talk about visual, acoustic, tactile, and— 
rarely, but all the more significantly—smell and taste metaphors. In his study 
Metaphor, Paul de Man analyzes the short allegory in Rousseau's Essay on the 
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origin of language2 pointing out the metaphoric process of transforming a visual 
experience into the inside, namely how a perceiving person changes the outside, 
visible characteristics into his or her inside feelings. In his views the mode of 
operation linked to sensory and perceptional metaphors can be found at the basis 
of the order of notions. By analyzing Rousseau's example he shows that creation 
of the notion of man has bom out of the linguistic capturing of a "spontaneous" 
and "passionate" moment of visual experience, which is based on a mistake, on 
"blind passion". When a primitive man on meeting other men names them giants 
he merely projects his fears into his visual experience and this deed results in a 
linguistic formation ("giant" metaphor) that can be regarded neither true nor 
false. The word "giant", however, that the "frightened primitive man made up to 
signifying his human fellow-being is indeed a metaphor in that is based on a 
correspondence between inner feelings of fear and outward properties of size."3 
Objectively speaking, this metaphor can be challenged since the other man is not 
at all taller than the perceiver but viewing the same subjectively it can be 
regarded as sincere because in the eye of the frightened primitive man the other 
does look taller. Or rather: the statement may be faulty but it is no lie. It well 
"expresses" the inner experience, the fear of the primitive man. "The metaphor 
is blind, not because is distorts objective data, but because it presents as certain 
what is, in fact, a mere possibility."4 One can easily imagine that they are 
dangerous and can indeed attack and hit the frightened primitive man or they 
may not. By naming them giants his feeling is stiffened into a fact despite actu-
ally being only an assumption, fiction, or rather—with the words of the theory's 
author: a flgural state. With Rousseau's example De Man proves that hierarchic 
structure of notions is built upon the basis of errors of sensual metaphors and 
their "blind passion", or if you like, upon formations that miss the fictional, tex-
tual element hiding in the nature of the existing they have called upon and feign 
to believe in their referential meaning. 
The basis of the pyramid of metaphors—similarly to de Man—is seen by 
Nietzsche as being made of a sensual order of metaphors, or as he puts it: 
"primitive world of metaphors", which is constantly overlooked by man seeking 
truth, as only through this forgetfulness "can one live in slight peace, security and 
2 ROUSSEAU, J. J.: "Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité." In: 
Oeuvres completes, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond. Gallimard, Paris 
[Bibliothèque de la Pléiade], 1964. vol. 3. 146-51. 
3 DE MAN, Paul: ,Metaphor (Second Discourse)". In: Allegories of reading. New 
Haven and London Yale University Press, 1979. 150-51. 
"Ibid., 151. 
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in a consequent way."5 And with the knowledge that he is "the axle of the world" 
around which the world turns. "Primitive metaphors" and "ancient forms" are 
called by Nietzsche "intuitive metaphors", meaning that they work on turning 
external nerve stimuli into internal images and this transfer is "if not the mother 
but the grandmother of all notions". It is not things that actually enter out 
conscience only their metaphors "as between two so greatly differing spheres as 
subject and object there is no causality, correctness and expression but only an 
aesthetic relationship between them."6 Thus when we think that we know some-
thing about the things themselves, namely when we talk about trees, colors, snow 
and flowers we do not have anything else but the metaphors of these things and 
they are the least equivalent to the original core."7 This figurative notion of 
recognition includes a violent gesture as well since the mind does not leave alone 
the (perceived) entities; rather it performs an operation of comparison on them. Or 
as Robbe-Grillet puts it: metaphors "create a constant relationship between the 
universe and humans", they build some kind of "soul-bridge" between things and 
the perceiver.8 This gesture is obviously arbirtraiy as this "soul-bridge" is not a 
priori existing between the universe and humans. Even Aristotle regards this 
figurative "bridgework" as one of the main characteristics of human race, although 
if we accept this as true then the question arises: what is the origin of the desire 
controlling the "rhetoric" operation of recognition that can be called violent and 
authoritarian? The answer is obvious says de Man "as this is the only way in 
which it can constitute its own existence, its own ground. Entities, in themselves, 
are neither distinct nor defined; no one could say where one entity ends and where 
another begins."9 A world turned into a meaningless, soulless impenetrable surface 
becomes a frightening force that we no longer control and to avoid this 
desperation we attach a "human face" to those not having a face. Otherwise it 
5 „Nur durch das Vergessen jener primitiven Metapherwelt, nur durch das Hart- und 
Starr-Werden einer ursprünglich in hitziger Flüssigkeit aus dem Urvermögen 
menschlicher Phantasie hervorströmenden Bildermasse, nur durch den unbesiegbaren 
Glauben, diese Sonne, dieses Fenster, dieser Tisch sei eine Wahrheit an sich, kurtz nur 
dadurch, dass der Mench sich als Subjekt und zwar als künstlerisch schaffendes Subjekt 
vergisst, lebt er mit einiger Ruhe, Sicherheit und Consequenz". (NIETZSCHE, Friedrich: 
Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im ausselmoralischen sinne. In: Kritische Studienausgabe, 
Herausgegeben von Giorgio Golli und Mazzino Montinari. Deutscher Taschenbuch 
Verlag de Gruyter. 1988. Vol. 1. 883.) (my translation) 
6 Ibid., 884. 
7 Ibid., 879. 
8 ROBBE-GRILLET, Alain: "Nature, Humanism, Tragédie". In: Pour urt nouveau 
román. Les édition de Minuit, Paris, 1986. 48. (my translation) 
9 DE MAN, Paul: „The Epistemology of Metaphor". In: Aesthetic ideology. University 
of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis / London, 1996. 44. 
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would be possible—a situation quite unbearable for man—that I am not more 
meaningful than —in fact equal with—a piece of stone and the world "affects me 
as the dark vision of organized chaos."10 Anthropomorphization, attaching faces 
on the basis of similarity relations turn things into mirrors, where man sees his 
own image forming. As Robbe-Grillet says: "they have been tamed, they are calm 
and look onto man with his own look"11 Human characteristics projected into 
nature by metaphors suggest that the world and I have the same soul, we share the 
same secret. That nature "exists within ourselves as well as in front of us."12 This 
is why formations of comparisons are never meek tralatitions but tools at hand for 
owning and taming the world. 
Through close-ups the narrator of the novel Film builds a soul-bridge 
between the Olds and himself, which forces the relation of familiarities and 
similarities onto the not too far from few gestures of two extremely closed 
bodies. The Olds neither signal to nor communicate with the camera and narrator 
questioning them. They are strangers, unpossessable and their secret about the 
past—if they have any—is unknown to the analyzing eye. The close-ups that try 
to turn perceivers' "outside" signs into "inside" ones forces the undominatable, 
the unknown, in this case the Olds into relations of similarity. This way close-
ups make the speaker visible, who wants to measure everything by his own 
means, wants to include everything in his own world or as Beáta Thomka puts it: 
"close-ups, micro-perspectives (...) distortions of viewpoints (...) are never 
biases of the seeing organ, rather they are biases of the seeing person and the 
way he sees. In this way objectivity becomes pretence, the tool turning back to 
the seer, the speaker."13 Close-ups and micro-closeness do not want to get to 
know the Olds, rather expropriate them through the metaphoric formations 
within focusing. The Old Man and the Old Woman do not give any deliberate 
signs and according to the narrator: they do not want to share their silence with 
us. For example, "there is no sign whatsoever" in the eyes of the Old Man "that 
we could read from". (98-99) Despite all this the narrator's often used and recur-
ring expressions are "by all signs" and "as i f ' and through this he introduces the 
nevertheless interpretations of the Olds' gestures. These interpretations are based 
on relations that put/places allegedly telltale signs parallel to gestures already 
10 MÉSZÖLY Miklós: „Warhol kamerája - a tettenérés tanulságai." [The Camera of 
Warhol - The Morales of being caught in the act] In: A tágasság iskolája. Szépirodalmi, 
Budapest, 1993. 137. (my translation) 
11 ROBBE-GRILLET:"Nature, Humanism, Tragédie". 62. 
12 Ibid., 51-52. 
13 THOMKA Beáta: Glosszárium [Glossaiy], Csokonai Kiadó, Debrecen, 2003. 22. 
(my translation) 
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seen, known and thought to be similar. We could say that he seizes the move-
ments of the Olds but this violent interpretation does not tell about the secrets of 
the two bodies but the intentions waiting to be deciphered. All this, however, 
still suggests that the Olds and the narrator share some kind of knowledge. And 
this is reinforced by the so called "universal" order of analogies ordering differ-
ent time and space level to each other as these comparisons are introduced as if 
they aimed at uncovering the sins of the Olds, while the truth about these allega-
tions—due to the silence of witnesses—cannot be uncovered, and they only 
draw attention to the "suspicion" of the narrator. Seemingly the narrator is 
awaited by failures from two sides if he seeks for the possibility of knowing 
without biases: at the level of universal analogies and in the use of the micro-
close (close-up) camera. We could say that the investigator-narrator is sur-
rounded so much by these repeated anthropomorphic analogies that they uncover 
a whole metaphysical system he is unable to break out of. 
But is really the role of comparison, or face-giving such a powerful force 
in getting to know and finding out the truth? I think that if the camera's process 
of close-ups has any significance in the text in question then it can be deter-
mined exactly through the analysis of this question. The camera's automatism 
"free of emphasis" promises that we can put aside our preconceptions by which 
we relate to things in everyday life, in other words: it is able to uncover such 
depths for the perceiver that we would only be able see by ignoring our mind's 
recognizing categories. In this sense the camera's view would be a pre-human 
view going beyond all orders brought or formerly recorded and determined by 
notions, mathematics, geometry, etc.; namely, embodying the hope that a secret 
pre-existence would be visible. According to Csaba Könczöl, Mészöly's writings 
often include such intentions going beyond notions as "the writer consistently 
strives for remembering soul landscapes and emotional states that are beyond 
good or bad' - that is, beyond determined truths, ideologies and value judge-
ments; and "he somehow suspends his conscience of an 'ideologist', and breaks 
away from his prejudices and dissolves all elements between the world and him-
self that are not incontestable and are not evident."14 
Mészöly himself in potentials essay The Camera of Warhol - The Morales 
of being caught at the act writes about the possibilities of camera viewpoints: "for 
a short period of time—as long as it is possible—we have become cameras. We 
have got a glimpse of such a raw mechanism of the happening view, that we usu-
ally decline to submerge (self-defense; we are 'I', and everything is 'else'. And 
14 KÖNCZÖL Csaba: "Rendezés vagy végrehajtás? [Directing or accomplishing?] 
(Mészöly Miklós: Film)". In: Tükörszoba. Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1986. 
220. 230. (my translation) 
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what happens if we lose the 'I'? Who will notice and be affected by the 'else'? 
Even reality is lost." Furthermore, Mészöly indeed sees the role of the camera to 
cut out metaphysical determinations: "this is all what happens, when we consider 
everything by cutting out metaphysical projections. In spite of this the camera 
appearing in the text of Film seems to work differently than the automatic 
recording device described in the essay. Its most important function, die close-up, 
focusing—as I previously pointed out—does not penetrate the—the world missing 
human interpretation, nor does it show us this world's inhumanity, its chaotic 
nature and endless extraneity, but rather, it immediately names the unrecognizable 
partial image torn out of its context and writes it back into the "pyramid" of 
notions through a relation of similarity. We are not made to see things in their own 
reality but only their metaphors. So what is it that the camera allows us to see? 
"An army of ever-restructuring metaphors, metonymies and anthropomorphisms, 
shortly: a summary of human relations".15 Mészöly's camera does not point 
beyond notions but outlines the source of notions, the "primitive" or in other 
words "intuitive" world of metaphors, where "external" stimuli (giving soul to the 
soulless) are transferred into a psychic order. In other words it closes-up on the 
moment when things turn into things and the world turns into the world for us. 
This way we get a close-up picture of the event of recognition, something we tend 
to forget about, namely the basis of human truths, the world of metaphors created 
in a "wild and spontaneous" way. 
In this sense the camera is not the metaphor of the narrator but the 
signifier of the process, which the narrator—contrary to all of their 
intentions—is unable to evade and cut out. This way the camera becomes 
the metaphor of metaphorization, a formation of the process transferring 
"outside" stimuli to "inside" ones, which builds a soul-bridge between the 
world and a human. Or as Neil Postman says: the form of the media (e. g. 
camera) "are rather like metaphors, working by unobtrusive but powerful 
implication to enforce their special definitions of reality."16 The close-up 
process of the recording device puts the text's own metaphoric operation 
into focus, pointing out that as the narrator's intention to cut out all 
emphases and biases uncovers his own face-giving and world-taming 
proceedings, the showing of "universal analogies" does not lead the 
investigation to the suspected sinners (the Olds?) either, rather, it outlines 
the figure coining accusations. To sum, its main function is to reflect back 
on the viewpoint. Thus the text's process of close-up makes its own 
15 NIETZSCHE: "Ueber Wahifieit..." 880. 
16 POSTMAN, Neil: Amusing Ourselves to Death. Penguin, New York, 1985. 10. 
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rhetoric proceedings universal and this way it draws the attention to the 
narrative determination of all laws, truths and foundations of accusations 
dedicated in language. In the words of de Man: "If the referent of a 
narrative is indeed the tropological structure of its discourse, then the 
narrative will be the attempt to account for this fact."17 Or if we wish to 
translate this statement to the language of the novel in question we can 
say that it is an attempt to account for why we can never get to know 
whether the Olds are guilty or not and whether they have anything to do 
with Silio's (other important character in the novel) existence beyond 
time and space, or not. 
17 DE MAN: „The Epistemology of Metaphor." 44. 

Roland Orcsik 
THE POETIC REFLECTION OF THE 
GASTARBEITER LANGUAGE 
(IVAN SLAMNIG AND ISTVÁN DOMONKOS) 
The 'linguistic turn' 
Let us start with a commonplace. 
The question of language in the lyric discourses of the second half of the 
twentieth century admittedly belongs to the dominant characteristics of these 
discourses. During the period, it is often language, to be more exact, its mode of 
usage that reflects the world view of the poet. Following Wittgenstein, we can 
state that the frontiers of language have become the frontiers of the poem, or 
rather of the world of the poem. 
In Croatian and Hungarian poetry, we can rank Ivan Slamnig and István 
Domonkos amongst the pioneers of 'linguistic poetry'. Both of them evolved 
their poetic oeuvres from being inspired by the intellectual currents of 
modernity, more precisely, by existentialism and by different avant-garde isms. 
They were the authors of the most important Ex-Yugoslavian literary organs 
after World War II: the Krugovi (1952-1958) in Zagreb and the Új Symposion 
(1965-1992) in Novi Sad. Resisting the socialist realist literature of the post-war 
era and thinking farther the experiments of modernity, they reached the quality 
of the neo-avantgarde and pre-postmodern linguistic literature. Cvjetko Milanja 
asserts the following about Slamnig: 
What is in fact at issue here is the 'entrance' to 'linguistic' poetry, 
which I would rather call the poetry of the grammatological turn or 
the poetry of the semiotic modelative matrix.1 
Goran Rem, interpreting the modernity-post-modernity constructs, 
attributes two strategies to Slamnig: 
1 "Rijec je o 'ulazu' u 'jezicke' pjesnike, koju ja radije imenujem pjesnistvo 
gramatoloSkog obrata, ili pjesniStvo semiotiöke modelativne matrice." Cvjetko Milanja, 
"Slamnig - Model knjizevnosti," in Goran Rem ed., OS lamnigu. Zbornik radova s 
medunarodnogznanstvenog skupa (Osijek: Pedagoski fakultét, 2003), 22. 
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[...] on the one hand, a strategy which, after Ivsic, Pavlovié, Stosic, 
prepares the turn of modernity into the post condition; on the other, 
a strategy which, with the above mentioned authors, but also with 
Mrkonjicty, Vladovicty, Rogicty, and Stojevicty, achieves the 
opening towards the post condition of modernity by itself.2 
According to János Bányai, similar conclusions can be drawn concerning 
the activity of the authors of Uj Symposioir. 
The understanding of the avant-garde tradition is at once a stepping 
out from the frames of this tradition because it indicates that the 
poetic (generic) norms and canons emerged in the historical avant-
garde failed, as a consequence of which—as a consequence of this 
'understanding'—the beginning of a new tendency can be 
announced, which can be referred to as new 'neo-avantgarde' or (if 
not too early) as post-modernism.3 
The main purpose of the present work is to explore how the problems of 
the 'linguistic turn' gain reflection in those poems of the two authors mentioned 
in the title which evoke the language of guest workers. 
The traces of identity 
It is clear from the above that both authors, from a certian perspective, 
started processes of separation from the modernity-paradigms of literature. This 
way, they have created a poetic language which appears to be unique in the 
discussed period. Actually, this language is oppositionist-natured; it gives the 
critique of a fossil, canonized literary conception. Slamnig, in one of his essays 
from 1958, defines contemporary poetry in a broad sense: 
2 "[...] one koja nakon IvSica, Pavlovica, Stosiéa - priprema obrat modernizma u post 
stanje, i one koja opet zajedno s tim autorima, ali i Mrkonjicem, Vladovicem, 
Mraovicem, Rogiéem i Stojevicem - izvodi sam ulazak u post stanje moderniteta." 
Gorán Rem, "Kvadrati tuge ili ekranizacija teksta," in idem. ed., 79. 
3 "Az avantgárd tradíció megértése egyben kilépés is e tradíció keretéből, mert jelzi, 
hogy a történeti avantgárdban kialakult poétikai - műfaji - normák és kánonok kime-
rültek, minek következtében - e »megértés« következtében - bejelenthető egy új -
»neoavantgárdnak«, vagy (ha nem túl korai) posztmodernnek nevezhető irányzat." János 
Bányai, "1965: A (poszt)modem fordulat éve?" in idem., Hagyománytörés (Újvidék: 
Forum, 1998), 92. 
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If we can at all talk about some kind of special difference between 
cotemporary poetry and the poetry of other periods, it means a 
tendency that gives voice to poetic elements which are considered 
to be subsidiary and left out from the everyday practice of speech.4 
One of the young authors of contemporary Croatioan poetry, Tvrtko 
Vukovic pronounces critical views on the subject: 
Slamnig was not able to carry out the project of demitologizing 
high, canonized poetry because his discourse was fundamentally 
determined by the borderline of the same, so called high literature.5 
At the same time, it is questionable to what extent Slamnig intended to 
exceed the frames of high literature. If we take into consideration the extreme 
plentitude of his canonized verse forms and the consciously applied, dialogical 
intertextuality of his poems, we can come to the conclusion that he did not have 
such an intention. This is well supported by Slamnig's concept on the autonomy 
of literature and those who create it: 
I believe that literature is something separate, that it, similarly to 
politics, works with language and texts, so with statements, either 
oral or written ones. However, there is one essential distinction; 
literary works own that difference and peculiarity for which, I 
think, it is necessary to make a stand.6 
On the basis of all this, we can conclude that for Slamnig, the literary 
work means an autonomous linguistic work and, in this way, the formation of an 
4 "A ako bi se moglo govoriti o nekoj posebnoj razlici izmedu suvremene poezije i 
poezije drugih razdoblja, onda je to tendencija da u njoj dodu do izrazaja oni zanemareni 
i usputni poetski elementi iz svakidasnje govorne prakse, ili iz djela, koja nisu sluzbeno 
priznata poezijom." Ivan Slamnig, "Pristupanje suvremenoj poeziji," in idem., Disciplina 
maste (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1965), 190. 
5 "Projekt demitologizacije visoke kanonizirane knjizevnosti Slamnig nije mogao do 
kraja realizirati, jer je njegov diskurz bitno odreden granicama polja te iste, tzv. visoke 
knjizevnosti." Tvrtko Vukovic, "Kulturalna vrijednost Slamnigove poezije," in Goran 
Rem ed„ 29. 
6 "Smatram da je knjizevnost nesto posebno, da barata jezikom i tekstovima, dakle 
izjavama, bilo usmenima, bilo pisanima, slicno kao politika, ali postoji jedna bitna 
razlika, postoji odjelitost i posebnost knjizevnog rada na kojoj, ja mislim, treba 
inzistirati" Zeljko Ivanjek et al., "Ivan Slamnig o sebi i drugima," in Branimir Donat 
ed., Knjizevna kritika o Ivanu Slamnigu (Zagreb: Dora Krupiceva, 2004), 191. 
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autonomous language at once. On the other hand, we will see that the aim of this 
autonomy is not to bring about novelty, but to work out its own distance, 
autonomy opposed to the familiar, canonized literary use of language by the 
employment of the well-known elements, inaccuracies, mistakes. 
One of these creations, 'Slamnigisms' is the usage of the Gastarbeiter 
[guest-worker] language in the poetic discourse. The method is most palpably 
employed in his sixth volume, entitled Dronta (1981). Before this volume, his 
similar experiments got manifested in forms of collages. Kresimir Bagic refers 
to this earlier and to that later phenomena as the poetic policy of the 
'babilonization of the text', by which he understands the following: 
[This is a] powerful authorial gesture which—mixed into different 
linguistic fragmentaries and speech-idioms—collects the identical 
and contradictious civilizational meanings, and thus, it appears as a 
particular supplement, interpreter, or as the generator of new 
meanings.7 
In his classification, he ranks the 'Gastarbeiter poems' ("Mein Faterlant", 
"Der geschmurfte Kater", "Süssmunde von der Münze", "Ich weiss nicht was 
soll es bedeuten") amongst the so called 'macaronic experiments'. Jasmina 
Lukic conceives the Gastarbeiter texts as the following: 
Slamnig bases his own phrases on the linguistic fragmentaries of 
the most manifold origin together with the new words, concepts 
created by himself, which he represents as a divergence formed in a 
new way as opposed to the accepted.8 
And indeed, if we read Slamnig's guest-worker poems bearing these 
instructions in mind, we can recognize that due to the grammatic mistakes, a 
non-literary and unexpected language has actually come into existence here: 
"Der Fater reist nicht drüben, / möcht gem toch naskisch essen. / Die Sarma unt 
die Riebitze - / dass gibts nischt hier in Hessen."9 (Mein Faterlant). Thus, the 
7 "[...] nadmocnu autorsku gestu koja - umjestanjem krhotina razlicitih jezika i govornih 
idioma - prikuplja podudaranje i protuijeöne civilizacijske smislove, nudeci se pritom 
kao njihov osobiti nadomjestak, interpretatnt ili, pak, kao generator novih smislova." 
Kresimir Bagic, Zivijezici (Zagreb: Naklada MD, 1994), 41. 
8 "Upravo na jezickim krhotinama najraznorodnijeg porekla i uz pomoc novih reci i 
pojmova koje stvara on sam, Slamnig gradi svoje iskaze kao uvek na nov nacin 
ostvarene otklone od ocekivanog." Jasmina Lukic, "Slamnigovski homo ludens," in 
Branimir Donat ed., 138. 
9 Ivan Slamnig, Dronta (Zagreb: Znanje, 1981), 47. 
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dimension of mistake, opposed to the canonized laws, generates a poetic world 
view. The above quoted poem is also significant beacause it casts a different 
light on the concept of mother tongue as homeland: 
Ich habe eine Heimat 
unt die muss sehr schon sein, 
mein Fater der sagt immer: 
'Da arbeitet gaar kein' 
Die Sprache ist wohl klingent, 
die Mutti liept die sehr, 
nicht wie die Sizilianerin 
die schpircht Alienisch nischt mehr.10 
The above lines prove how this poem reflects on its own substance, on its 
own world: on language. All the same, this language is not the home or 
residence of the authentic existence understood in the Heideggerian sense. This 
language is not a Holderlinian poetic instrument even if it might propose the 
notion, suspicion of lack of existence. This language reflects the oblivion of 
identity through the oblivion of the mother tongue; it displays the instability of 
the "theatralized, lyric subject"11 in a humorous, ironic way. The following 
mistake also refers to this alienated condition: Italianisch - Alienisch. In the 
word 'Alienisch', we can observe an English word as well: 'alien'. It bears the 
succeeding connotations: stranger, extra-terrestrial. So, on the one hand, there is 
humour, a ludist poetic game with language, languages; on the other hand, 
alienation is also there. Cvijetko Milanja perceives this as black humour: 
[...] it seems to be humour for the reader, but a sort of black 
humour is a more precise phrasing since the author's anxiety about 
the debasement of the cultural and civilizational level is distinctly 
tangible.12 
10 ibid. 
11 "teatraliziranog lirskog subjekta" Bagic, 33. 
12 "On nudi torn citatelju humornost, ali bi bilo tofimje reci neku vrstu cmog humora. 
Naime jasnoje uociti autorovu zabrinutost snizenoscu kulturnoga i civilizacijskog nivoa, 
indeksirana makaronstinom." Cvjetko Milanja, "Slamnigovo kasno pjesniStvo," in Goran 
Rem ed., 73. 
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, We can notice similar attitudes in the other Gastarbeiter poems of the 
author. Thus, for example, in the poem entitled "Ich weiss nicht was soil es 
bedeuten", identity gets negated, problematized: 
Ja se rodih uz napor 
gdje se lako rodio Heine. 
Sivi vinorodni lapor 
moji su bregi kraj Rajne. 
[•••] 
Mem Sehiff ist keine Sagina 
mein Schiff ist eine Kogge, 
und ich bin kein Dalmatiner 
ehnti tschatschine Rogge.13 
On the one hand, we encounter a Heineian intertextual subject here, who 
declares 'I' with confidence; on the other, we realize that this subject does not 
have its own language, instead, he speaks two languages full of mistakes; he is 
neither German nor Dalmatian and has no idea about what all this means. 
Slamnig's influential fellow-poet, Zvonimir Mrkonjic calls this Gastarbeiter 
language as the "language in-between",14 and the condition of being in-between is 
true for the identity of the lyric subject as well: 
The dislocation of language and being dislocated from language, 
the escape of identity and escaping from identity create the 
Slamnigian verse more successfully than the quest of all these 
[...]•" 
A comparable technique can be discerned at the Vojvodinian Hungarian 
poet, Istvan Domonkos. Domonkos, being the co-operator of more journals 
published in Novi Sad—translator and member of the editorial staff at the 
literature section of the weekly Ijjitsdg, and at the supplement of the journal 
Symposion (1961-1963), and finally at Uj Symposion—knew well the 
13 Slamnig, Dronta, 50. On this poem cf. also Branko Kuna, "Pudki jezidni slojevi 
Slamnigove poezije - izmedu ludizma i estetizma," in Goran Rem ed., 141. 
14 "medujezikom" Zvonimir Mrkonjic, "Uvod u fundamentalnu drontologiju," in 
Branimir Donat ed., 130. 
15 "ISfiaSenost (iz) jezika, bijeg (iz) identiteta uspjeSnije tvori Slamigovu pjesmu nego 
potraga za njim [...]" Mrkonjic, 129. 
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contemporary Yugoslavian literatures, and therefore the works of the 'Krugovi' 
generations (or to use Slamnig's term, the 'cold-war' generations), too.16 
Domonkos's Gastarbeiter poem bears the title "Kormányeltörésben" and 
may be his most frequently cited work as well. He consequently employs the 
infinitive here, establishing the "agrammatical linguistic model",17 the diction of 
the Gastarbeiter lyric subject. Nevertheless, his text had been written earlier 
than Slamnig's similar verses. The Vojvodinian author wrote "Kormányeltö-
résben" in Swiss emigration; he sent it to his poet-friend, Ottó Tolnai, who 
published it in the Új symposion in 1971 and later the same year, in the second 
volume of Domonkos, the Áthúzott versek edited by him. The South Slavic 
authors affronted this poem first in 1973, in the translation of Judita Salgo.18 
Despite the fact that Domonkos knew the contemporary Croatian poetry 
of the time well, we cannot state that he automatically adopted or imitated 
Slamnig's experiments, or vica versa. We can rather talk about a kind of 
synchronity; both poets 'smelled' something in the air of the 'cold war'. So, my 
intention is not to demonstrate who influenced who, or who was the first and the 
second because I would not like to report about a poetic horse-race here. My 
chief concern is how Slamnig and Domonkos represent the Gastarbeiter 
linguistic word. 
Irony and the irony of irony 
If we take a look at the reception of Slamnig's Gastarbeiter poems, we 
can note that he most frequently emphasizes the irony stemming from the 
incorrect usage of language. Among others, Vlasta Markasovic also talks about 
the author's ludist, ironic game: 
16 István Lukács observes it correctly that "the Croatian ' Krugoviian turn remains 
unnoticeable in Hungary for a long time" ["hrvatski 'krugovaski' prevrat u Madarskoj 
dugo nece biti zamijecen"]. István Lukács, "Hrvatska postmodema knjizevnost u 
Madarskoj," in Goran Rem ed., 360. However, we must add that yet, in the literature of 
the Vojvodinian Hungarians, or rather in the Symposiomsls', the inspiration and ample 
reception of the 'Krugovhans' could be felt. This is what is precisely testified, among 
others, by the works of István Domonkos, but unfortunately, the political situation in 
Hungary at that time did not allow for the recognition of this fact, and Hungary is still in 
debt for the discussion of the matter. (On Új Symposion and the South Slavic literary and 
artistic relations cf. Zoltán Virág, "A margó vándorai. Az Új Symposiomól," Híd 6 
(2005): 41-62. 
17 Magdolna Danyi, "Az agrammatikus nyelvi modell," EX Symposion 10-12 (1994): 9. 
18 István Domonkos, Ja biti, Judita Salgo trans. (Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1973), 49-61. 
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Interlingual quotations, the collage of the linguistic matrix, the 
variety of the linguistic material applied independently from its 
origin, all contribute to the general ironic impression of this poetry. 
Slamnig's lyric subject is absolutely deprived of pathetism; 
moreover, it finds its pleasure in a pseudo-mediocrity. In some 
poems, it can even be regarded as a Svejkian 'simpleton'. 
Slamnig's lyric subject is an outsider pushed to the margin; 
however, it does not play unplugged by any means because by his 
salient ludism, the author amplifies his instrument—his language.19 
Furthermore, it is also exciting how Zvonimir Mrkonjic compares the 
Gastarbeiter subjects of Slamnig and the Austrian poet, Ernst Jandl: 
Whereas Jandl advances towards the gramatically stale C asp an an 
language, which concretizes the subconscious and its power over 
writing, Slamnig shapes language by the corrosion of graphy, by 
the automatic humour of the transcription of the 'foreign' language 
and of the putting down of the 'how-you-speak'.20 
From this aspect, we can conclude that Slamnig's irony in these poems 
refers, on the one hand, to the canonized literary forms of speech;21 on the other, 
by the corrosion of graphy, to the loss of the authentic, stable identity. Although 
Slamnig's Gastarbeiter language talks about a loss, it does not do so by a targic 
atmosphere, but by humour and irony, by a ludist linguistic game. So, in his 
poetry, the literary, intellectual standpoint still gets hightened somehow, which 
makes it possible for the author to keep an autonomous-literary distance from 
the represented. 
19 "Interlingvalna citatnost, kolaziranje jezickih matrica, obilje jezicnog materijala 
niveliranog bez obzira na podrijetlo pridonosi opcem dojmu ironiőnosti ove poezije. 
Slamnigov je lirski subjekt totalno depatetiziran, a őak i pseudomediokritetan. U nekim 
pjesmama on je dak i 'bedak' sejkovskog tipa. Njegov je lirski subjekt marginalac, ali 
nikako ne svira unplugged, jer bujnim ludizmom autor ojacava njegov instrument -
jezik." Vlasta Markasovic, "Ludisticke paradigme u djelima Ivana Slamniga, Vanje 
Radusa i Dubravka Matakovica," in Goran Rem ed., 93. 
20 "Dok medutim Jandl ide prema gramaticki zakráljalom kasparskom jeziku koji 
konkretizira nesvjesno i njegovu prevagu nad pisanjem, Slamnig razraduje jezik 
korozijom grafije, automatskim humorom transkripcije 'stranog" jezika i pisanja 'kao 
§to se govori'." Mrkonjic, 130. 
21 In Mrkonjic's view, this Gastarbeiter language is "an alternative language which 
substitutes for the 'positive' literary language [...]" ["jednog alternativnog govora koji 
zamjenjuje 'pozitivni' knjilevni jezik [...]]." Mrkonjic, 131. 
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In Domonkos's "Kormányeltörésben", we can also discover this staleness 
of language and identity. However, here, the possibility of any literary, 
intellectual distance gets negated, which, in my interpretation, is brought forth 
by the irony of the metatextual irony. According to Friedrich Schlegel, this 
double irony is less frequent and, among others, emerges in the following cases: 
[...] wenn man nicht wieder aus der Ironie herauskommen kann, 
wie es in diesem Versuch über die Unverstädlichkeit zu sein 
scheint; [...] wenn die Ironie wild wird, und sich gar nicht mehr 
regieren läßt."22 
Schlegel points out that the irony of irony reveals that Socratic irony— 
which provides the aristocratic attitude of the awareness of unawareness—still 
gets overwritten in certain cases. At Domonkos, the irony of irony serves the 
evasion of aristocratic distancing, whether die Socratic mode or the Slamnigian 
literary reflection is at issue. That is why we can find so many contradictious 
statements in the above mentioned poem of Domonkos, as Beáta Thomka also 
perceived it: "The contradictions in which the experience of the I being on the 
point of departing, retreating abounds necessarily ripen out the gestures of 
Confutation."23 Thomka mentions this precisely in relation to the self-
determination of the lyric subject, which is repeated in the poem as its refrain: 
"én lenni" ["I to be"]. And the negation of this "lenni" ["to be"] appears as the 
negation of the lyric subject constituted by the poetic speech or writing: "ez nem 
lenni vers / én utánozni vers"24 ["this not to be poem / I to imitate poem"]. 
Further on, this matter of the subject and the poem continues to be ironized: 
"vers lenni tócsa / beleülni lenni szivacs / tönkretenni új ruha"25 ["poem to be 
puddle / to sit in it to be sponge / to spoil new clothes"]. Then, the following also 
reflects ironically on the ideological burn-out of the subject: 
tócsában találni [to find in the puddle 
sok kövér kukac a lot of fat worms 
proletariátusnak for the proletariat 
proletariátus jövőbe veti horgát the proletariat throws its hook off 
to the future 
22 "[... ] wenn man nicht wieder aus der Ironie herauskommen kann, wie es in diesem 
Versuch über die Unverstädlichkeit zu sein scheint; [...] wenn die Ironie wild wird, und 
sich gar nicht mehr regieren läßt." Friedrich Shlegel, Charakteristiken und kritiken I. 
(Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöning, 1967), 369. 
23 "Az ellentmondások, melyekből oly bőven kijut a távozóban, távolodóban lévő én 
tapasztalataiban, szükségképpen a tagadás, cáfolás gesztusait érlelik ki." Beáta Thomka, 
Tolnai Ottó (Pozsony: Kalligram, 1994), 41. 




vers lenni kérdezni: 
bírni el pici egér 
hátán egész-ház 
ha bebújni lyuk?26 
to catch bathroom 
poem to be to ask 
to hold little mouse 
on its back whole house 
if to get into hole?] 
The title of the poem itself also refers to this loss of identity, to this 
emptyness of the subject. By the way, the Serbian translator of the poem, Judita 
Salgo could not translate the title of the poem exactly. Moreover, she 
gratuitously omitted all of its paratexts, mottos. The original title is 
untranslatable because, among others, it refers to an Old Hungarian literary text. 
The Hungarian word 'kormányeltörésben' [being with a broken steering-wheel] 
comes from the poem marked as number nine of the Hungarian Renaissance 
poet, Bálint Balassi. As we know, this word was not used at the time of Balassi 
that is why we presume that it is the poet's own compound. It involves the 
following connotations: the breaking of a steering-wheel, which symbolically 
refers to the aimlessness of a life deprived of love.27 In other words, it refers to 
the loss of direction and to the meaninglessness of life. This is related to the 
Gastarbeiter language, conceived as existence in the poem. László Végei claims 
the following concerning the matter: "[...] Domokos, in a peculiar way, also 
denies this language. [. . .] The relieving elements of "Kormányeltörésben" are 
manifested by the irony of irony"28 due to the fact that this freedom does not 
appear as completeness, but only as possibility. This is the reason why I think 
that Schlegel's concept of 'the irony of irony' is more relevant here since it 
contains all the contradiction that provides high tension for the poem of Domon-
kos. Accepting the contradictions, the subject becomes active and passive at the 
same time; it wriggles between the flux of speech and its negation. 
Péter H. Nagy ascribes the following role to Domonkos's poem in the 
history of Hungarian literature: 
[...] "Kormányeltörésben" outlines a poetic situation which makes 
us aware of the experience of the turn of the lyric language, but it 
can also be read from the expectations of the previous period.29 
26 ibid. 
27 Balassi's concept of love has its origin in the tradition of the Petrachian poetry. 
28 "[... ] Domonkos ezt a nyelvet sajátos módon meg is tagadja. [... ] A Kormányeltörésben 
felszabadító elemeit a tagadás tagadása jelenti." László Végei, "A metafizikától a bele nem 
egyezés eposzáig," in idem., A vers kihívása (Újvidék: Forum, 1975), 123—4. 
29 "[...] a Kormányeltörésben olyan poétikai szituációt körvonalaz, amely már 
tudatosítja a líranyelvi fordulat tapasztalatát, de olvasható az azt megelőző periódus 
elvárásai felől is." Péter H. Nagy, "Identitásképző csataterek," Alföld 2 (2002): 53. 
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Domonkos's poem does not present a Hegelian dialectical process or a 
Thomas Kuhnian change of paradigm, but it precisely unveils how the different, 
simultaneously operating scientific, ideological paradigms eat up the individual 
with a viscerated identity, depriving it from the possibility of any free choice. 
With a little Marxist or post-structuralist echo, we can say that this poem 
uncovers the ideological process of identity production. The Gastarbeiter lyric 
subject denies ideologies from this aspect, but along with it, it also denies its 
own identity as the manifestation of the literary-poetic speech. By this and by 
the metatextual statements ("ez nem lenni vers") ["this not to be poem"], 
negation retreats to its avant-garde starting point; however, it has got 
disappointed from the utopicity so characteristic of avant-garde poetics and 
politcs. All this makes it impossible for the poem to be pigeon-holed into any 
aesthetic paradigm without any problems, either in terms of modernity or post-
modernity. This speech ominously reminds of the closed speech of the 
"philosophy of the dustly hole", where, according to Radomira Konstantinovic's 
interpretation, 
Language is an arbitrary link because, apart from itself, it, in fact, 
does not join anything; the word 'tree' will never become a tree just 
as the word 'justice' justice. So, if reality has invited me for speech, 
with its being an outcast from words, it is as if it only addressed me 
so that I can arrive at a revolt against language.30 
While Slamnig's irony provides an autonomous-literary distance 
keeping for the author, Domonkos's irony of irony negates any kind of 
possibility for distance. At the latter one, distance only appears as the desired 
possibility of freedom: "asszony lepedő ágy / clitoris / rátenni ujj / nem gondolni 
kollektív / nem gondolni privát"31 ["woman sheet bed / clitoris / to place finger 
on / not to think collective / not to think private"]. 
If we accept Branimir Bosnjak's interpretation that Slamnig is a 
"traveller in language",32 Domonkos's lyric subject is wandering around 
30 "proizvoljna veza zato sto niSta stvamo ne povezuje, vec povezuje samo sebe samog; 
rec drvo nikada nece postati drvo, kao sto rec istina nikada nece postati i sama istina. 
Stvamost, dakle, ako me je pozvala da govorim, ovim svojim izuzimanjem od reci, kao 
da me je pozivala samo zato da bih dosao do' pobune protiv reci" Radomir 
Konstantmovic, Filosofija palanke (Beograd: Nolit, 1991), 122. 
31 Domonkos, Áthúzott versek, 82. 
32 "putnik u jeziku" Branimir Boánjak, "Ivan Slamnig: Karnevalizirani pluskvamperfekt 
i intertekstualnost tradicija," in Goran Rem ed., 35. 
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deprived of his face, purpose, and language "mint vasmacska nélkül gálya az 
tengerben'""33 ["as a galley on sea without an anchor"]. 
Having compared the two Gastarbeiter uses of language, we can come to 
the conclusion that Slamnig's method refers to a literary alternative,34 whereas in 
case of Domonkos, things are a little bit different. For him, the Gastarbeiter 
language is not an alternative, but the only possible and, quite paradoxically, 
impossible language at once, which is created by the self-destroying power of 
the irony of irony. That is why a tragic, purposeless world view gains more 
emphasis in him. Although humour appears here as well, it can on no account 
burst out in a relieving laughter since it contains a certain amount of bitterness. 
The only possible alternative can exclusively be suspected in the closing lines of 
his poem, where identity, the subject gets a chance in non-thinking ("nem gon-
dolni kollektív / nem gondolni privát") ["not to think collective / not to think 
private"]. Of course, the question is whether this is possible at all. And if yes, in 
what ways can this freedom be articulated when the essentially ideological 
speech or language is incapable of this? 
Translated by Zsuzsanna Maczák 
33 From the motto of Domonkos's poem, where he quotes Bálint Balassi's mentioned poem. 
34 Cf. Mrkonjic, 131. 
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TEXTUALLY MANIFESTING FASHION CODES AS FIGURES 
IN WILLIAM GIBSON'S PATTERN RECOGNITION 
He wears something like a mailman's pouch, 
slung across his chest. Shorts, she thinks, 
drawing abreast of this trio, are somehow 
always wrong in London.1 (28) 
Cayce Pollard, the protagonist of William Gibson's novel, Pattern 
Recogniton, is a coolhunter, someone who recognizes the thin line that separates 
the cool-to-be from the flash fads. She has an extraordinary allergy to trade 
marks, brand names, and fashion, which makes her an expert of spotting what 
will become fashionable; a talent by the help of which design firms can decide 
what to focus on. She is a member of an Iternet community that collects and 
speculates on a lengthy series of short film clips referred to as the 'footage'. The 
clips are deposited on the World Wide Web, at unusual places, and there are big 
debates on deciding how many creators are working on them; whether they show 
a work-in-progress with a continuously building narrative; or whether they are 
clips of an already existing film. Cayce is one of the most respected contributors 
of the footage web discussion on the "Fetish: Footage: Forum". The novel 
follows her adventures from arriving in London up to the point of giving her 
opinion on a logo redesign for a company that manufactures athletic shoes. 
Pollard soon finds herself hired for finding the mastermind behind the footage. 
The owner of the fashionable advertising agency is interested in the footage 
because he finds its cult-like expansion to be the key to a new way of product 
marketing. From this point on, the story follows Cayce Pollard through her 
quest, which takes her from London to Tokyo, then to London again, and finally 
to Moscow. 
1 William Gibson, Pattern Recogniton (London: Penguin Books, 2003). All subsequent 
quotations are extracted from this edition. The page number of the quoted lines follows 
each quotation in brackets. 
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i 
The novel has a strong emphasis on being contemporary with its reader. 
One of its episodes explains that the protagonist's adventures take place two 
years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the Twin Towers, near which her 
father was last seen before his disappearance. The reflection on this event does 
not come up anywhere else in the story; it stays linked to the memory of the 
missing father, which means that it is a small, chronological information, by the 
help of which the reader can locate the story somewhere in his or her recent past. 
The novel operates with a textual universe that explicitly relies on using 
functioning references to contemporary material culture, design, and fashion. 
This particular feature, this intentional referentiality stands in the focus of those 
negative critical refelctions which argue that Gibson's earlier works, with their 
plots placed in the future, were much more powerful and intense, whereas this 
novel, set in 2002, is superficial and shallow. As one of the reader-critics puts it: 
[... ] Gibson wants us to believe that his finger is on the pulse of the 
cultural Zeitgeist, but his pop-art references both "high" (Rodeo 
Drive, Louis Vuitton, and countless mentions of Prada) and "low" 
(The Gap, Tommy Hilfiger) have all the staleness of an old issue of 
Marie Claire found in a dentists office. [... ] As a work of literature, 
it will surely resemble a musty time capsule within a couple of 
decades.2 
Namely, the effort to create a discernibly current novel fails to be 
successful at the point where this kind of up-to-date context is generated by 
using elements of popular culture such as product names, trade marks, celebrity 
names, names of famous locations in the mentioned cities, and other reality 
effects exposed to a sign-circulation along the constant transposition to which 
we are used to referring to as fashion. 
I understand fashion as a discoursive communicational method which 
takes an active part in the social signifying process while motivating the 
complex investigation for recognizable marks and features by which we 
constantly read ourselves through our everyday lives. Following Gábor 
Klaniczay, I consider fashion to be the self-governing, but never truly 
independent order of signs, figures, and communication.3 I am interested in the 
development of a comparative interpretational methodology that could help in 
2 Spotlight customer review in Subzero Blue Store available: 
http://www.subzeroblue.com/store/index.php?Operation=CustomerReviews&ItemId=BO 
009GEDSQ&ReviewPage= 17, access: 31 January 2006. 
3 Gábor Klaniczay, "Miért aktuális a divat?" in idem Ellenkultúra a hetvenes-nyolcvanas 
években (Budapest: Noran, 2003), 55-85. 
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reading literary texts which have their structures and rethorical strategies 
influenced by the functioning characteristics of the signifying methods of 
fashion and by the textual manifestations of fashion codes. 
Even though according to most critical reflections, Pattern Recognition is 
not Gibson's best novel, I think that its narrative and rhetorical strategies make it 
a representative text in this respect. Therefore, I do not intend to form an 
oppinion concerning its place in contemporary canon; I would much rather like 
to focus on the tension between the referential and rhetorical potentials of the 
fashion codes applied in the text—i.e. on how the text can handle, and in what 
ways it can explicate this kind of tension; on how fashion as a discoursive, social 
communicational surface and its operational characteristics affect the text that 
uses its codes. 
He is wearing what Cayce takes to be a Paul Smith suit, more 
specifically the 118 jacket and the 1 IT trouser, cut from something 
black. In London this look seems to be about wearing many 
thousand pounds' worth of garments that appear to have never been 
worn before having been slept in, the night before. In New York he 
prefers to look as though he's just been detailed by a tight scrum of 
specialists. Different cultural parameters. (9) 
Fashion, interpreted as the intertexture of sociocultural distinguishing 
mechanisms, marks out its own connotative sphere to which it is related 
metonymically, and it is able to represent the individual embodied in the text by 
its help as a complex paradigm. To create the image of the person whose 
appearance is described in the above quotation, one can only rely on the reality 
effects4 the text offers. The brand name 'Paul Smith' could be recognized; the 
item-codes of the jacket and the trousers perhaps; and the oddity of the different 
looks of London and New York; however, all possible reading strategies must 
necessarily involve some sort of relation or attitude towards fashion and its 
textual appearance. The intextextuality of the text creates an intercultural 
relational system which is essentially connected to the context of fashion. 
The interesting contextual feature of the texts that—similarly to the one at 
issue— operate with popular cultural codes is that they 'pretend' to promise a 
metonymical substitution while they demonstrate that referentiality is doubtful 
since their codes are authentic, but not referential, concerning actual reality. 
These codes become codes only through the rhetoric decisions of a reader. A 
Paul Smith suit signifies exclusively in case the reader finds it signifying, and its 
4 For the term 'reality effect' cf. Steven Connor, Postmodernist Culture (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989) 
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significance points no further than the actual textual universe. Since in culture, 
everything circulates through communication and discourse, and every meaning 
formation involves interpretation, fashion—understood in a wider sense than its 
most visible manifestation, the fashion of clothing—follows the same 
discoursive pattern and engages pieces of culture in its signifying process just 
like any other signifying mechanism. 
My God, don't they know? This stuff is simulacra of simulacra of 
simulacra. A diluted tincture of Ralph Lauren, who had himself 
diluted the glory days of Brooks Brothers, who themselves had 
stepped on the product of Jermyn Street and Savile Row, favoring 
their ready-to-wear with liberal lashings of polo knit and regimental 
stripes. But Tommy surely is the null point, the black hole. (18) 
The most important feature of the protagonist of the novel is that she 
developed an allergic reaction against trade marks and fashion in general. She 
escapes fashion by eliminatig its main characteristic, the constant renewal of 
appearance. Her outfits resemble to some sort of uniform that could have been 
worn inconspiciously during any year between 1945 and 2000, with the primary 
feature that they consist of items from which all trade marks have been carefully 
removed. One of the things she likes in the footage is the caracters' timeless 
clothing and chronotopical position. From her reality, overdosed with the 
vibrating circulation of signs of consumer goods, she escapes to a private 
minimalist world of stability, to a utopia that is safe from the pressures of 
consumer society. It is quite curious that while she suffers from the torrent of 
trade marks, she encourages their creation and renewal since her profession (to 
spot the cool-to-be) makes her activate her illnes. 
When approaching the figures of fashion in a literary text, it appears to be 
necessary to use the conceptions of cultural analysis in a comparative literary 
discourse together with the consideration of the differences in their approach of 
the subject and the debatable, if not doubtful possibility of their harmonization. 
In the introduction to her sociological study, Dress Codes,5 Ruth B. 
Rubinstein points out the difference in social scientists', fiction writers', and 
fashion historians' approaches to fashion. Social scientists from the turn of the 
twentieth century are either interested in an implicit consideration of fashion 
while trying to cover up and understand the consumption patterns of different 
social classes, or they are trying to understand fashion as being the latest desired 
appearance, enabling the individual to pursue competing desires for group 
5 Ruth P. Rubinstein, Dress Codes. Meanings and Messages in American Culture 
(Boulder-San Francisco-London: Westview Press, 1995) 
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identity and individual expression.6 Fashion historians usually discuss clothes in 
terms of aesthetic tastes and style of a particular period or of a particular group 
in society,7 and, as Rubinstein emphasizes, in contrast to social scientists or 
fashion historians, fiction writers typically imbue a specific image of clothing 
with meaning. She quotes Flaubert's description of Madame Bovary, where the 
character's clothing described at her first appearance basically revealed all the 
characteristics of her personality that led to future tragedies. The most important 
message of her outfit was that she was "fun-loving, frivolous, fashion-conscious 
and out of place."8 Namely, when a text operates with descriptions of a 
character's clothes not just in terms of listing established items of clothing (such 
as trousers, ties, or shoes), but also reflects on their features (such as colour, cut, 
material, or trade mark), it lifts these messages into its context as narrative and 
rhetorical structuring elements. 
The early twentieth-century social scientists agree in the fact that the 
social manifestations of fashion are signs and that their cycle indicates a certain 
communicational model, a parlance organized along some specific rules; 
however, their standpoints differ concerning what these rules truly are. The 
analytical logic of the structuralist theory engaged in the debate at the point 
where, along with the recognition of fashions, fashion's resemblance to language 
brought about the intention of developing the system of its signs within the 
framework of the Saussureian language system.9 Roland Barthes' analysis is 
perhaps the most frequently quoted and accepted theoretical work among the 
theorists of fashion; nevertheless, these quotations are almost always uncritically 
acknowledgeable and seldom step further, towards a critical reflection10. Even 
6 Cf. Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class. Hungarian edition: Thorstein 
Veblen: A dologtalan osztály elmélete (KJK Budapest 1975). Also cf. Georg Simmel's 
"Fashion". Hungarian edition: Georg Simmel, "A divat," in ed. Péter Somlai, Válogatott 
társadalomelméleti tanulmányok, Gábor Berényi and Virág Bognár trans. (Budapest: 
Gondolat, 1973), (473-507) 
7 M. and A. Batterberry, Fashion: The Mirror of History (New York: Greenwich House, 
1977); E. Wilson, Adorned in Dreams (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); A. 
Hollander, Seeing Through Clothes (New York: Viking, 1978), quoted by Rubinstein, op. 
cit., (4). Hungarian works with similar approaches: Katalin F. Dózsa, Letűnt idők eltűnt 
divatok (1867-1945) (Budapest: Gondolat, 1989); Margit Szilvitzky, Az öltözködés rövid 
története (Budapest: Corvina Kiadó Vállalat, 1974); Erzsébet Ék, Magyarországi viseletek: 
a honfoglalástól napjainkig (Budapest: Littoria Könyvkiadó, 1994). 
8 Rubinstein, op.cit., (4). 
9 Cf. Roland Barthes's Système de la Mode, Editions du Seuil. Hungarian edition: Roland 
Barthes, A divat mint rendszer, Zsófia Mihalcsik trans. (Budapest: Helikon Kiadó, 1999). 
10 One of the few critical works on Barthes's fashion theory is by Jonathan Culler, "The 
Development of a Method: The Language of Fashion," in Diana Knight ed., Critical 
Essays on Roland Barthes (New York: G. K. Hall & Co., 2000), 168-73. 
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Rubinstein's cited study is supported by a structuralist semiotical background. 
Her aim. to establish a systematic analysis of clothing images and meanings in 
American society, is preceded by the intention 
[...] to define the basic constructs of the communication discourse 
system. This step entails identifying the language and vocabulary 
of the images that give shape to the contemporary discourse." 
Fashion's resemblance to language is not the invention of the structuralist 
discourse; in fact, it is a constant element in the discourse of fashion history and 
theory. To support this, we can quote one of the most widely used fashion 
history books in Hungary, the Képes divattörténet [Illustrated Fashion 
History]:12 "Az »öltözék titkos nyelve« kifejezés helyett [...] bátran használ-
hatjuk az »öltözködés ékesszóló nyelve« kifejezést" ["Instead of using the 
expression 'the secret language of clothes', one can speak about the 'eloquent 
language of clothing' with perfect confidence."].13 Some literary theorists have 
pointed out that fashion's resemblance to language makes it as readable and 
important to read in everyday life as it is in case of literary texts.14 Conceding 
the approach of the category from this perspective, it is easily comprehendable 
that fashion does not manifest itself directly, but through a figurative 
replacement or substitution similar to language. This is the kind of resemblance 
that is highlighted in Nietzsche's following quotation of Cicero (De oratore, 
111.38.155.): "Just as clothes were originally invented for protection against cold; 
however, later on, they were used for the decoration and the ennoblement of the 
body, tropes also arose from a deficiency and were used later on frequently 
" Rubinstein, op.cit., 6-7. 
12 Ljudmilla Kybalová et al., "Mi a divat?" in idem Képes divattörténet. Az ókortól 
napjainkig, Anikó Harmath trans. (Budapest: Corvina, 1974), 15-36. 
13 Perfect examples could be found for the symbolic meanings of certain clothing items 
by the examination of the strict rules or even the dress laws which determined the dress 
codes of the Egyptian Pharaohs, the Roman senators, or the Medieval aristocracy. Most 
fashion histories explain the signifying abilities of costume by referring to it as 
something that can 'talk' about the individual or can even reveal secrets about the 
wearer. Although dress is one of the most individual inventions of culture, fashion that 
motivates its changes makes its individuality go along with a great desire for imitation at 
all times. The individual's aim, to imitate or copy others, represents the aim of self-
stylization and of emphasizing inner emotions, characteristics, and spirit by external 
tools. Ibid., 15-36. 
14 Cf. John Vignaux Smyth, "Fashion Theory," in idem The Habit of Lying. Sacrificial 
Studies in Literature, Philosophy and Fashion Theory (Durham-London: Duke 
University Press, 2002), 155-93. 
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because they were delightful." Nietzsche cites Cicero in his Rhetoric Course,15 
the text of which is quoted by Paul de Man in his Rhetoric of Tropes}6 My 
conceptions about the rhetoric operation of fashion signs, understood as signs 
that function in a language-like sphere of communication, can be clarified 
through de Man's, and in connection with it, (metonymically) through 
Nietzsche's understanding of the rhetoricity of language. 
According to de Man, one of the main points of Nietzsche's study of 
rhetoric is that 
[...] the trope is not a derived, marginal, or aberrant form of 
language, but the linguistic paradigm par excellence. The figurative 
structure is not one linguistic mode among others, but it 
characterizes language as such.17 
The textually manifesting fashion codes, alike figures in a Nietzscheian 
sense, are not derivated, but are essentially structuring the texts they are in. 
During their deciphering, we can ignore neither their figural nor their referential 
meanings. They enter the texts as reality effects, carrying a relevant referential 
meaning, but by constantly moving over their textual boundaries, they express 
their connotative sphere, like figures. By their functioning method, they are áble 
to define the intertextual relationship existing between different cultural layers. 
The textual appearance of the most discernible field of popular culture 
favours—by the employment of reality effects—a kind of metonymical meaning 
formation through which the elements of reality applied in a fictive sphere start 
to function as the simulacra of the experience of a reality close to the actual 
reality of the recipient. 
Engaging the de Manian rhetoric theory in a reading together with an 
interdisciplinary and intertextual interpretation that uses the conceptions of 
cultural analysis is not possible without some reflections on the highly 
problematical reconciliation of the two aspects. Although rhetoric and a 
comparative interpretation presume each other, they stand in contradiction as well. 
On the one hand, reflecting on rhetoric always supposes a comparative gesture; 
however, on the other hand, the prevailing and inevitable referentiality of a 
15 Friedrich Nietzsche, "Retorika," Farkas Zsolt trans., in Thomka Beáta ed., Az 
irodalom elméletei IV. (Pécs: Jelenkor, 1997), 5-49. 
16 Paul De Man, "Rhetoric of Tropes," in idem., Allegories of Reading. Figural 
Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke and Proust (New Haven-London: Yale 
University Press, 1979) 103-8. 
17 De Man, op.cit., 108. 
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comparative examination is bound to pass by rhetoric understood in the de Manian 
sense to be able to validate its logical-grammatical procedures and methods.18 
CPUs for the meeting, reflected in the window of a Soho specialist 
in mod paraphernalia, are a fresh Fruit T-shirt, her black Buzz 
Rickson's MA-1, anonymous black skirt from a Tulsa thrift, the 
balck leggings she'd worn for Pilates, black Harajuku schoolgirl 
shoes. Her purse-analog is an envelope of black East German 
laminate, purchased on eBay—if not actual Stasi-issue then well in 
the ballpark. (8) 
Dorotea may have attempted to out-minimalize her this morning, 
Cayce decides. If so, it hasn't worked. Dorotea's black dress, for all 
its apparent simplicity, is still trying to say several things at once, 
probably in at least three languages. Cayce has hung her Buzz 
Rickson's over the back of her chair, and now she catches Dorotea 
looking at it. (10) 
The tension between the two approaches actively govern the reading of 
fashion's textual appearances that function as codes and figures at the same time. 
The above quotations, describing the outfits of the protagonist and of a 
'negative' character, use some codes that can be read referentially, and 
according to the semiological reading of these signs, they are open for 
denotation and understanding within the clear and decipherable system of 
fashion. Nevertheless, a "fresh Fruit T-shirt" or the "Harajuku schoolgirl shoes" 
signify only if a recipient finds them signifying, and even if so, they signify 
solely in the way the recipient, who finds these codes being parts of his or her 
reality, understands them. 
The transformation of these codes into signs is a result of an extremely 
long and complicated process of interpretation within fashion, which is 
intentional in as much as it is subjective. The participation of even the most 
common and obvious-seeming element of the actual reality as a sign in a literary 
text is always preceded by a series of tropic Replacements and replacements; 
therefore, its interpretation must necessarily involve a rhetoric approach. 
Consequently, if a reality effect enters a text as a code, it cannot necessarily be 
clearly and unambiguously decoded as well. Fashion is a discoursive 
communicational method that appears through a language-like significational 
18 I would like to thank András Müllner for drawing my attention to the lack of self-
reflection of the actual discourse, which is trying to create some sort of balance on "the 
see-saw of textuality contra referentiality". 
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process. Its ontologically rhetorical manifestation through constant substitution 
is another feature that makes it a signifying system similar to language. 
However, it could be useful to reconsider the comparative interpretational 
approach of fashion from the aspect of the de Manian comprehension of the 
immanent rhetoricity of language. Since the comparison to language forms part 
of the theory of fashion from the earliest times, it can be easily understood that 
their resemblance most obviously appears in their tropological manifestation. 
"Harajuku schoolgirl shoes" does not only refer to a certain part of a 
school uniform that is worn by Japanese schoolgirls, but it is also a trope that 
stands for the large, abstract, connotative sphere of the 'Japanese schoolgirl' as 
the icon of most sexual fetish-fantasies of Japanese men. As a trope, it also 
stands for an exotic turist-attracting spectacle in Harajuku, Tokyo, where these 
girls gather in small groups, and they change their uniforms to the most shocking 
and artistic outfits that Japanese gothics, punks, or surreals can imagine. 
Through these metonymical references "Harajuku schoolgirl shoes" suggests 
unusual simplicity in this text. It motivates a different code-reading from the one 
that identifies clothes by trade marks and designer names since its connotations 
create a methonymical link to a special subculture of Japanese popular culture 
and to a subculture that idealizes Japanese popular culture. The quoted text uses 
this particular item of clothing in a context that stresses the damaging psychical 
effects of fashion on the protagonist, who tries to avoid it by wearing clothes that 
are not in connotative relationship with the fashion surrounding her. All the 
same, her aspiration to escape fashion cannot be successful and is crowded with 
contradictions. First of all, as it was mentioned earlier in my paper, the 
protagonist herself contributes to the constant development of fashion, which has 
damaging effects on her psyche since Pollard herself makes her living from the 
ceaseless trade-mark expansion. Apart from this, it is quite apparent that the 
character cannot ever escape fashion in dress since the term 'fashion' does not 
only refer to the serial-products of commercial culture, but it also stands for the 
constitution of distinguishing features, the two basic components of which are 
the imitation and exploration of new signs of differentiation. From this 
perspective, it is not at all surprising that clothing-ideologies, avantgarde art-
movements, or anti-culture programmes, all of which proclaimed themselves as 
alternatives for the popular or the commercial, have ended up as fashion.19 
According to the emphasis of the text, by her choice of outfits and other parts of 
her material surroundings, Cayce Pollard has an endless desire to differentiate, 
and thus, implicitly, she is always in the phase of making fashion. As the text 
ironicaly reflects on it, "She's a design-free zone, a one-woman school of anti 
whose very austerity periodically threatens to spawn its own cult." (8). 
19 Klaniczay, op.cit. 55. 
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Zoltán Lengyel 
BLESSED TO GO ON TO STOP 
COMMENTS ON BECKETT AND WITTGENSTEIN 
Die Kunst, gegen die Tatsachen zu existieren, sagt Oehler, ist 
die Kunst, die die schwierigste est. 
Thomas Bernhard, Gehen 
Methodological Preoccupations 
What is the purpose and what is the sense of writing commentary 
literature, if it has any? Of writing texts about texts? My conviction is that its 
main sense is to introduce the (will-be) reader to the possible purifying joy 
(really "cathartic" joy) of the attentive and self-giving reading of literary-
philosophical works. Or at least to give a hint at the possibility of that joy of 
reading. Its purpose is on no account to solve problems but to create and 
relativize problems. To anticipate the form of questions that which can sensibly 
be asked from the reading experience. To expose the so-called "primary" text's 
intellectual strength. 
It can expose that strength as long as it has its own "primary" intellectual 
strength of a similar nature (if not necessarily and not possibly of similar 
intensity) as that of the so-called "primary" text. The organised and structured 
(thus not, in any way, "chronological") documentation of the reading 
experience thus should comprehend and not "apply", but rather get woven into, 
and via this interwoven texture from word to word, step by step indirectly 
introduce the (will-be) reader to the language use of the so-called "primary" 
text. Its purpose is in no way to make the work of reading easier by preparing 
the ground and by explaining (away) the text's (imagined) structure, but to 
show the real difficulty of the work of reading by speaking a language 
compatible with that of the "primary" text(s). 
In order to create such commentary that prefers and performs the above 
tasks it is indispensable to get into a position of possible conversation with the 
commented texts, and thus it is essential to establish a mediatory layer of 
language use. In the case of the theme of this paper a touch of compressed 
enigmatic clarity (Wittgenstein) and that of the interweaving motion of voices 
(of the different inner integrated personalities; Beckett) will be indispensable in 
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order to get closer to the works, i.e. in order to let the real difficulties and 
problems of these works reveal themselves, showing themselves off. And also 
to avoid using quotes from the texts as demonstrative proofs, as dead material. I 
treat these writings rather as living and unfinished but fixed fragments of 
speech, and thus I attempt to initiate a dialogic/dialectic discourse which is 
itself unfinished and indefinite, being in the process of becoming. In order to do 
so it is necessary to have some common ground of language use, a no man's 
land of an in-between discourse which is neither one nor the other, neither the 
commented text nor the commentary, but which nonetheless partakes in both. 
Laconic clarity is necessarily adopted as a subjective philosophical value while 
the uncertainty of the speaking subject uttering logical propositions is a 
necessarily adopted poetic virtue. These are not such methodological devices 
that I consciously tried to assert in advance, i.e. their eminence is not the 
outcome of a pre-formulated plan. I was, so to speak, compelled to use these 
forms of speech, as any given and fixed taxonomies and interpretative strategies 
seemed inappropriate and would result in the falsification of the original 
thought of the essay. In case I would have tried to strip off these imitative 
(sometimes parodic, paraphrasing or analogical) layers of my work in order to 
create a neutral and objective use of language, I would have easily been caught 
up in a paralogic but isolated discourse imagining itself making valid and 
demonstrable propositions. And naturally this danger of imagined objectivity 
and authoritative interpretation is constantly present in writing commentary 
literature. This danger from time to time takes the form of a temptation (of 
speaking in a certain way in a certain position with scientific certainty) that 
should be resisted in order to fulfil the task of commentary literature which I 
sketched in the first two paragraphs. These two here over-simplified qualities 
(philosophical compression and poetic uncertainty) carry the danger of 
contradiction when I have to try to continuously and simultaneously pay high 
attention to both of them - thus the essay will serve as an experiment of how to 
reconcile and balance these aspects, too. 
To make myself clear: I propose that the (however problematic and 
uncertain) essay is the appropriate form for commentary literature and that the 
demonstrative and refutative discourse borrowed from natural sciences falls 
short right at the outset because its voice is not integrable with poetic and 
philosophical saying. This proposition will not be demonstrated as it cannot be: 
doing so would run against the proposition itself. This essay itself as a whole 
and as an experiment is meant to serve as a supporting force for this 
proposition. 
But all this does not mean at all that the sentences of this essay will leap 
out of, or in some way or the other evade logic; I do not think anyway that it is 
possible for language to do so. All this attempt of saying differently (or 
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alternatively to demonstration/refutation, assertion/negation) means that the 
argumentation of the essay will accentuate and use certain tools of logic, or, to 
put it differently and perhaps more precisely, the argumentation will obey certain 
set of logical and rhetorical rules such as analogy, paralogy, paraphrase, etc. To 
use the metaphoricism of sight: the essay tries to give a kaleidoscope-like picture 
of the problematic by showing different aspects simultaneously (here one after 
the other, due to the medium of writing) and without architectonic hierarchy, as 
opposed to the microscope or the telescope which is directed on a limited whole 
and is designed to give an exact, objective, observable picture. 
As I have already mentioned, this paper is a structured documentation of 
the reading experience and not a linear treatise of the works of the two authors. I 
found this form the most appropriate to approach these writings, as it may 
hopefully be able to preserve more or less the infinite and inconclusive tension 
created by the reading of the texts, as opposed to a linear demonstrative argument 
which would try to close and cut off any outside space for interrogation, for 
possible continuation. 
In a way, each of the numbered sections begins again and again to untie 
the weave of the whole problematic and each of them concludes by maximally 
exhausting its own intellectual possibilities. Each of the sections sets a new 
problem but they all serve only to set the problem. The arrangement of the 
sections is thus not arbitrary or contingent. The sequence is built on a logic that 
is the following: the central thought in each section is being pursued to its limits 
of comprehensible sense and the thought of the next section is the outcome of 
what is left of this game of "vivisection". 
The dividing branches of the argument of this essay are centred around a 
single and simple thought: life is utterly and strictly inexpressible and it is a 
blessing that it is. To be more explicit: Beckett and Wittgenstein get hitherto the 
furthest in pursuing the project of modern philosophy and literature to its edge -
the essentially self-relativizing and self-annihilating project which always 
already tries to point towards what is beyond its means: the strictly 
inexpressible nature of life. Life is a source and an end to which no conceptual 
apparatus can bring us closer; a way of doing philosophy and literature can 
manage at its best to more or less rightly measure the distance between the 
logical-conceptual-tropological system (the system of the philosophical treatise 
and that of the literary text) and life. Such a way of doing philosophy and 
literature would be to try to become contemporary with life - which is a project 
that has no end, as life is what pre-structures time and space. Thus the negative 
and self-critical role will be decisive in philosophical and literary praxis, and 
their living discourse will be essentially and necessarily indirect. 
All the following lines of argument strive to point to the thesis 
summarised in the above paragraph. It is the main point of the paper.) 
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Introduction 
The works of Samuel Beckett and Ludwig Wittgenstein direct our atten-
tion prominently to the blessedness of life, to the joy of life. To live is to be 
blessed, that is: to be given a gift. 
What is significantly similar in the works of these authors is that the 
blessedness and joy occur in writing and in thinking as total and strict inex-
pressibility. [It]1 is not a pitch-note but silence. At least on the acoustic and intel-
lectual level. The visual-physical aspect of the speech-silence, expressibility-
inexpressibility pairs is tendentiously described by kinaesthetic metaphors, espe-
cially by those concerning the different modes of humane locomotion. By 
applying these pairings (speech/go, silence/stop) and by highlighting the prob-
lem of inexpressibility the texts follow a philosophical-literary tradition; in this 
essay, for the sake of sharpening the problem, I shall turn for evidence to the 
founding texts of modern philosophy and literature: to the writings of Augustine, 
the inventor of modern subjectivity and strict agnosticism in relation to Wittgen-
stein (this relation is exposed mainly in section IV), to Descartes' Discourse on 
Method and Meditations and to Dante's Comedy in relation to Beckett (exposed 
mainly in sections I and III). 
The inexpressible, i.e. the reference point for the self-destruction and self-
relativization of philosophy and literature is thus seen here as the ultimate pro-
jective of modern philosophy and literature: their discourse is structurally open -
their ultimate reference point remains and must remain outside or beyond then-
system in order to keep the system working on, going on. 
My working-hypothesis is that both oeuvres have their crystallizing 
points: for Beckett's it is The Trilogy and for Wittgenstein's the Tractatus. Both 
of these texts culminate in a state of paralysis or at a certain self-limitation: 
nothing else can be said; only silence remains. They are crystal-like and thus 
from the perspective of an artist-aesthetics or production-aesthetics they are 
closed and conclusive. But, evidently, from the reader's point of view they re-
open again and again with every instance of the action of reading. I try to com-
memorate the experience of reading by asserting the latter aspect, thus the 
aesthetics of reception becomes accentuated. 
1 I use square brackets throughout this paper (with the exceptions of providing the 
originals of translations and indicating ellipsis: [...]) to indicate the absolute vagueness 
of die words (mostly pronouns) between them. Not in lack of better term, but in lack of 
any term. These are grammatical holes. 
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The articulation of my comments on Samuel Beckett's The Unnamable 
and Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus will require an indi-
rect use of speech. To speak about silence is contradictio in adiectio. 
We may maintain, as does Martin Heidegger about Gehör, Gehören2 
(listening, remaining/going silent), that silence is a modus of speech: that 
would stand in family relation to propositions like ' « t o stop/stand» is a 
variant of « t o g o » ' , and, to extend the analogy, 'death/being unborn is a 
modification of life' (which Heidegger himself would have possibly been the 
last to propose directly). Briefly, it would require giving prominence to one 
(emphatically the positive, assertive one) of these complementary aspects. 
Those texts on which I make my comments would not fit into this logic. If 
they recognize the structural and existential precedence of [anything] at all, it 
would be that of silence and listening, that of calm, which serves as an ab-
sconded point of departure or structuring force of any discursive activity and 
which remains unseen, unheard and intangible within the discursive boundaries. ̂  
[It] can be only grasped as absence; which is, of course, a contradiction in terms: 
if you can conceive barely the absence of something then you can have no idea 
of the thing itself. No negative theology would ever bring you closer to an 
affirmative definition of the concept of God, for instance. 
This recognition at the outset eliminates the possibility of direct constative 
statements and propositions about and of silence that would have sense. The 
indirectness consists exactly in this: we are capable to speak solely about the 
absence of the word proper (the Word), and in the end we are not able to speak 
even about that either, but we find ourselves still speaking. 
As if we were compelled to speak about our inability to determine the 
nature of our loss. 
I shall call par excellence literary and philosophical discourse that which 
has the inexpressible as its solely enduring obsession. The modes and variations of 
approaching the inexpressible, however, themselves resist fixation (of any pre-
established taxonomy), though they are numerous, potentially infinite. (To cite 
Malone, the speaker of the second part of the Trilogy. "The forms are many in 
which the unchanging seeks relief from its formlessness."3 (181)) The two basic 
names for approaching or staring at and being amused at the inexpressible are 
philosophy and literature (a third could be named religion). It is useful to see how 
these two terms relate to one another in order to make clear how I apply them. 
2 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Sein undZeit 36. § 
3 Samuel Beckett. "Malone Dies". (Trans, from French by the author.) In The Beckett 
Trilogy. London: Picador, Pan Books, 1979 (1951). 163-264. 
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The first coherent and extensive corpus founding "Western" philosophy 
(and philosophy itself is a "Western" term) is the work of Plato. Plato's dia-
logues present philosophy as being always in the making: the elaboration of 
concepts and opinions is always embedded in a dramatic and fictitious situation. 
Philosophy is a work in progress. It is important to be conscious of the fact that 
there is not a single thought in the dialogues which is directly referred to by 
Plato. The indirect mode of communication is essential to the dialogues' 
philosophical meaning; that indirectness which in modern terms is attributed to 
literature. Even Socrates could not be equated with the author; an equation so 
often done by scholar readers. Plato did not write philosophical treatises. 
In the dialogue Phaedrus Socrates says to Phaedrus that the name 
"philosopher" should be attributed to someone on the ground of what s/he is 
striving for, of what s/he tries to approximate: thus accentuating the philia-
aspect and presenting philosophy as essentially unfinished, a living discourse, 
speech (as opposed to the dead and fixed writing; see Phaedrus 278d). But the 
dialogues themselves are in written form which produces a curious anomaly: the 
indirect form and the content of Plato's works suggest that the works themselves 
are written to have been overcome by the reader, and philosophy itself starts to 
exist so to speak where the fixed writing ends. The dialogues even in their very 
literary genre point to a possible continuation beyond themselves, a continuation 
that they do not contain. 
The ground-making philosophy of the West, or more precisely the seeds 
of that philosophy were written in a dramatic-narrative literary form. Here the 
later-to-become modern schism and separation4 of philosophy and literature did 
not exist (in fact, the term "literature" did not exist). The fact that philosophy 
presents itself in what can now be called literary forms at its outset (think of 
Parmenides's elegies too) does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that 
philosophy and literature is one and the same, but that they meant to describe 
different aspects of the striving towards the inaccessible, the ever-renewing Eros 
of the ungraspable and inexpressible. Philosophy is the name of the activity itself 
(philia is action); literature is the name of the medium, of the form. While the 
former implies openness and infinity (the (imagined) approximation of the inex-
pressible formally can go on without end), the latter suggests closeness, finite-
ness, the necessity of an end (as there is materially a punctual end of every form 
of writing). That is how I use these terms. (I will use the term "art" here synony-
mously with "literature"; literature is written art.) 
4 The isolation is artificial and theoretic. Augustine's Confessions is autobiographical 
literature, agnostic philosophy and anti-Manichean theology. Dante's Comedy contains a 
wholly-developed and sophisticated philosophical and ethical system. These are just two 
important examples. Of course there are several other trends or even periods when the 
isolation is more emphasized than the relatedness. 
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The term "modern" is being used to distinguish philosophy and literature 
after Christ from classical (basically Greek) philosophy. The projective of 
modern philosophy from Augustine through Descartes to Kant was to limit the 
field of possible knowledge. Basically it is an epistemological and a methodo-
logical quest. To define what is knowable one has to have a concept (however 
obscure, imagined or even comic) of the inconceivable, the unintelligible, the 
unspeakable. The obsession with ineffability (though it has some remote traces 
in Greek philosophy) is the result of the strong Jewish, Eastern impact accompa-
nying the spread of Christianity in Europe. In the Torah to the ever-inquiring 
Moses, who wants to know who his God is, replies JHWH with divine humour: I 
am who I am. (The daimonic experience of Socrates is of analogous nature: the 
daimon, the inner signs with its silence, it marks exclusively negatively. But that 
is only analogous: while the daimon is specifically interior, JHWH resides both 
in the exterior and the interior, and, in a way, in neither of them.) The taboo and 
even the inconceivability of the name begin to obsess European philosophy after 
that impact, so that is the reason for using the category of modernity. 
Arthur Schopenhauer defines going (Gehen) as a continuous effort to pre-
vent falling.5 Analogously to this idea, it is possible to conceive speech as a 
continuous effort to prevent silence (falling into silence). 
The metaphors signifying the procedure (this word itself is such a meta-
phor) of thinking and speaking in philosophical and literary texts are most often 
kinaesthetic expressions. Expressions signifying different modes of 
thought/speech and motion apparently cannot flee from each other. 
The topos of the inexpressible and those uses of language which try to 
commemorate this inexpressibility frequently find themselves in getting articu-
lated through kinaesthetic expressions. The compelling metaphoricism of these 
expressions (of which the. simplest form in The Unnamable is "to go on") will 
turn out to be of central importance in the logic of the texts, thus I will try to 
treat this aspect with careful attention. 
It seems that Schopenhauer's remark on going indicates an inclination to 
think of motion and speech from the light of calmness/motionlessness and 
silence, respectively. The perspective of Beckett's speaker(s) and narrator(s) is 
similar. It seems from this perspective that motion and speech presuppose or 
even are preconditioned by an undisturbed and ungraspable calmness and an 
unspeakable silence. Its their ground to move. That is, the privative, the negated, 
the absent concept (nota bene, however, that an unconceivable "concept") is the 
one grounding the discourse, creating the ground under my feet to go on. 
5 Cf. Arthur Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Teil IV. 57. 
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Our working-questions thus should be the following: is there a similar 
ground for thinking? And what if one has (always) already disturbed this 
silence?/ is (always) already in motion? And is one able at all to disturb it, or is 
one able not to disturb it? (Though these questions soon turn out to be nonsen-
sical within the boundaries of the epistemological quest. (This problem is 
exposed in section III and VI.) 
(This idea is closely related to the condition of sub specie aeterni contem-
plation. (The expression "sub specie aetemi" is usually being translated as "from 
the perspective of eternity", but it is equally possible to understand it as "under 
the species of eternity". The two renderings refer to two different worldviews.) 
(This aspect will be worked out in section VI, too.)) 
* * 
I set out with a retrospective approach: in order to contextualize the texts 
in the oeuvres I firstly sketch how their crucial problem concerning the inex-
pressible possesses other works of the authors. It is a sketch because I only want 
to hint at the significance of this problem by citing two examples (there would 
be numerous others, and later I shall turn to some of them, too). 
The following fragments can provide a hint of how the commitment to 
silence proclaimed by the end of the Tractatus (7) exerts its influence on the re-
emerging and ongoing investigations of Wittgenstein. I chose these fragments 
partly because I try to appeal right at the outset to the mentioned analogy of 
motion/calmness (paralysis) and speech/silence. 
We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a 
certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, 
we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to 
the rough ground!6 (Phil. Irtv. I./107,46e) 
The preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by 
turning our whole examination [Betrachtung - L.Z.] round. (One 
might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated 
[Die Betrachtung muß gedreht werden - L.Z.], but about the fixed 
point of our real need.) (Phil. Irtv. I./108, 46e) 
6 Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophische Untersuchungen=Philosophical Investigations. 
(Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe.) Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967 (1953). 
We see that what we call "sentence" and "language" ["Sprache" -
L.Z.] has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is the family of 
structures more or less related to one another. (Phil. Inv. I./ 108, 
46e) (all italics by the author) 
The point of the real need remains fixed: the basic motive of the philoso-
phical quest (investigations) remains to be the same as it was in the Tractatus. 
The inability to give account, to express the basic radical motive itself (i.e. the 
reason/compulsion to speak) leads to the inversion of (philosophical) language 
use, a shift to another language game which recognises the continuity of this 
shifting of language games itself, but this does not necessarily and also cannot 
result in totally different considerations. What is articulated in and through the 
Investigations is not and it cannot be an absolutely different worldview to that 
of the Tractatus. Except that "it" is always already in the plural: worldviews, 
language games, basic motives. The two language uses (that of the Tractatus 
and of the Investigations) have essential differences due to different 
terminologies and different syntax, but their internal structures remain "more 
or less related to one another". 
It is a permanently emphasised thought in the Wittgensteinian corpus that 
what is essential is inexpressible. The difference though, or the shift of differ-
ence constantly in motion accompanying the direction of his notes and remarks 
is that while in the Tractatus this inexpressibility conclusively and rigidly states 
itself as something hidden, something remote or mystical, in his later reflections 
it starts to become essentially uncertain and the possibility arises that tire inex-
pressibility is constantly present as evidence, as an unabolishable condition of 
life patterns and language games. 
But, to use the expressions of the Tractatus it remains valid that in relation 
to the "higher" (6.4, 6.432), to "the mystical" (6.44, 6.45, 6.522) all this philoso-
phical babble ("rumbling and roaring"7) is indifferent (and, to be sure, "the mys-
tical" and "what is higher" are themselves instruments of this babble). That is, be 
whatever it may the nature of the inexpressibility, one cannot give account of it 
through words. The ladder, the architectonic system of the philosophical treatise 
is designed to be thrown away (6.54). A convincing illustration of this can be the 
remark in the Preface of Investigations: "I should not like my writing to spare 
other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to 
thoughts of his own." (Phil. Inv., Xe) 
As a matter of fact, you cannot even get to begin without them. (I mean 
thoughts of your own.) But you cannot get to begin within them either. The 
7 Cf. this with the motto of Tractatus: "...and whatever a man knows, whatever is not 
mere rumbling and roaring that he has heard, can be said in three words." (Kumberger) 
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two-faced aporia of solus ipse accompanies all the problem-raising done by 
philosophy.8 
Friction-proof icy ground is the ideal accommodation for philosophy, for 
thought. There you freeze, you cannot stir, stay motionless, calm. To be able to 
set out for walking you have already been (re)moved from there. You have 
already (re)moved yourself from there. You are unable to stay there. But in some 
sense you are unable to start walking either, you are paralyzed, because the pic-
ture holds you captive.9 
In Beckett's Trilogy there appears to be a similar description picturing the 
situation of helplessness, of inertia, of being frozen and paralysed, and at the 
same time the condition of constant flux and motion, of uncertainty. This condi-
tion is also the outcome of inexpressibility, of a silence of which one can give no 
account in words. In the first text in Beckett's Texts for Nothing, which is a 
contemporary in his prose to the Trilogy and is closest to it in its tracks of 
thought and vocabulary, the anonymous speaker sets out in the following way 
(and this can be regarded as a continuation of the thread lost and found in The 
Unnamable): 
Suddenly, no, at last, long last, I couldn't any more, I couldn't go 
on. Someone said, You can't stay here. I couldn't stay there and I 
couldn't go on. I'll describe the place, that's unimportant. The top, 
very flat, of a mountain, no, a hill, but so wild, so wild, enough. 
8 Let me copy here two fragments, without further comment on them and on solipsism 
here (in section I they will be treated at more length): "The world is my world: this is 
manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I 
understand) mean the limits of my world." (TLP, 5.62) "But within, motionless, I can 
live, and utter me, for no ears but my own." (The Unnamable, 298) A remark all the 
same: I do not imply at all that these propositions say the same thing. 
9 "A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside of it, for it lay in our 
language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably." (Phil. Inv. 115, 48e, 
italics by the author) 
Cf. this with the following passage by Johannes Climacus (Soren Kierkegaard): "But the 
bird in the cage, the fish on the beach, the invalid on his sickbed, and the prisoner in the 
narrowest prison cell are not as captive as the person who is captive in his conception of 
God, because, just as God is, the captivating conception is everywhere present and at 
every moment." Johannes Climacus (Soren Kierkegaard). Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. (Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong.) 
Princeton University Press. 484. 
10 Samuel Beckett. Texts for Nothing. (Trans, from the original French by the author.) 
London: Calder andBoyars, 1974. p. 7. 
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The place where the speaker could not stay and from where [he] could not 
go on is a very flat top of a mountain, or of a hill. [He] found [himself] there 
suddenly (no) at last, long last. The attempt to describe the place is unimportant; 
it is clear that it is not possible to give a description, nevertheless it is attempted 
(it turns out later that it is a depth at the height of a mountain, underground, in 
the earth, a six feet under perspective: the dead speaker below, the living above). 
Of that [place] you could not get the picture, nevertheless, (or for this reason) 
you are most tempted to picture its indescribability in words. 
Here it can already be seen how the connotations of speech (thought) and 
motion constantly informs and influences each other in Beckett's works, some-
times indistinguishably. The simplest form of such expressions is to "go on", 
which most frequently refer to both aspects. The speaker often reports either his 
inability to go on or his compelling drive to go on or most likely both. To go on 
speaking or to go on kinetically. These reports reopen again and again on a 
regression ad infinitum: the speaker comprehensibly speaking about his inability 
to speak while speaking, while being compelled to speak. 
The regressus almost always takes the form of silence in The Unnamable. 
But what is remarkable that precisely this silence makes it possible for the voice 
to sound; silence is even more than a conditio sine qua non of speech: it pre-
cedes speech existentially; silence creates the possibility of speech. 
The above introduction contains the seeds of the dividing branches of 
argumentation elaborated in the following sections: the aporia of being 
compelled and being unable to speak, to go on; the enhanced quality of silence, 
stillness and absence as being of utmost importance in the logic of the texts, etc. 
The empirical aspects of inexpressibility (the extreme experiences of fear, pain 
and joy) will be treated with exceptional focus in the first part of the conclusive 
VII section. 
In summa: the following sections try to show the reason why the ineffable 
is the corner-stone of philosophical and literary modernity, and above all they try 
to point out that the texts of Beckett and Wittgenstein radicalizes the indefinable 
problem of inexpressibility precisely by treating it consequently as indefinable. 
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I. 
(the method to set out; constant purgatorio) 
The projective of modernity constantly and basically informs various lay-
ers of Beckett's work. Descartes' Discourse on Method and Dante's Comedy11 
are two apparent pretexts of the Trilogy (besides the continuously underlying 
biblical references). It is possible to read the text in the light of these two works. 
From time to time I shall appeal to this aspect of reading. In the passage below 
there is a concentrated presence of their reminiscences. 
One starts things moving without a thought of how to stop them. In 
order to speak. One starts speaking as if it were possible to stop at 
will. It is better so. The search for the means to put an end to 
things, an end to speech, is what enables the discourse to continue. 
(The Unnamable, 274)n 
It seems that one presupposes the end (the possibility of an end, i.e. the 
logical fact of the end (cf. TLP 2.0121)) right at the outset. One cannot do other-
wise; things must have started moving which contains the condition that they 
were without motion, and thus it is possible that they will stop (that one will be 
able to stop them). As long as there is discourse flowing it is conditioned by an 
unending uninterrupted seeking for a "method" to stop. 
The discourse always already on method. Whether it is conscious or 
unconscious that this is the case, one, or rather I (to follow the shift of pronouns 
in the text; see the continuation of the quoted passage below) find myself pos-
sessed by the sole task to find a way to put an end, and exclude any accidentia 
(more precisely: those features which at least seem to be unessential at the 
moment) that disturbs the concentration on this task. 
11 Apart from the structural similarities (the three parts, the stations of the quests, etc.; 
those of which I will not treat here) the topos of the unthinkable unspeakable, which is 
one of the main issues of this essay, and naturally of the Trilogy itself, is a frequently 
recurring theme in the Comedy. 
To provide an incomplete catalogue of such passages let me just quote a few: Inferno 
XXXIV. 24: "all words would fall short of what it was"; Purgatorio XXIX. 40-42: 
"Now Helicon must pour its fountains for me, / Urania must help me with her choir / to 
put in verses things hard to conceive"; Paradiso I. 70-71: "Passing beyond the human 
cannot be / worded"; Paradiso X. 3: "the Power - first and inexpressible - [lo primo e 
ineffabile Valore]". (Trans. Allen Mandelbaum.) Available on Digital Dante: 
http://dante.ilt.columbia.edu/new/comedy/ 
12 Samuel Beckett. "The Unnamable". (Trans, by the author.) In The Beckett Trilogy'. 
London: Picador, Pan Books, 1979 (1952). 265-382. 
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No, I must not try to think, simply utter. Method or no method I 
shall have to banish them in the end, the beings, the things, shapes, 
sounds and lights with which my haste to speak has encumbered 
this place. In the frenzy of utterance the concern with truth. Hence 
the interest of a possible deliverance by means of encounter. But 
not so fast. First dirty, then make it clean. (The Unnamable, 274-5) 
I have already emphasised that the speaker of the text says that the dis-
course's continuance is conditioned by a craving, a wonder concerning the 
means (the method) of finishing. It seems though that isolation, reduction here is 
not a method but a must ("I shall have to banish them in the end", says the 
speaker). Descartes's method seems to be at first sight more deliberate. 
In case we take the consequences of Descartes's method the most seri-
ously and strictly it is possible, namely, to negate die existence of everything 
about which the least doubt may occur (i.e. about which I cannot attain absolute 
certainty),1' it turns out, firstly, that I can solely think/say I, and cannot do other-
wise (cfi: "I, say I. Unbelieving." (The Unnamable, 268)). The I-saying "subject" 
has nothing to do with psychologically fixable categories. The compelling force 
of the voice saying I relativizes the category of subjectivity. The quote below 
from the Tractatus apparently uses the word "subject" as a psychological cate-
gory, and thus consequently clearly distinguishes it from the philosophical self, 
the thinking I, the ego cogito. 
5.631 There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains 
ideas. 
If I wrote a book called The World as I found it, I should have 
to include a report on my body, and should have to say which 
parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc., this 
being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing 
that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could 
not be mentioned in that book. -
[...] 
5.64 Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are 
followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of 
solipsism shrinks to a point without extension and there remains 
the reality co-ordinated with it. 
13 René Descartes. Discourse on Method and the Meditations. (Trans. F. E. Sutcliffe.) 
Penguin Books, 1968. 53. 
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The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human 
body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but 
rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world - not a 
part of it.14 
The outline of Wittgenstein's The World as I Found It could be the outline 
of Beckett's Trilogy and mutatis mutandis of the Cartesian corpus. The radical 
isolation exhibits the subject in the end as non-existent, or at least as condition-
ally existent, relative. This self becomes a point without an extension - which 
coincides with Descartes's definition of the soul (as opposed to the body which 
is extension). 
The propositions "cogito ergo sum" and "I am a res cogitans" (both refer-
ring to the soul) are interdependent. Their connection is not linear or hierar-
chical; i.e. it is not the case that the latter follows from the former. Only a 
thinking thing is able and at the same time has to pronounce the cogito of ego 
cogito. And it is able to pronounce it precisely because it thinks. Thus the circu-
larity of this interdependent correlation opens on an infinite regression (and thus, 
consequently, for Beckett the thinking thing becomes even unable to think, an 
unthinking thing which nevertheless still has to think. Which is a kind of 
philosophical burlesque, of course.). The above quotation from Wittgenstein 
names this infinite regression "the metaphysical subject", "the philosophical 
self' instead of naming it res cogitans. 
It is too often neglected in sententious propositions on and judgements of 
"Cartesianism" (and the cause for that is in the "Cartesian" texts themselves, to 
be sure) that for Descartes the cogito itself is preconditioned, so in the eminent 
sense (existentially) it is not fundamental. (I tend to think that the "modernity" 
of Descartes's philosophy resides mainly in this instance which brings him close 
back to Augustine, and which distances him from the quasi-Gnosticism and 
Aristotelianism of scholasticism.) Descartes names this preconditioning exis-
tence God (or he finds [His] name, for [this existence] is already named thus). 
The radical question of The Unnamable concerns the very (im)possibility 
of naming and in the meantime the determinant condition of the speaker of being 
already woven into the process of naming and of being already named. (To use a 
figure of speech: the unnamable is being written from the absent source provided 
by the space between the string of signs JHWH. If that is space. Or void.) 
To get back to Beckett's passage where I left it: "In the frenzy of utterance 
the concern with truth" (The Unnamable, 275), the voice continues. Descartes 
names the ultimate goal of his quest - not very surprisingly - the truth, too. It is 
14 Ludwig Wittgenstein. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. (Trans. D. F. Pears and B.F. 
MeGuinness.) London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2001 (1921). 
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also valid here (in the relation between the Cartesian and the "Beckettian" project) 
as in the case of Wittgenstein that "the axis of reference o f ' the "examination must 
be rotated, but about the fixed point of ' the "real need" (Wittgenstein, PI, 108, 
46e, see above). Philosophy creating literature, literature doing philosophy. And 
outside the security of literary and philosophical history it becomes less and less 
determinable which is which. (It can be added that narration here by no means 
serve as clear-cut boundary between philosophy and literature; the Discourse uses 
narrative strategies at least as thoroughly as Beckett's text, with the difference that 
Descartes leaves the question of narration unproblematized.) 
But I keep up with the continuation of the already-cited passage of The 
Unnamable: "Hence the interest of a possible deliverance by means of encoun-
ter. But not so fast. First dirty, then make it clean." This ongoing process of 
saying and unsaying is being conceived as a process of purification too (besides 
that it is a seeking for a method to make an end; to look at (un)saying as a clean-
sing process provides another, Dantean or quasi-Dantean aspect). 
But not so fast. First take into consideration the semantics of "to deliver": 
it will be useful because it may provide us with a recurring logic of the text's 
formation. In the two expressions "to deliver a speech" and "to deliver a child" 
we may see the two extremes of the word's semantic scale. To utter either of 
them would require a special situation; the variety of these situations could be 
described by a scale that has the two extreme values of activity and passivity. In 
the cited sentence there is a dynamic shift of meaning of "deliverance". It is 
essentially uncertain whether that deliverance is to be acted out by the speaker 
"I" "in the frenzy of utterance" "by means of encounter" or on the "I" "by means 
of encounter" (thus the meaning of the word "means" is shifting, too). 
The sentence gets into an essentially intermediate position (if it is a posi-
tion; really it moves) as the discourse has already turned from I-narration into 
the impersonal in the preceding sentence. By reinterpreting this sentence in the 
light of the following formation of the text and the variations on this theme we 
may witness the semantic movement of "deliverance" (and "means") from the 
first ("active") to the second ("passive" or "receptive") meaning, without ever 
arriving there however. The encounter may deliver one from the dirtiness of 
babble to the cleanness of silence through the Purgatorio (frenzy) of compulsive 
speech. At least there seems to be a possibility to happen so. But the prevailing 
condition remains to be the intermediary of Purgatorio constantly accompanied 
by the recurring temptations (of "them", by "them"; see comments on "them" 
later) and the blessed moments of silence. 
But yet it is the prevailing condition of Purgatorio that holds any conceiv-
able vitality, any sign of life. In his essay "Dante... Bruno. Vico.. Joyce" the 
young Beckett already lays the foundation of such a view of life concerning the 
will-to-be Finnegan's Wake (Work in Progress then). The difference between 
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Dante's and Joyce's Purgatorio is the difference between the conical and the 
spherical, respectively. Joyce secularizes and thus revitalizes Dante's Purgatorio. 
Sin is an impediment to movement up the cone, and a condition of 
movement round the sphere. In what sense, then, is Mr. Joyce's 
work purgatorial? In the absolute absence of the Absolute. Hell is 
the static lifelessness of unrelieved viciousness. Paradise the static 
lifelessness of unrelieved immaculation. Purgatory a flood of 
movement and vitality released by the conjunction of these two 
elements. There is a continuous purgatorial process at work, in the 
sense that the vicious circle of humanity is being achieved, and this 
achievement depends on the recurrent predomination of one of two 
broad qualities.15 
The dynamism is Purgatorio, but the extreme values that make it work are 
not inherent in that dynamism; what provides the world with sense and value 
cannot be found in the world. 
Inferno and Paradiso from time to time give signs of the possibility of 
their presence, but what possesses the speaker/actor is the condition of the inter-
mediate term. In the continuous encounter with himself, in the continuous 
encounter with another, in the continuous encounter with [himself] as another, 
in-between, on the threshold of the encounter with the absolutely and solely 
exterior.16 
n. 
(facts — die Tatsachen) 
1. The world is all that is the case. 
1.1. The world is the totality of facts, not of things. 
1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the 
facts. 
1.12 For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also what-
ever is not the case. 
15 Samuel Beckett. "Dante... Bruno. Vico.. Joyce". In Our Exagmination Round his 
Factification for Incamination of Work in Progress. London: Faber & Faber, 1972 
(1929). 
16 Before the above quoted sentences the speaker says: "The only encounter I ever 
witnessed, a long time ago now, has never yet been re-enacted. It was perhaps the end of 
something." (274) 
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1.13 The facts in logical space are the world. 
1.2 The world divides into facts. 
1.21 Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else 
remains the same. 
2 What is the case - a fact - is the existence of states of affairs. 
The first proposition can be substituted by this one: The world is the 
fact(s). Facts are not things. Tatsachen (facts) differ from Sachen (things, 
objects) in Tat (act(ion)):17 facts provide the basis for action and speech. They 
are the determinants of my condition as a speaker making propositions, as an 
actor acting. Existential determinants. I can speak only about them, on them. 
And, which is the same and at the same time not the same I can speak about the 
fact that I cannot speak about [whatever] else. Or more precisely that I cannot 
speak [otherwise]. 
And yet simply the existence of facts (and nothing else) refers to their 
beyond (6.44). In relation to this beyond how I speak and how I act in the world 
of facts (method or no method) is absolutely indifferent (6.432). And this itself is 
a factual proposition. 
But not so fast. From facts, on facts, in facts, with facts, through facts I am 
only capable to set out. (And this signifies that I cannot get out of myself. Wher-
ever I proceed I find me (5.6, 5.63, 5.632)) Facts constitute friction which makes it 
possible to walk. As long as we walk the conditions are not ideal for thinking. As 
long as we proceed in thinking, as long as we utter, the conditions cannot be ideal 
for thought. What makes it possible for thought, for speech to go on (rough 
ground, friction, facts) is the very condition that prevents it from being perfect, 
complete. For it is clear that a perfect, complete thought would be a finished and 
finite thought, would no longer be a thought; the word proper (the Word) will not 
let itself be articulated. 
(Whence then the obligation to speak? What makes it necessary to dis-
turb silence? The direction of these questions is wrong. It is not I as subject 
who started to move things. I find myself as subject among things already in 
motion. The wrong direction of these questions is the outcome of a fallacy to 
have metaphysical remorse (to use Soren Kierkegaard's concept); it is a fallacy 
to have metaphysical remorse as I am not the creator of the world. To be a 
subject means to be able to speak, to act, and to be unable not to speak, not to 
act, even if this subject happens to be, as they say, physically blind, deaf, 
dumb and paralytic. The pragmatic-contextual referents of the pronoun „1" and 
that of the word „subject" are not the same.18) 
17 The Latin language also has a similar etymology with the words of facio and factum. 
18 Cf. (my thoughts constitute a parallel variation on the theme of the following line of 
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In the light of this condition it is seen clearly that I cannot help speaking 
about my inability to speak. In this sense "all propositions are of equal value" 
(6.4); they do not and cannot provide themselves with value (sense), and it is 
impossible to judge ultimately what value (sense) they possess, or what 
value/sense possessed them. But still as long as discourse goes on propositions 
on facts, propositions about facts, propositions creating (or rearranging) facts 
remain to be the sole point of reference. 
m . 
(worm - between facts and life) 
Unfortunately we must stick to the facts, for what else is there, to 
stick to, to cling to, when all founders, but the facts, when there are 
any, still floating, within reach of the heart, happy expression that, 
of the heart crying out, The facts are there, the facts are there, and 
then more calmly, when the danger is past, the continuation, 
namely, in the case before us, Here there is no wood, nor any stone, 
or if there is, the facts are there, it's as if there wasn't, the facts are 
there, no vegetables, no minerals, only Worm, kingdom unknown, 
Worm is there, as it were, as it were. (The Unnamable, 334) 
Things do not matter, only facts, when it is necessary to stick to, to cling 
to whatever. The existence or non-existence of things (or, to be incompletely 
enumerative: wood, stone, vegetables, minerals), their proximity or absence does 
not have the slightest influence on the existence of facts (they are there, intact). 
"The facts are there" - cries out the heart. Is it a cry of pain or of joy? 
Even after the work of the most devastating doubt there is still Worm (the 
ego cogito in incognito), [who] seems to be the irreducible remnant of "vice-
existers" (289; of "them"): dumb, deaf, blind, without cognition, without motion. 
Kingdom unknown. But for whom unknown? Who is to know [him]? Is it possi-
ble to conceive [him] even as unknown? "But not too fast,..." (334), the passage 
goes on. It is clear that the work of doubt is preconditioned by the desire to know. 
To label [Worm] "unknown" does only have sense within the limits of the lan-
guage game of an epistemological quest. There may be other language games 
thoughts): "The word « I » does not mean the same as « L . W . » even if I am L. W., 
nor does it mean the same as the expression «the person who is now speaking». But 
that doesn't mean: that « L . W » and « I » mean different things. All it means is that 
these words are different instruments in our language." Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
Preliminary Studies for the "Philosophical Investigations " generally known as The Blue 
and Brown Books, 2. ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980 (1969). 67. 
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which would name [Worm] otherwise, or in which the name Worm means some-
thing else. 
To utter "Worm" is itself a possible connection between different lan-
guage games. Worm is the name of those souls who crawl through the gates of 
Purgatorio; the imperfect souls who are not yet ready to endure the encounter 
with their Lord's judgement - they have to repent for the sin of Pride: 
O Christians, arrogant, exhausted, wretched, 
whose intellects are sick and cannot see, 
who place your confidence in backward steps, 
do you not know that we are worms and bom 
to form the angelic butterfly that soars, 
without defenses, to confront His judgement? 
Why does your mind presume to flight when you 
are still like the imperfect grub, the worm 
before it has attained its final form? (Purgatorio X. 121-129) 
What is required here seems quite impossible (for logic at least, being its 
basic concern with probability and possibility): a "passing beyond the human" 
(Paradiso I. 70) to form the "angelic butterfly" which is the final form. That is 
what is required to [survive] the encounter with the here solely exterior. It is a 
condition of levitation. But only an intellect sick with arrogance would dare to 
flight before the end is here (the desire to know the end before the end); this 
intellect places its confidence into backward steps and gets further and further 
away from the possibility to attain the final form. Further and further down the 
spiral - the stairs towards Paradiso and Inferno circulate round the mount of 
Purgatorio. 
The never-ending temptation to make an end before the end arrives is 
closely related to the temptation to go silent before one is silenced, that is, before 
one is disengaged from one's obligation to speak, and to the infinite "stoic" 
temptation of suicide.19 This is the temptation of using Worm as a speaker (who 
19 The speaker of The Unnamable speaks of suicide as the sole step, the only move which 
[he] alone (can) manage. It is the only step that "they" (the vice-existers) will not be able to 
take instead of [him]: "They can't do everything. They have put you on the right road, led 
you by the hand to the very brink of precipice, now it's up to you, with an unassisted last 
step, to show them your gratitude. [ . . .] The last step! I who could never manage the first. But 
perhaps they would consider themselves sufficiently rewarded if I simply waited for the wind 
to blow me over. That by all means, it's in my repertory. The trouble is there is no wind equal 
to it. The cliff would have to cave in under me. [ . . .]" (The Unnamable, 306) 
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essentially cannot speak), as a vice-exister (who essentially cannot exist, and 
cannot non-exist). 
Worm, according to its use in the language game of Dante, crawls on at 
the gates of Purgatorio.20 In case [he] dares to think that [he] is able to fly in 
order "to confront His judgement", then he is in a regressive spiral. The essential 
situation of Worm is to stay lying on the threshold of Purgatorio, on the thresh-
old of the encounter. 
The impossibility consists in speaking "the" Language, the mistake is to 
believe that one speaks a (comprehensive) language in which it is possible to 
utter the proper name - suggest both of these uses of Worm in the discourses of 
Dante and of Beckett. The sole absolute alternative would be to abstain from 
naming, to go silent. 
And it is impossible to go silent, and yet it is impossible not to go silent, 
but in-between two impossibilities there seem to move a shift of volition called 
life - intangible by the possibilities of factual logic; "the facts are there", "Worm 
There is no contigency equal to suicide: it requires an absolute resolution. It may be 
irresistibly attractive as the sole possible motion as opposed to the prevailing condition 
of inertia. It would be action par excellence - the one which begots an end at last. Still it 
is suspected of being an expression of gratitude towards "them", towards the tempting 
possible actors and speakers. That too is to be resisted. And, in any way it remains 
caught up in the realm of inertia in the end; the cliff won't cave in. 
20 Molloy, the first speaker of the first part of the Trilogy, at the concluding phase of his 
hopeless journey in the forest (which was in prospect to find his mother and home) first 
abandon "erect motion, that of man" (Molloy, 82), then crawls on his belly ("I suddenly 
cried, striking my brow, Christ, there's crawling, I never thought of that" (82)), "like a 
reptile"(83), and finally crawls on his back, plunging his "crutches blindly behind" him 
(83; blind - think of the inter-relations between sight and cognition) into the thickets. 
His path of motion describes "if not a circle, at least a great polygon, perfection is not of 
this world" (83; the spiral). Finally he finds himself in the light that which he could have 
foreseen but only from far. It is outside the forest (the forest where Dante had lost the 
true path, and from which Descartes wanted to get out by following a straight line in the 
Discourse), in a ditch ("I don't know why" (83) comments Molloy). The question 
concerning the destination of his mother and his home now seems to him as "ludicrously 
idle" (83) (the whole "quest" was set out to find her!), "though of undeniable interest on 
the plane of pure knowledge" (83-4). But his "interest" seems to consist in staying in 
this situation (the last sentence uttered by Molloy is: "Molloy could stay, where he 
happened to be." (84)), in-between the double-prospect of height (light) and depth 
(ditch). 
Cf. the abstract of this story with the following description: "Even when you aren't 
thinking in circles, you may still sometimes stride straight through the thicket of questions 
out into the open, and at other times wander along tortuous or zigzagging paths which 
don't lead out into the open at all." Ludwig Wittgenstein. Vermischte Bemerkungen = 
Culture and Value. (Ed. G. H. von Wright. Trans. Peter Winch.) Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1980(1977). 80e. 
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is there" as there is "a there" made possible by the animating voice of life, by the 
interval. The shift is infinitely quieting and hardly perceptible - the descending 
pitch and the dispersing noise of the sentence concludes into a soft rhyming 
murmur (in order to reconcile the acoustical and the spiritual): "Worm is there, 
as it were, as it were." 
We feel that even when all possible scientific ques-
tions have been answered, the problems of life 
remain completely untouched. Of course there are 
then no questions left, and this itself is the answer. 
The solution of the problem of life is seen in the van-
ishing of the problem.21 
(Is not this the reason why those who have found 
after a long period of doubt that the sense of life 
became clear to them have been unable to say what 
constituted that sense?) 
Life resists problematization. After all the riddles (6.4312, 6.5) are solved 
by science the [problem] of life remains unquestioned, intact. Life can never be a 
theme of research; no solutions and no problems can be discovered. 
Nevertheless, [it] seems to be the hidden, absconded reference point of 
value and sense (which, in the end, makes it possible for any problem to 
emerge).22 For the world does not provide itself with sense (6.41). 
The proposition "The world and life are one" (5.621) does not mean that 
they are equated, but that the world and life are two aspects and not two separate 
[entities]. The world is essentially picture-like. The world of facts is what is 
21 There is a much later (1937) variation on this thought: "The way to solve the problem 
you see in life is to live in a way that will make what is problematic disappear. 
The fact that life is problematic shows that the shape of your life does not fit into life's 
mould. So you must change the way you live and, once your life does fit into the mould, 
what is problematic will disappear." It is clear that these formulations says more than the 
TLP version. They are imperative, while the former is descriptive. Culture and Value, 27e. 
22 There is a remark of Wittgenstein dated around 1931 which partly supports this idea: 
"Perhaps what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and am not able to express) is the 







there to be problematized. "The facts all contribute only to setting the problem, 
not to its solution." (6.4321) The [problem] of life seems to be heterogeneous to 
the problems of the world. Any problematized fact contributes to set the [prob-
lem]. But the solutions to these problems do not give us any picture of the 
[problem];23 the constitution of life is what essentially cannot be discovered, 
revealed. 
Though we use the concept of life in a number of ways in philosophical 
(and literary) discourse, it can never bring us any closer to life. But it may help 
us to measure the distance. One such concept is Augustine's concept of God as 
life par excellence (cf. for instance Confessions VII. 10. 5-924 and several pas-
sages of the Soliloquies), and another such concept occurs in later remarks of 
Wittgenstein. 
568. Seeing life as a weave, this pattern (pretence, say) is not 
always complete and is varied in a multiplicity of ways. But we, in 
our conceptual world, keep on seeing the same, recurring with 
variations. That is how our concepts take it. For concepts are not 
for use on a single occasion. 
569. And one pattern in the weave is interwoven with many others.25 
The pattern/pretence of weave pretends life in the discourse. The very 
pattern of weave is but one pattern in the weave. (Woven textuality is itself a 
pattern.) Concepts relativize each other in the weave and relativize the weave. 
They are essentially interdependent, interwoven in the ongoing weaving of 
philosophical speech. That is, in the life of speech that they pretend. In the 
speech of life they pretend to speak but that they obviously cannot bring closer. 
There is a radically agnostic tendency in Wittgenstein's way of doing 
philosophy that brings it very close to Augustine. In fact, the most often quoted 
and perhaps most well known sentence of Wittgenstein which closes the Trac-
tatus (7) is a compressed paraphrase of an Augustinian thought from the book 
23 Cf. this with the closing words of the Preface: "I therefore believe myself to have 
found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems. And if I am not 
mistaken in this belief, then the second thing in which the value of this work consists is 
that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved." (TLP, p. 4.) 
24 "Aut ulla vena trahitur aliunde, qua esse et vivere currat in nos, praeterquam tu facis 
nos, domine, cui esse et vivere non aliud atque aliud est, quia summa esse atque summa 
vivere id ipsum est?" 
25 Ludwig Wittgenstein. Zettel. 2nd ed. (Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe.) Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1981 (1967). Pp. 98-9. 
72 
On the Christian Doctrine. The afterlife of these thoughts of a rather similar 
nature vividly shows how the rhetoric quality of dispositio (taxis) fundamentally 
influences the weight of a thought: the closing position of the Witggensteinian 
thought provides it with a seemingly much deeper emphasis than that of the 
Augustinian one. Nevertheless they both show the consequential agnostic atti-
tude towards the capacities of knowledge and speech. It is useful to quote the 
whole section of Augustine because it contextualizes the thought of going silent 
right in the problematic of inexpressibility (I italicize the paraphrased sentence, 
to be sure). 
6. Have I spoken of God, or uttered his Praise, in any worthy way? Nay, I 
feel that I have done nothing more than desire to speak; and if I have said 
anything, it is not what I desired to say. How do I know this, except from 
the fact, that God is unspeakable [deus ineffabilis est]? But what I have 
said, if it had been unspeakable, could not have been spoken. And so God 
is not even to be called "unspeakable", because to say even this is to speak 
of Him. Thus there arises a curious contradiction of words, because if the 
unspeakable is what cannot be spoken of, it is not unspeakable if it can be 
called unspeakable. And this opposition of words is rather to be avoided by 
silence than to be explained away by speech. [Quae pugna verborum 
silentio canenda potius quam voce pacanda est.] And yet God, although 
nothing worthy of His greatness can be said of Him, has condescended to 
accept the worship of men's mouths, and has desired us through the 
medium of our own words to rejoice in His praise. For on this principle it 
is that He is called Deus (God). For the sound of those two syllables in 
itself conveys no true knowledge of His nature; but yet all who know the 
Latin tongue are led, when that sound reaches their ears, to think of a 
nature supreme in excellence and eternal in existence.26 
There is a split in the reference of the word "ineffable" which Augustine 
tries to expose. For strictly speaking this word tries (or pretends) to point at 
something which is beyond its own medium. There is no logical model which 
can give account for this split reference. [It] silences logic and speech. 
It is not by chance that the closing sentence of the Tractatus is a tautology. 
"What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence." What we cannot 
speak about we can do nothing else but to pass [it] over in silence. But there is 
an imperative which completes the tautology that is the Ungrund of logic. Yet 
26 Augustine. On the Christian Doctrine. (Trans. James J. O'Donnell.) Available at: 
http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/jod/augustine.html 
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the sentence itself does not contain the Ungrund itself in any way but can only 
describe its relation or non-relation to it. 
In Augustine's passage the idea of God is clearly divided from the 
existing God. The effect of the two syllables "deus" is that you imagine the idea 
of a perfect being but in this case the idea and its [object] may have nothing in 
common. 
When we say that life is utterly inexpressible we run into the same 
contradiction in terms. We should pass over this contradiction in silent 
acknowledgement (and not in ignorance). In a way, the contradiction and the 
tautology as means of (non-)expression mark the limits of our possible 
knowledge. More precisely they describe how the limits look like from the 
inside. To demand more from speech and knowledge would be illusory excess. 
And the possibilities of speech and knowledge remain always excessively 
overflowing: this contradiction of life's inexpressibility lying at the depth of the 
expressible is what grants it the infinite possibility of joy and praise of life. And 
of suffering and pain of life. 
V. 
(to tell life: story/life; from time to time) 
For the speaker of The Unnamable the inclination to storytelling is the 
strongest temptation preventing [him] from going silent, preventing [him] from 
living. To tell a story is always pretence, a mock imitation of life. The pronoun 
"they" is meant to designate the various possible speakers (vice-existers) of the 
[speaker]; to allow any of them to speak would conclude in another storytelling 
which begins, goes on for some time and then ends. They are "tempters" (The 
Unnamable, 296). They are the variations of the temptation of making an end. 
From time to time there are enumerations of "them": the names of the speakers 
(narrators) and actors ("heroes") of previous Beckett works are usually men-
tioned together with names invented in situ or with some remark, which suggests 
that there could be a countless add-on to these. 
In The Unnamable emerges the name of Mahood (first he is named Basil) 
who seems to be the storyteller of storytellers: a generalized variation of the previ-
ous ones (the suffix "-hood" points in this direction) and the most individualistic 
("Ma-": the reversed "am" of "I am") among them at once. "He" may be described 
as the inner personification of the faculty of imagination, or of invention. He is 
isolated: he is a hairless head locked up in ajar in a chop-house near the shambles. 
He "heaped stories on" the [speaker's] head (283). The speaker "always liked not 
knowing"; Mahood "didn't know either, but it worried him." Their voices mingled 
with each other. The speaker is uncertain whether Mahood's voice is present at the 
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time when he (the speaker) speaks. He hopes that "it will disappear one day", 
"completely". From time to time the speaker has to realize that the voice speaking 
is not [his] own voice, however hard [he] tries to hear and speak in [his] own 
voice, that is to go silent at last. [It] would be a life at last.27 
The vice-exister Malone in the previous part of the Trilogy tried hard to 
report his own death. Malone is a mutilated variant of "I'm alone". That is, [he] 
is the isolated [subject] without I. The [ego] in its nakedness and closeness. Near 
the end of [his] soliloquy [he] says: "I am being given, if I may venture the 
expression, birth to into death, such is my impression. The feet are clear already, 
of the great cunt of existence. [...] My story ended I'll be living yet. Promising 
lag. I shall say I no more "(Malone Dies, 260) Through a (re)birth [he] has been 
purged from the dirt "of the great cunt of existence" (in case you read the sen-
tence without paying attention to the seemingly redundant colon). Or, to venture 
the expression of the impression, the feet are clear enough for "the great cunt of 
existence".28 The meaning is shifting without arriving at any fixable point. A 
double-negation: neither existence nor inexistence (in existence). "My story 
ended I'll be living yet." Malone survives [his] story. Malone survives [his] 
soliloquy. Or the end of the story of Malone makes it possible to live. "That is 
the end of me. I shall say I no more." That is the end of Malone saying I. Or that 
is the end of I saying Malone, of I saying Malone as I. Instead of this the 
[unnamable] says I. ("I, say I. Unbelieving." (The Unnamable, 267)) The voice 
in [me] says I. Would that mean that there are no stories left at last? 
The anonymous speaker sets out with the following questions in the IV. 
text for nothing: "Where would I go, if I could go, who would I be, if I could be, 
what would I say, if I had a voice, who says this, saying it's me?" (Texts for 
Nothing, 22) The I who is "the same old stranger as ever" (ibidem) is expected 
to speak. It is possible that [it] is even the I who says the following: 
There's my life, why not, it is one, if you like, if you must, I don't 
say no this evening. There has to be one, it seems, once there is 
speech, no need of a story, a story is not compulsory, just a life, that's 
27 "I am doing my best, and failing again, yet again. I don't mind failing, it's a pleasure, 
but I want to go silent. Not just as now, the better to listen, but peacefully, victorious, 
without ulterior object. Then it would be a life worth having, a life at last." (The 
Unnamable, 284) Cf. "peacefully, victorious" with the pseudonym of the author of 
Either/Or: Victor Eremita (i.e. the victorious hermit, victorious in hermitage). 
28 Grammatically there is a third possible interpretation but I do not see yet the point in 
understanding the passage as "the feet of « the great cunt of existence» are «clear 
already»". However, that is a legitimate alternative. And maybe it is not accidental that 
the word "cunt" provides a rather blasphemous association: it has the same string of 
sounds as that of the name "Kant". Open for suggestions. 
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the mistake I made, one of the mistakes, to have wanted a story for 
myself, whereas life alone is enough. (Texts for Nothing, 24) 
Life alone is enough. The most compressed combination of (not solely 
artistic) minimalism and maximalism. 1. It is enough to ("merely") live, to stay 
alive, as it were, there is no need of anything (least of all a story): it would be a 
luxury to have anything else. 2. Life alone is enough and nothing else will do 
instead of [it], anything else (most of all a story) is vain and useless. (3) To live 
alone is enough; to live with someone else, to live somewhere else, to live later 
or before will not do, it would be futile. 
These alternatives do not disclose each other at all On the contrary, they 
deepen the consequences of one another. These alternatives do not occur one 
after the other, but at the same time which is not time: from time to time. The 
text ends as follows: 
Yes, there are moments, like this moment, when I seem almost 
restored to the feasible. Then it goes, all goes, and I'm far again, 
with a far story again, I wait for me afar for my story to begin, to 
end, and again this voice cannot be mine. That's where I'd go, if I 
could go, that's who I'd be, if I could be. (Texts for Nothing, 24-5) 
The speaker of the last two rhythmically rhyming or repetitive29 sentences 
has a voice that cannot be [his] voice. The fragment "this voice cannot be mine" 
is enhanced as it does not contain any rhyming or repetitive feature which would 
connect it to the other parts. It is enhanced by virtue of an absence, bereavement. 
It could be considered an aside - a shifting of the mould of the speaking subject 
which requires a shift in the receiving subject. Semantically-logically speaking 
this fragment is a negation. To negate the negation in logic means to affirm 
(~~P=P). 
But these are, so to speak, heterogeneous negations (the absence of the 
rhyming quality of the expression and the logical negation); negations on differ-
ent planes (the acoustic and the intellectual). Between the planes there lives "this 
moment" which is already gone and have not come yet. From time to time [it] 
"seem almost" present - in the condition of bereftness and absence. [It], i.e. this 
concentrated temporal mock-category of eternity and timelessness, of a never-
291 italicize the rhyming syllables, the repetitions: "Then it goes, all goes, and I'm far 
again, with a far story again, I wait for me afar for my story to begin, to end, and again 
this voice cannot be mine." The interrelations: goes - goes; far - a far - (for) - afar -
(for); again - again - (be)gin - (a)gain; end - and. 
76 
happened past and never-to-come future is what creates a mock-presence, a 
quasi-eternity that makes it possible to go on.30 
VI. 
(eternity; to know life: knowledge/life) 
6.4311 [...] If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal 
duration but timelessnes, then eternal life belongs to 
those who live in the present. 
Our life has no end in just the way in which our visual 
field has no limits. 
6.4312 Not only there is no guarantee of the temporal immor- • 
tality of the human soul, that is to say of its eternal 
survival after death; but, in any case, this assumption 
completely fails to accomplish the purpose for which it 
has always been intended. [... ] The solution of the riddle 
of life in space and time lies outside space and time. 
6.45 To view the world sub specie aetemi is to view it as a 
whole - a limited whole. 
Feeling the world as a limited whole - it is this that is 
mystical. 
(It is easy to see in these passages the immense influence of the thought of 
Immanuel Kant and Arthur Schopenhauer - but these formulations are radically 
agnostic as opposed to theirs. For instance 6.4312 denies the imperative power 
of intellectual postulates.) Outside space and time you live when you receive the 
worldview sub specie aeterni. From [here] the limited totality of the factual 
world becomes clear. [It] is life in an eminent sense - a potentially infinite life as 
opposed to the limitedness of the world. Conceiving life in this sense cannot 
guarantee any comforting end in advance. Contemplated from this point of view 
30 Cf. my considerations with some of the "few general remarks" (267) at the outset of 
The Unnamable: "Perhaps that is how it began. You think you are simply resting, the 
better to act when the times comes, or for no reason, and you soon find yourself 
powerless ever to do anything again. No matter how it happened. It, say it, not knowing 
what. [...] What am I to do, what shall I do, what should I do, in my situation, how 
proceed? By aporia pure and simple? Or by affirmations and negations invalidated as 
uttered, or sooner or later? Generally speaking. There must be other shifts. [...]" 
(ibidem) 
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the world has an end but not life. We cannot foresee our end - that is a matter of 
absolute uncertainty. Life cannot foresee its end as/thus it has none. [It] sees the 
end of the world of space and time (the world of Kant's transcendental 
aesthetics). [It] is essentially eschatological and archaeological at the same time 
which is not time; from time to time. 
Life is not a picture and cannot be put into words (6.522). Briefly, [it] is 
not spatiotemporal and thus essentially non-empirical. [It] resists articulation. 
[It] is mystical. To articulate any proposition on [it] falls short of giving a picture 
of [it]. [It] cannot be, so to speak, factualized. The plane of knowing (natural 
sciences), the epistemological quest is entirely irrelevant to this [problem]. From 
[here] the ultimate indifference of the world of facts becomes clear. And it 
seems that [it] requires or commands silence (7). 
"Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death." 
(6.4311) "So too at death the world does not alter, but comes to an end." (6.431) 
Death designates the end of the world and not that of life. Death and sub specie 
aeterni is what is essentially non-empirical. Death is, so to speak, an infinite end. 
The inconceivable concept of death always remains outside or beyond any sys-
tematic vision, even if the system is built on a speculative imaginative concept 
of death (or of God, or of life, etc.). 
It is clear that there are no valid claims against nihilism, atheism and scepti-
cism because themselves have no valid claims in those [fields] where they imagine 
themselves to trespass. This is not a [field] for any valuable (sensible) claims. 
Scepticism tries to propose negations on the inexpressible. 
6.51 Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when 
it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked. 
For doubt can exist only where a question exists, a question 
only where an answer exists, and an answer only where 
something can be said. 
In case you try to solve everything by means of the epistemological 
quest, scepticism must seem to be irrefutable, for its formal logic can be just as 
perfect as that of Thomas Aquinas and the five or six ways to demonstrate the 
existence of God. A solid, fixed ground is presupposed (even if not articulated) 
in both of them. And this solid fixed ground is system-inherent: it can be 
contained in a vision. 
But on perfect ground motion and thought is essentially impossible - there 
is no friction. The all-containing, captivating vision lacks the source of outer 
resistance, of friction - or rather it imagines to have contained this resistance 
into itself. They - scepticism and the God-demonstrations - both speak directly 
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about what is unspeakable; and they remain completely intact by one another 
and become somewhat prison-like in themselves. 
Descartes compares "the moral writings of the ancient pagans to the most 
proud and magnificent palaces built on nothing but sand and mud." (31) He 
"considered that nodiing solid could have been built on such shifting founda-
tions." (32) Shifting foundations mean here the foundations of any philosophy 
before Christianity. Descartes reports that he himself "had always had an 
extreme desire to learn to distinguish true from false in order to see clearly into" 
his "own actions and to walk with safety in this life." (33) He strives to root out 
all the prejudices and errors from his mind during his travels. "Not that, in so 
doing, I imitated the sceptics who doubt only for doubting's sake, and affect to 
be always undecided; for, on the contrary, my whole plan had for its aim assur-
ance and rejection of shifting ground and sand in order to find rock or clay." (50) 
A solid ground is what is needed to walk with safety in this life. Thus 
Descartes's project is to demonstrate the existence of God to acquire such a 
ground - God, whose existence is the precondition of any demonstration, of any 
utterance, according to his (Descartes's) own account. However successful he 
considers himself in this project, the closing remark of the Sixth Meditation can be 
telling about whether that solid ground is always at hand in concreto. "But because 
the necessities of action often oblige us to make a decision before we have had the 
leisure to examine things so carefully, it must be admitted that the life of man is 
very often subject to error in particular cases; and we must, in conclusion, 
recognize the infirmity and weakness of our nature." (169, italics mine.) 
All the same: it should not be forgotten that even if the concept of God for 
Descartes becomes the part of the all-containing vision, the concept itself is 
strictly indefinite. It follows from this that the theological-dogmatic-metaphysi-
cal debates about the imagined features of the inconceivable and inexpressible 
and the origins of the world (the "cosmological ideas") are being already seen as 
completely futile long before Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. It seems that the 
attempted demonstration of the existence par excellence decidedly does not 
intend or imagine itself capable of telling anything concerning the nature of this 
existence. The XXVI. Section in the 1st book of the Principia about the infinite 
and the indefinite will not allow a more definite or confident way of "demon-
stration". This section is about "[tjhat it is not needful to essay to comprehend 
the infinite, but merely to hold all that in which we can find no limits as indefi-
nite, such as the extension of the world, the divisibility of the parts of matter, the 
number of the stars, etc." 
We will thus never embarrass ourselves by disputes about the 
infinite, seeing it would be absurd for us who are finite to undertake 
to determine anything regarding it, and thus as it were limit it by 
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endeavouring to comprehend it. We will accordingly give ourselves 
no concern to reply to those who demand whether the half of an 
infinite line is also infinite, and whether an infinite number is even 
or odd, and the like, because it is only such as imagine their minds 
to be infinite who seem bound to entertain questions of this sort.31 
The weakness and infirmity of our nature will show the enterprises to 
define the essentially infinite not only as excessive but also as futile or even 
damaging. To preserve this in mind during our thinking and speculations is not a 
question of "Cartesianism" or "anti-Cartesianism". And often it is too easily 
forgotten that the "apostle" of Reason accentuates the necessary limitations of 
this otherwise important faculty and does not at all treat it as an indubitable 
authority.32 
At any rate, the consciousness of the infirmity and weakness of the human 
nature (rather than the successful demonstration of the existence preconditioning 
demonstrations) is the aspect which a quasi-Cartesian or quasi-anti-Cartesian 
thinker, Blaise Pascal preserves and emphasises. His interpretation of Descartes 
is very close to that of Beckett. Pascal preserves the constant threat of nihilism 
or scepticism (he calls it Pyrrhonism) on logical discourse. For him it is not 
dependent on the mind's judgement whether thought proceeds on solid ground 
or sand. 
But it is impossible that God should ever be the end, if He is not 
the beginning. We lift our eyes high, but lean upon the sand; and 
the earth will dissolve, and we shall fall whilst looking at the 
heavens. (488)33 
In writing down my thought, it sometimes escapes me; but this 
makes me remember my weakness, that I constantly forget. This is 
as instructive to me as my forgotten thought; for I strive only to 
know my nothingness. (372) 
31 René Descartes. The Principles of Philosophy, excerpts. (Trans. John Veitch). 
Available at: http://www.classicallibrary.org/descartes/principles/ 
32 There are tendencies to view Beckett's texts either as Cartesian or more often as anti-
Cartesian projects. I see both of these trends as very narrowly reductive. It is not useful 
to ignore the constantly interweaving motion of pros and cons, of quasi-pros and quasi-
cons which is a structuring force of most of his texts. And it is even less useful to ignore 
that these texts carefully avoid to demonstrate or to refute anything whatsoever. 
33 Blaise Pascal. Pensées. (Trans. W. F. Trotter.) Available on: 
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/pascal/pensees 
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To lean on sand is a determinant condition and not a matter of choice. Our 
sole existential certainty, death, is essential uncertainty, (cf. Augustine, Solilo-
quies, II. 13) The epistemological quest is not primordial. The weakness and 
infirmity of forgetfulness, of not-knowing is qualitatively instructive. 
It is a philosophy which at the outset discards demonstrated and proved 
existence. (Its aim is rather to become contemporary with existence, with life, 
while and by constantly reminding itself about the absurdity of this project: it is 
impossible to become contemporary with what pre-structurates time and space.) 
To encounter with the indifference of the factual world and the I-saying subject 
to what is "higher" by leaning exactly on them. 
Thomas Bernhard's formulation in Gehen "gegen die Tatsachen zu exist-
ieren"34 is a compressed expression of this condition. It can cover the following 
meanings: 1) to exist against facts; 2) to exist in direction to facts; 3) to exist in 
relation to facts. But there still remains an illuminating feature of the word 
"gegen": its rhyming with the title Gehen. To exist from facts, to exist towards 
facts, to exist against facts and to go on indeed seems to be the most complicated 
art - it is not art anymore but life. 
VII. 
(to experience life: pain and joy; the blessedness of absence) 
Strictly speaking, in our determinate purgatorial position, or rather stream 
of life we could not have the slightest idea about experiencing Inferno and Para-
diso. We have their concepts nevertheless. And we must have their hints. 
The two extreme values of experience, pain and joy are concepts without 
objective measurable evidence. The expressions of pain and joy can always be 
pretended or imitated, and it is impossible to have unambiguous criteria deter-
mining their genuineness. At any rate we always tiy to make a decision 
concerning their genuineness. 
The main difficulty arises from our imagining the experience (the 
pain, for instance) as a thing, for which of course we have a name 
and whose concept is therefore quite easy to grasp. 
34 Thomas Bernhard. Gehen. Suhrkamp Frankfurt Verlag, 1977 (1971). p. 12 
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So we always want to say: We know what "pain" means (namely 
this), and so the difficulty only consists in simply not being able to 
determine this in someone else in certainty. What we don't see is 
that the concept 'pain' is only beginning to be investigated. The 
same is true of pretence.35 
So our making a decision does not rest on a fixed concept of pain. It is the 
indeterminacy inscribed in the possibility of making decisions in such cases that 
marks the beginning of the concept's investigation. The indeterminacy is condi-
tionally essential here; it will never be abolished. Even if we try to imagine that 
it would be possible to define in each case the genuineness of pain by a detector, 
the criteria of pretence and pain would change but the indeterminacy would stay. 
Could a legislator abolish the concept of pain? 
The basic concepts are interwoven so closely with what is most . 
fundamental in our way of living that they are therefore unassail-
able. (Last Writings, 43e-44e) 
The most fundamental and indefinite concepts are unassailable not at all 
because of their objective certainty (these concepts condition the possibility of 
objective certainty) but as their conceivable indeterminacy is indispensable for our 
way of living to be maintained; it makes it possible to go on. 
Fear, pain and joy are "primitive" and unspeakable relations. Their con-
cepts are necessarily indefinite and indeterminate. The behaviour or the expres-
sion of pain, of fear and of joy (facial features, groaning, screaming, smiling, 
crying, etc.) are signs and parts of their concepts, but even a (still unimaginable) 
total list of these parts could not determine schematically our concept. One is 
tempted to say that the remaining unspeakable private experience (of pain, for 
instance) is what is essential to it. What is essential remains silent. 
536. I may know that he is in pain, but I never know the exact degree 
of his pain. So here is something that he knows and that his 
expression of pain does not tell me. Something purely private. 
He knows exactly how severe his pain is? (Isn't that much as if 
one were to say he always knows exactly where he is? Namely 
here.) Is the concept of the degree given with the pain? (Zettel) 
35 Ludwig Wittgenstein. Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology. Vol. 2. (Trans. 
C. G. Luckhardt and Maximilian A.E. Aue.) Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. 43e. 
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What can be named essential here is not a question of measurable know-
ledge. That is, what remains private and untold is not knowable even for the 
person experiencing the pain. (In case it would be knowable it would be tellable 
too.) But what he can tell and express to us is all linked with his pain (or joy, or 
fear, etc.). Our response to these signs will not basically rest on a thought out 
decision we make concerning the genuineness of the signs. In a way, our 
reaction will reflect (again in a private way, of course) the "primitiveness" and 
inexpressibility of its source. 
541. But what is the word "primitive" meant to say here? Presumably that this 
sort of behaviour is pre-linguistic: that a language-game is based on it, 
that it is the prototype of a way of thinking and not the result of thought. 
[...] 
543. My relation to the appearances here is part of my concept. (Zettel) 
This essentially indefinite indeterminate concept is not the outcome of a 
well-built speculation (in fact it is the lay of the possibility of any architectonic 
speculation), but what foremostly determines my way of acting and speaking. 
These concepts are constantly in motion and what is presumably constant in 
them cannot be fixed by thought, cannot be put into words. 
* * 
The delight I take in my thoughts is delight in my own strange life. 
Is this joy of living? (Culture and Value, 22e) 
But we don't have the feeling that someone who sees no problem in 
life is blind to something important, even to the most important 
thing of all? Don't I feel like saying that a man like that is just liv-
ing aimlessly - blindly, like a mole, and that if only he could see, 
he would see the problem? 
Or shouldn't I say rather: a man who lives rightly won't experience 
the problem as sorrow, so for him it will not be a problem, but a joy 
rather; in other words for him it will be a bright halo round his life, 
not a dubious background. (CV, 27e) 
The [problem] of life is not an unseen background which should be dis-
covered in order to comprehend [it]. You can only, so to speak, unthink the 
unthinkable and unspeak the unspeakable. That is, the epistemological quest has 
no access to [it]; the ineffability is the strictest possible. [It] is the ground on 
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which thought-unthought and say-unsay could move. But not necessarily a 
background. [It] is constantly present in its absence. 
May this un/thought be the joy of living (Lebensfreude)? This question is 
curiously senseless as it is not possible to answer it - either affirmation or nega-
tion would fall short of approximating the [problem]. 
To explain the unutterable joy - what does that mean? Does it 
mean to explain that it is this and that? In that case, the predicate 
"unutterable" becomes just a rhetorical predicate, a strong expres-
sion, and the like. The explaining jack-of-all-trades has everything 
in readiness before the beginning of the performance, and now it 
begins. He dupes the listener; he calls the joy unutterable, and then 
a new surprise, a truly surprising surprise - he utters it. Suppose 
that the unutterable joy is based upon the contradiction that an 
existing human being is composed of the infinite and the finite, is 
situated in time, so that the joy of the eternal in him becomes unut-
terable because he is existing; it becomes a supreme drawing of 
breath that cannot take shape, because the existing person is exist-
ing. In that case, the explanation would be that it is unutterable; it 
cannot be anything else - no nonsense. If, however, a profound 
person first condemns someone or other who denies that there is an 
unutterable joy and then says: No, I assume that there is an unutter-
able joy, but I go further and utter it, then he is only making a fool 
of himself, and the only difference between him and the other 
whom he condemns is that the other is more honest and direct and 
says what the profound person is also saying, since they both are 
saying essentially the same thing.36 
To preserve the unutterable unutterable is to prevent [it] to be uttered 
either affirmatively or negatively, to leave it out from the game of demonstration 
and refutation. Demonstration and refutation says essentially the same thing. Not 
that [it] can become object of any of these. But it is the most tempting for logic 
to go further and to imagine surpassing into the [prelogic], to imagine envel-
oping the [prelogic] into itself. 
Despite the clear limitations of logic one has to remind oneself again and 
again that the affirmation and the negation, the demonstration and the refutation 
of a fact concerns the same fact. Negation can not add anything to the fact. 
36 Johannes Climacus (Soren Kierkegaard), Concluding Postscript, 221. 
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4.621 But it is important that the signs 'p' and '~p' can say the same 
thing. For it shows that nothing in reality corresponds to the 
sign'-'. 
The occurrence of negation in a proposition is not enough to 
characterize its sense (—p = p). 
The propositions 'p' and '~p' have opposite sense, but there 
corresponds to them one and the same reality. 
Affirmation and negation, and consequently demonstration and refutation 
can not say anything in a philosophical sense; i.e. they are analytic judgements in 
the Kantian sense which are not able to extend our knowledge but at best to clarify 
and arrange the propositions already at hand. 
Malone loses his stick with which hitherto he has been able to draw the 
things near to himself (that is analogous to the process of losing the linguistic tools 
with which to utter constative statements). He tends to conceive it as a catastrophe. 
But while meditating on the nature of this loss, he comprehends what the stick 
meant to him, and understands the essential "Stick, shorn of all its accidents" 
(Malone Dies, 233). So he discerns in the catastrophe a "blessing in disguise". 'To 
know you can do better the next time, unrecognizably better, and that there is no 
next time, and it is a blessing there is not, there is a thought to be going on with." 
(ibidem.) The (un)thought of the possibility of an unrecognizable capability is a 
blessing to go on. It is a blessing that there is no next time. Or it is a blessing there 
is not - a blessing present in virtue of its absence. The "blessedness of absence" 
(204). A silent blessedness granting a thought to be going on with. 
A "thought to be going on with." To know. But what is essential about 
silence is that "in the silence you don't know" (The Unnamable, 382). To know 
is incommensurable with the condition of silence. Silence is not knowable. 
My voice. The voice. I hardly know it any more. I'm going silent. 
Hearing this voice no more, that's what I call going silent. That is 
to say I'll hear it still, if I listen hard. I'll listen hard. Listening 
hard, that's what I call going silent. I'll hear it still, broken, faint, 
unintelligible, if I listen hard. Hearing it still, without hearing what 
it says, that's what I call going silent. (The Unnamable, 362) 
The definitions weaken each other and thus strengthen the resolution to 
go silent. From the growing void of the attempted circumscribing of "going 
silent" yields the resolution to hear. An infinitely interested direction towards the 
voice, the other, you. 
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The most intensive inwardness turns out to be preconditioned by an 
unrecognizable exteriority. [It] is a small rotunda named Yonder, or which is 
somewhere yonder, beyond something (291; the rotunda reappears in Imagi-
nation Dead Imagine) from where and to where I proceed, where I am from time 
to time. You, Yonder, beyond would be the blessed place called home. The 
memory of that home, which is not a memory, the hope of that home, which is 
not a hope (i.e. these are not cognitive categories) is what makes to go on, to 
think and to speak possible. 
...but how can you think and speak at the same time, without a 
special gift, your thoughts wander, your words too, far apart, no, 
that's an exaggeration, apart, between them would be the place to be, 
where you suffer, rejoice, at being bereft of speech, bereft of thought, 
and feel nothing, hear nothing, know nothing, say nothing, are 
nothing, that would be a blessed place to be, where you are. (344) 
The absolute exterior you would be the blessed place. My infinite process 
towards you is blessed; its indeterminacy is what is the form of the blessedness. I 
can never get assurance whether I proceed closer or further. [It] is outside the 
game of certainty and uncertainty; [it] makes that game playable. 
This indicates an ontology which is not onto logy: TO OV is to be blessed to 
go on. The closing word of The Unnamable is "on". This word ends with a nasal 
close-plosive consonant "n" (as well as the Greek word for "being" or "is" (Sein): 
ov, and as well as the Sanskrit sacred "meaningless" word OM). Thus die phonic 
ending suggests closeness, a self-devouring discourse. And the you becomes I 
again ("you must go on, I can't go on"). But the meaning of the closing remarks: 
"it will be I, it will be the silence, where I am, I don't know, I'll never know, in the 
silence you don't know, you must go on, I can't go on, I'll go on" work against the 
closeness; these remarks suggest an inconclusiveness, a process unfinished, 
openness. The semantic plays itself against the phonic, and vice versa. It is given 
for us to go on, and not to know, and it is a blessing that it is so. 
[To understand] life, to live means not merely to resign myself to the fact 
that I can never understand life but to take this fact as a blessing, a gift The 
sentences of Wittgenstein strive against the fact that it is impossible to under-
stand the other, you. Against the facts, "gegen die Tatsachen zu existieren" is 
indeed the most difficult and tiresome art as it is clearly beyond art. "The diffi-
culty in philosophy is to say no more than we know." (Wittgenstein, The Blue 
and Brown Books, 45) Philosophizing becomes the [art] of resisting the tempta-
tion of my numerous possible speakers and actors; it is an infinite means to catch 
up with life which is possessed by all of us and which possesses all of us. 
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[Here] art falls short and remains silent, is silenced - and art cannot give 
form to the silence itself but can only clarify its relation to the silence. Silence 
yields potentially infinite poetic and philosophical exuberance. [It] limits and thus 
creates and structures art's scope and playground again and again. And thus [it] 
requires to pronounce from time to time: here now I stop. 
Or there is no other choice. Silencing my voice I stopped at any rate, but 
there is nothing that can assure me that it was the right moment. And stopping 




THE CONTINUITY OF INTERPRETATION 
THE SEMIOTIC AND POETIC FUNCTIONS OF THE MISE EN 
ABYME IN PAUL AUSTER'S THE MUSIC OF CHANCE 
The iconic notion of the mise en abyme has been that of incessant semiotic 
inquiry since its first introduction in literary discourse by André Gide's Journal 
for 1893. 
„(... ) what would explain better what I'd wanted to do (... ) would be 
a comparison with the device from heraldry that involves putting a 
second representation of the original shield „en abyme" within it."1 
This heraldic concept, originally put into print in Claude-Edmonde Magny's 
Histoire du roman français depuis 1918, was chosen as an emblem and instrument 
of interpretation owing to the fact that its characteristics represent, mirror a certain 
visual or textual structure both intensively and extensively. Its evolution into the 
Peircean counterpart of the Saussurean unicorn may explain its popularity and 
controversial nature. This paper aims at highlighting certain contexts in the 
semiosis of mise en abyme in Paul Auster's The Music of Chance (1990) and by 
the same token attempts at exploring the narrative function of 'the shield within 
the shield'. Before examining the significance of the City of World (a miniature 
scale-model of a particular estate in Pennsylvania), it is necessary to revise some 
aspects in the general understanding of this paradoxical iconic device. 
The unique position mise en abyme occupies in present day critical liter-
ary thinking is rooted not simply in post-modern preoccupation with self-
reflexivity and mirror images but also in the semiotic problems this structure 
poses to scholars of the field. The deductive logical paradox inherent in its semi-
otic workings makes the mise en abyme an ostentatious example for the text's 
capacity to signify a point outside of its own universe. While critical thinking 
seems to have no aesthetic objections to repetition in the postmodern idea of 
'the copy of a copy of a copy... ',2 the situation in the case of 'the copy on a copy 
on a copy' may be somewhat different. It is absolutely evident that the Saus-
1 Gide, A. 1967. Journals 1889-1949. Hammondsworth: Penguin, p 30. 
2 The set of illustrative examples could range from Erik Satie's serial music through 
Andy Warhol to contemporary pop culture. 
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surean insistence on the arbitrariness of signification can hardly accept the stress 
laid on mimetic functions of a form representing itself within the boundaries of 
the antecedent structure. Accused of displaying limited isomorphism and blamed 
for the futility of infinite regress and duplication, the concept of 'the shield 
within the shield' raises questions concerning the divisions and subdivisions in 
the Peircean apparatus of iconicity, which, in turn, chases us back to the problem 
of signs being motivated or inherently symbolic in nature. Peirce considers the 
metaphoric nature and symbolic iconicity of any given language system primor-
dial and essential. In this respect (barring pure symbols) language is described as 
one entirely built on symbolic icons and symbolic indices, a typology that under-
lines the conventionality of the relationship between sign and object. On the 
grounds of this very system, one might even come to the conclusion that the 
mise en abyme is an indexical (having an existential connection with its object) 
icon (resembling, partaking in the characters of the denotatum). Are we to call it 
then a symbolic indexical icon (all three in one) so as to maintain the Saussurean 
premise and the Peircean description? 
This daunting question was explored by Olga Fischer and Max Nanny, who 
set up a dichotomy that differentiated between two distinct modes of signification, 
namely endophoric and exophoric iconicity.3 Exophoric iconicity stands for the 
traditional concept of 'form miming meaning' whereas its counterpart, 'the 
endophoric' is based on the idea of 'form miming form.'4 Since the latter type 
describes sequence of elements operating in parallel on the same level, the 
symbolic principle of iconicity is reaffirmed here. A further consequence to this 
argumentation determines the autonomy of self-reference as the essence of 
literature, i.e. reference over depiction, existence over mimesis and meaning. The 
advantage of such classification emerges in the way this system renders the 
arbitrary equation of signifier versus signified and the iconicity of signification 
into two distinct categories, and so erases the conflict of exclusiveness. 
Once this intra-lingual, endophoric mode of signification has been estab-
lished, we may turn towards the rather vertiginous paradox of 'regression ad 
infinitum', which is present in the mise en abyme. Being the most opaque and at 
once the most transparent moment in the plot, this synecdoche, this structural 
point appears to be a narrative equivalent of J. Hillis Milller's linguistic moment. 
3 Form Miming Meaning. Iconicity in Language and Literature (Benjamins 1990) 
4 The emphasis laid on the intra-lingual aspect of signification results in the extended 
interpretation of the stock example 'veni, vidi, vici ' assigning greater importance to the 
diagrammatic nature of iconicity over its imagic characteristic. Despite the phonological 
considerations (the gradual loss of sonority along with the repetition of phonemes 
expressing Cesar's rapid, intrepid offensive) it is the topology of the phrase that contains 
co-references, thus reinforcing the metaphoric arbitrariness of signification. 
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The "proliferation of figures" as Dällenbach describes it5 is but a hole in the 
information-bearing sign system.6 In effect, the machinery of gradual layering 
becomes a dynamic act with a result that could be best compared to an ever-
diminishing palimpsest. The vertigo of possible synecdochic, hipertextual 
interconnections, the blackhole of metonymic, lateral thinking. Regression and 
progression ad infinitum. 
The protagonists of The Music of Chance, Nashe ( a you-have-to-lose-
yourself-to-find-yourself Don Quixote) and Pozzi the Jackpot (a poker wizard 
Sancho Panza) visit Flower and Stone (doubles, Doppelgänger), two eccentric, 
lottery-winning millionaires in their luxurious mansion to skin them in a game of 
poker. As expected, Pozzi's magic touch with the cards works perfectly but sud-
denly fails them when Nashe-roaming the rooms of the building-inadvertantly 
removes the models of his hosts from the City of World, the Utopian miniature 
scale-model universe constructed by Stone. From then on they loose 10.000 
dollars more than everything they had and finally become prisoners in the omi-
nous confinement of the Four Realms. 
"The room was much larger than Nashe had imagined it would be, 
a place almost bamlike dimensions. With its high transparent 
ceiling and a pale wooden floor, it seemed to be all openness and 
light, as if it were a room suspended in the middle of air. (...) The 
only (...) object in the room was an enormous platform that stood, 
in the center of the floor, covered with what seemed to be a 
miniature scale-model rendering of a city." (my italics)7 
The space encapsulating the mise en abyme is described here as the white 
space of signification, where the inevitable laws and forces of semiosis are sus-
pended in mid air. This paragraph announces not simply a suspension of dis-
belief for the sake of narrative argument, but also the subversion of any kind 
belief in systematic cohesion. The center of the mise en abyme could not be any 
more dead then this. This is the transparent vortex of signification. 
5 Dallenbach, L. 1989. The Mirror in the Text. Oxford: Polity. 
6 If the miniaturised version of shield 'B' is placed (mise) in the abyss, in the dead center 
(en abym) of shield 'A' (supposing that shield 'A' is a replica of shield B'), then shield 
'B' occupying and covering a certain territory and thus modifying the structure of shield 
'A' will formulate an image of shield 'C' (i.e. 'A' containing 'B'), which, in turn, will 
have to contain a presentation of shield 'D' displaying shield 'C' in the center and so on. 
7 Auster, P. 1990. The Music of Chance. New Yoik: Penguin, pp. 79. From now on the 
reference is 'MC\ 
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"It is called the City of World," (...) "I like working on it," Stone 
said, smiling tentatively. "It's the way I'd like the world to look 
Everything happens at once." 
"Willie's city is more than just a toy," Flower said, "it's an artistic 
vision of mankind. In one way, it's an autobiography, but in 
another way, it's what you might call a Utopia - a place where the 
past and future come together, where good finally triumphs over 
evil. If you look carefully, you'll see that many of the figures 
represent Willie himself. There, in the playground, you see him as a 
child. Over there, you see him grinding lenses in his shop as a 
grown man. There, on the comer of that street, you see the two of 
us buying the lottery ticket. His wife and parents are buried in the 
cemetery over here, but there they are again, hovering as angels 
over the house. That's what you might call the private backdrop, 
the personal material, the inner component." (my italics)8 
By way of displaying representations of the author in the artifice, the 
model as a simulacrum directs its vertical extensions both outwards and inwards. 
The result is an endless chain of 'prime' movers creating an infinite number of 
universes. Relying on the medieval tradition of representing the diachronic 
through the synchronic, the mise en abyme also spreads horizontally along the 
time line. The prophetic function in the préfigurations of the author fades into 
downright mockery, once you catch the satiric tone of the amatourish mental 
note in the last sentence. 
"But all these things are put in a larger context. They're merely an 
example, an illustration of one man's journey through the City of 
the World. Look at the Hall of Justice, the Library, the Bank, and 
the Prison. Willie calls them the Four Realms of Togetherness, and 
each one plays a vital role in maintaining the harmony of the city. 
If you look at the Prison, you'll see that all prisoners are working 
happily at various tasks, that they all have smiles on their faces. 
That's because they're all glad they've been punished for their 
crimes, and now they're learning how to recover the goodness 
within them through hard work. (...) Evil still exists, but the 
powers who rule over the city have figured out how to transform 
that evil back into good. Wisdom reigns here, but the struggle is 
nevertheless constant, and great vigilance is required of all the 
8MC p. 79 
citizens - each of whom carries the entire city within himself 
William Stone is a great artist, gentlemen (...)." (my italics)9 
This rather distopian then Utopian vision of protestant providence serves 
didactic purposes, the message represented by the entire scenery is inprinted in 
each of the participants - according to the saint augustian tenet of a system 
incorporating a larger system within itself. 
"Stone looked up, stared at the empty space space for a moment, and 
then smiled in contemplation of the work that lay ahead of him. (...)" 
"I'm thinking about doing a separate model of this.room. I'd have 
to be in it, of course, which means that I would also have to build 
another City of the World. A smaller one, a second city to fit inside 
the room within the room." 
"You mean the model of the model?" Nashe said. 
"Yes, a model of the model. But I have to finish everything else 
first. It would be the last element, a thing to add at the very end." 
"Nobody could make anything so small," Pozzi said, looking at 
Stone as though he were insane. "You'd go blind trying to do a 
thing like that. (...)" 
"But if you did a model of the model," Nashe said, "then 
theoretically you'd have to do an even smaller model of that model. 
A model of the model of the model. It could go on forever."10 (my 
italics) 
The description of the model merging a microcosm with the macrocosm 
folds into several directions covering all of the five interpretative fields inherent 
in the mise en abyme: 
- the prophetic meaning, prefiguration (representing the diachronic through a 
synchronic model), 
- the didactic meaning (preaching normative morality, evil becoming good), 
- the satirical effect (protestant vigilance,11 smiling inmates in a concentration 
camp, mockery autobiographical material, the "blind" optician as an artist, art as 
life), 
- the cognitive meaning (self-reflexivity, regression ad infinitum, duplication 
and triplication, art as work-in-progress), and 
9MC p. 80 
10 MC p. 81. 
11 The prisoners of the inmates in the City of the World are guarded by 'Calvin'. 
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- the mystical, magical control (transparency, whiteness, lévitation, the uncanny, 
which makes the familiar strange, the strange familiar, Nashe destroying the 
puppets of power).12 
In the 'Partial Magic in the Quixote ™ Borges ruminates on the possible 
effects generated by the presence of a mise en abyme, and arrives at the 
conclusion that the fascination of the beholder watching a character becoming a 
spectator (as in Hamlet, Don Quixote, The Arnolfini Marriage by van Eyck or in 
several Borges short stories) is rooted in the sensation that he himself may well be 
just as fictious in character. The blending of epistemological interrogations with 
ontological statuses destabilizes the arbitrary and this way static relationship 
between signified and signifier. In Peircean terms the process of signification is a 
threefold system divided into object, interprétant and representamen.14 This 
system places the focus on the role of the interprétant, due to its function to 
interpret the object as dynamical (a real thing on which an idea is based) or 
immediate (the idea of a cognized object). As Greenlee commenting on Peirce put 
it: "the possession of an interprétant [is] the essential condition of signification."15 
When the workings of semiosis are pushed to the extremes, to its very 
limits, the seemingly stable role of the interprétant starts unfolding in this loop-
hole of exegesis. If the ontological position of the self becomes undecidable 
within the framework of infinitely multiplying surfaces and identities, it is the 
continuity of interpretation that offers an epistemological paradigm and guaran-
tees the linguistic existence of the disintegrating subject. 
Based on the differences and similarities created while dissecting the sig-
nifies from signifieds in the mise en abyme, the subject re-establishes his sym-
bolic interirorization of the Imaginary (in the Lacanian sense), rearranges the 
accessible set of immediate objects. The self is referred to a hipodiegetic level, 
outside of the continuum of narration-or in other words, the reader is told a story 
and understands something that is not in the story. In The Music of Chance the 
ongoing process of interpreting the differences and similarities between embed-
ding and embedded work is marked by the differing conclusions of the two pro-
tagonists. Nashe as an exhausted Don Quixote instinctively chooses the satiric 
aspect over the prophetic and didactic functions, the cognitive direction instead 
12 White J., John. 2001. In: The Motivated Sign, Iconicity and Language and 
Literature 2. Amsterdam: John Benjamin Publishing Company, p. 34. 
13 Borges, J.L. 1989. "Magias parciales del Quijote". Barcelona: Emece. In Obras 
Completas. p. 47. 
14 Peirce, C. S. 1931-59. Collected Papers. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, p. 228. 
15 Greenlee D. 1973. Peirce's Concept of Sign. The Hague-Paris: Mouton. 
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of mystical. He tempers with the laws of this microcosm, though he couldn't 
care less, since he is already lost in the most foreboding sense of the word. His 
companion, a soldier of fortune type of Sancho Panza decides on the opposite, in 
a way a naive reader would. In his mystical, magical interpretation tempering 
with the laws of the simulacrum is like 
"(...) violating a fundamental law. We had everything in harmony. 
We'd come to a point where everything was turning into music for 
us, and then you have to go upstairs and smash all the instruments. 
You tempered with the universe, my friend, and once a man does 
that, he's got to pay the price."16 
Everything that happens after this point in the novel stems from the inter-
textual game these two interpreters/interpretants play with each other and then-
shared object: the conundrum of the mise en abyme. In the maelstrom of uncer-
tainty, in the exile of doubt Nashe, who interprets the City of the World by cogni-
tive means, gradually lures himself into sinking lower and lower down the depths 
of the same abyss Pozzi warned him about. 
"Sometimes, powerless to stop himself, he even went so far as to 
imagine that he was already living inside the model."17 
And it is at this point that Nahe burns the symbols of his sin, the two 
figures torn out from the space of simulacrum. From Pozzi's point of view this 
could be understood as an act of revenge (and so he dies a violent death), but 
Nashe's cognitive aspect makes it an effort to break the continuity of interpre-
tation, to suspend the ongoing cycle of signification. In the final scene the last 
words emanating from Nashe's focalized view dissolve into the pure white 
nothingness that pours from the headlights of a car he intently drives into. As an 
interpretant, sign and interpreter the protagonist ceases to exist outside the 
sphere of interpretation. 
In conclusion, we can state that the semiotic apparatus of infinite regress 
which is inherent in the mise en abyme generates a gap in signification and 
information, which abyss, in turn, is to be filled by certain functions, which 
destabilize the interepreter's presuppositions and systematic believes. If we 
accept Beckett's comment that what the artist of the day should look for is but a 
form that encapsulates the chaos,18 than probably the reader will agree with the 
author of this essay that the mise en abyme might just do the trick. 
16 MC p. 138 
17 MC p. 178 
18"(...) it admits the chaos and does not try to say that the chaos is really something else. 
(...) To find a form that accommodates the mess, that is the task of the artist now." 




THE GLA MORA MA AS WORLD MODEL 
'God is dead.' (Nietzsche) 
'Nietzsche is dead ' (God) 
'Both of them are dead.' (Odin) 
(graffiti) 
Hungarian criticism primarily approaches Bret Easton Ellis's novel, 
Glamoramd from particular theoretical problems. These are prominently the 
problem of the reality-effects (the necessity and impossibility of a referential- or 
mimetic-principled reading) and the questions of the textual apprehensibility of 
popular culture (filmic narration, surficiality, subcultural embeddedness, etc.) 
Although these approaches lead the reader to recognitions which are revealing in 
a considerable number of cases, they provide few clues concerning the text's 
readability as a novel. They above all deal with the details and, indeed, with the 
surficial aspects of the text. Rather, it appears to me that an allegorically 
organised, coherent system of narrative and metaforic patterns run along the 
text; the interpretation of which, not least, confronts us precisely with that 
theoretical possibility that the distinguishability of surface and depth cannot only 
be admitted as an illusion; or can, but not in the sense as the criticism of 
logocentrism traditionally conceives it. In my paper, I undertake the task of 
interpreting the novel by the comparison of these patterns while also looking for 
the answer how this attitude of the text in relation to signification can be 
apprehended. 
The central theme of the text is conspiracy. Therefore, my first question is 
what in fact conspiracy is as such. It is a complex structure, formed by an 
undefined number of elements, in which each element of the system is attached 
to at least one other, and the map of the links is arborescent, amorphous. 
Regarding the interplay of the elements, every system element is moved except 
for one, and several elements are movers as well. Nevertheless, one element is 
exclusively a mover, i.e. the system contains one (and solely one) unmoved 
1 Bret Easton Ellis: Glamorama (1st ed.) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999). All 
references are to and all quotations are extracted from this edition. The page numbers of 
the referred to or quoted parts appear in brackets after each reference or quotation in the 
text of the paper. 
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centre. The operation of the system is governed by some kind of law which 
determines, on the one hand, the rules by which particular elements are joined, 
and on the other, the rules by which the elements move.2 This principle is 
unknown in every case just as the whole of the structure organised by it. As the 
object of cognition, the conspiracy becomes a secret, and as a secret waiting for 
disclosing, it can be divided into two levels. The surface level is composed of 
systematically recurring motifs, changes, movements which are related to single 
system elements, and which can be structured according to the aspect of identity 
and difference and interpreted as signs (symptoms). On the second level, reason, 
motivation, principle stands, which as a signified can at least be assumed and 
recognised in principle (i.e. it can be detected). 
This system corresponds to the linguistic model of the metaphysics of 
presence and to its epistemological fundamental, having its base on this very 
linguistic model, which itself is based on the separability and superposability of 
the sign and the signified, on the subordination of the sign, and on the principle 
of representation (i.e. the system corresponds to the aspiration by which the 
metaphysics of presence strives to map out the referential world relying on the 
help of causality). In this perspective, as the objects of experience, every 
phenomenon and thing fits into the same network of an unknown system, where 
they play or can play the roles of the mover and the moved at the same time. 
The purpose of cognition is to reach that fixed point which is the ultimate reason 
of every movement, which is the unmoved itself by exploring the movement and 
the net of links (the meaning and the sense) of particular elements. The 
significance of cognition accordingly lies in the fact whether the explored net 
could really be closed or not, i.e. whether it is complete or not. In other words, 
in the fact how many elements and how exclusively they are attached to the 
known reason (the mover). 
Consequently, we can rigtly expect that the novel is going to tell us about 
how the characters are connected to the conspiracy. The relevant attribute of the 
characters will be their position in relation to cognition, and the plot will take 
shape through the transition of this attribute. According to our first assumption, 
the conspiracy, despite of all its obscurity and complications, is a local one. 
Therefore, we would await reading a detective story, learning about the 
operation of a confinable, circumscribable (a politically and/or socially 
subversive) system. Our impression is that the bounds of the conspiracy show 
congruence with the frames of Victor's life. The sequence of oblique hints and 
motifs leads us to the suspicion that the key figure of the conspiracy is the 
father, and his aim is to replace Victor with an alter ego. (Lunch with the father, 
2 Cf. the description of the system with Aristotle's Metaphysics (XII. 6-7, especially 6, 
1071b 4). 
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the critique of Victor's lifestyle, the necessity of a "new you" [79], the 
problematics of replacement, the insufficiency of the change of the name [77-
82].) Considering all what have just been elaborated above, what in fact can this 
text be about? 
Joining the problematics of genealogy and representation in the relation of 
the strong father versus the weak son could in principle become interpretable 
according to the semiotic scheme of fallogocentrism. The assigning of a name as 
a cultural creative gesture is supposed to provide opportunity for the existence 
and (self-)representation of the father (and of the ultimate substance at the end 
of the invisible genealogy chain). The metaforic attachment of the offspring (the 
signifier) and the begetter (the signified) through the identical name would 
create the unity and exclusiveness of genealogy (meaning). However, the 
conspiracy, which seems to be ruled by the father, is precisely working on the 
metaforic replacement of an offspring who represents the father imperfectly. In 
this sense, Victor is a bad trope because in his case, two things showing no 
similarity have been denominated by the same word (name). On the other hand, 
his alter ego is a trope which represents well because in its case, the same word 
(name3) refers to a similar entity. So, the correlation of meaning is assured; 
moreover, it is necessary; actually this is what happens. The two possible agents 
of cognition and designation would be Victor and/or the father, and similarly, 
two narrative patterns could unfold further on. 
In the first case, Victor, the son, i.e. the level of signifiers would uncover 
the level of things, i.e. signifieds by unveiling the conspiracy and proving the 
presence of the father behind it. Accordingly, this would also be the narrative of 
self-knowledge at the same time, resulting in the reconsideration of the position 
in the face of the father. As a consequence of the opposition between father and 
son, the story of some kind of (re)identification process would come to light. It 
would either reinterpret the relation of the signifier and the signified and bring 
about a well functioning new trope (reckoning with the father, the declaration 
of the self as a new meaning) or would reinforce this signification and would 
frame itself into a good metaphor (i.e. Victor would start to lead a life approved 
by his father). In the second case, the interpretative gesture would be 
accomplished by the father, who finally manages to find a well representing son 
for his self-designation due to the alter ego. The story in this case would tell us 
about the self-interpretation of the father, in which the fate of Victor would be to 
disappear in one of its blind spots. 
The story comes up to our expectations to the extent that the alter ego on 
the side of the father really takes over Victor's place (pt. 5), and Victor also 
exposes the role of the father (400-3). However, our expectations are refuted to 
3 "THE TRANSFORMATION OF VICTOR WARD (UH, WE MEAN JOHNSON) [...]" (450). 
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the extent that single moments of the story cannot be explained by this as a 
central conception, and the narrative is not closed either. During his acquitance 
with things, Victor casts light to systems of conspiracy operating below, above, 
and next to each other, involving a whole range of (minimum) double agents. He 
recognizes that Palakon, the father, and Bobby equally and mutually take 
advantage of each other (and him) to achieve their own goals (421-3). Thus, the 
centre gets displaced, but it is inscrutable where. The father cannot be the centre 
because he is controlled as well (by the Japanese, 422), and another, more 
sophisticated conspiracy is being hatched around him. (The Victor alter ego 
keeps on acting in undetected affairs [457-9], the appearance of Lorrie Wallace 
and Palakon on the video record [475].) Bobby cannot be the centre since in 
spite of his death, everything goes on. Palakon cannot be the centre either 
because he " '[...] has... no affinity...' " (422), or rather, even if he did, the 
context implies that he could only be a moved element in the system of the 
conspiracy. 
So, the text introduces more and more conspiracies, double agents, and 
alter egos (Jamie Fields, who—besides Palakon—gives away the most about the 
whole, is one of them as well [424-6]), which makes us reconsider our previous 
notions concerning the scope, the number of the moved elements, and the 
structure of the novel's conspiracy. Such a complex structure is getting outlined 
in front of us in which the different size subsystems (the simoultanously running 
conspiracies) possess partial autonomy, and their elements are intricately 
attached to the elements of other subsystems, making even the status of the 
immobile centres relative. All the same, they do not extinguish each other, the 
resultant of their operations points strictly at one direction: at the father, behind 
the father, at the post of the president, and behind it, at the direction of a global 
political pursuit (mainly on p. 422). (Its nature is unknown, but it is not relevant 
in relation to the structure.) Furthermore, the conspiracies are omnipresent in the 
time and space of the novel's world. (Jamie Fields at the college [467-8]; 
Abdullah's report presumably about the first appearance of the later Victor alter 
ego [11]; the started, but not finished fragments of the narrative in pt. 5 
concerning the Victor alter ego and the pseudo-Lauryn Hynde, showing up 
beside him [460-3], or the already mentioned videotape with Palakon, etc.) 
Every portion of the text's world is produced by the conspiracies; every happe-
ning of it is the result of the pulling of the conspiratorial strings. (Or rather, after 
the novel has introduced alter egos in so great a quantity, presupposing the 
opposite would be more difficult to justify.) However, in this case, we can no 
longer talk about conspiracies—at least not in the sense in which we did 
previously—since they mean reality itself. 
Similarly, the logocentric model of cognition conceives the referential 
world—which it considers to be the most complex organism—as the interaction 
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of more systems of rules, which are subordinate, superordinate, or co-ordinated 
to each other, and which are only partly independent from the other. The 
responsibility for the mapping and exploring of these can be taken by the 
different disciplines, within which particular subsystems (conspiratorial 
subthreads) correspond to particular problem fields of each discipline. Since in 
the text, the conspiracy system gets identified with reality itself, we cannot place 
anything to its end (or to its dominant centre), but the unmoved mover, the 
Father.4 In short, the conspiracy system is the metaphor for Creation and for the 
metaphysical absolute behind it; hence, the analogical structure bears its 
determining features. It is not scrutinizable and not conceivable, but it is present 
in every space and every time; it creates and rules the world with all its 
elements5 and will also destroy it according to its wish.6 What can the text be 
about in this case? 
Against this absolute conspiracy, the stake of cognition is the highest 
possibble. According to our expectations, in the following, the novel is going to 
tell us about how the level of language, signifiers, cognition (Victor) is revealing 
the level of the world, things, signifieds, demonstrating the presence of the only 
fixed point there, the presence of the Father. Thus, the story would again serve 
as the narrative of self-knowledge at the same time, i.e. as the story of a 
(re)identificational process based on the widest perspective possible. The 
presupposition of being the object or the element of the conspiracy, of being a 
creature would provoke the reconsideration of the position in relation to the 
Father. In the first case, Victor would again venture to rewrite this signification 
denying his bond to the ultimate signified. In the second case, by accepting it, he 
would shape himself into a good metaphor putting on the determining features 
of the signified.7 The latter would be the traditional narrative of cognition 
concluded by the Christian West. Its prototype is the prodigal son's story in the 
parables, where the son gets from the lack of knowledge (from false believes), 
through sin, to the perception of Truth, to conversion. 
4 Cf. the theological system of Saint Thomas Aquinas (that phase of the Aristotle 
reception which had the most significant effect on Christian theology) with special 
regard to his "five ways" (Summa Theologiae la, q2, a3). 
5 Cf. "[...] he's erasing people, he's inventing a new world, seamlessy. 'You can move 
planets with this,' Bentley says. 'You can shape lives. The photograph is only the 
beginning.'" (357-8). 
6 Cf. "The extent of the destruction is a blur and its aftermath somehow feels beside the 
point. The point is the bomb itself, its placement, its activation—that's the statement. 
[...] It's really about the will to accomplish this destruction and not about the outcome 
because that's just decoration." (296). 
7 Imitatio Christi; cf. "And that ye put on the new man, which after God is created in 
righteousness and true holiness."(Ephesians 4.24). 
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The text comes up to our expectations to the extent that it suggests the 
frame of this narrative scheme in the form of allusions; however, it also refutes 
them to the extent that it suggests so only in a way as if that scheme was 
unnarratable. The alter ego converts to the principles of the father (446); it 
rereads Dostoyevsky (ibid.); its deeds are explained as repentance by the others 
(455); it functions perfectly as a metaphor; however, it does not tell us about 
what is really going on. On the other side, Victor seems to get (at least regarding 
the volume of the conspiracy) from sheer incompetence to the complete 
understanding of the system.8 He wants to communicate the truth, which he sees 
more and more clearly, with the purpose of saving others;9 he shows the 
development of the intention of help and compassion in himself as new 
characteristics;10 he strives to prevent further destructions;11 by this time he feels 
responsibility for the father (347); he watches himself from an entirely new 
perspective as a sign of the change of his identification;12 he feels regret,13 and 
he shows the feeling of self-accusation (478). Furthermore—after the disorders 
of his short- and long-term memories—as the primary condition of fashioning 
self-identity, he begins to remember, confronting his past and present selves.14 
in short, Victor's transformation follows what has been expected; however, its 
interpretatation (declaration), i.e. true cognition, fails to come about. The 
question remaining after all these is to what extent the language of the fictional 
world can account for this. 
If any meaning can be assumed in this world, it is undoubtedly the 
concept of being "in" (cf. first on p. 5), trendy. If cognition can have any 
objects, they are certainly the celebrities and products in who and in which this 
concept is embodied. If the process of signification can be assumed, it can be 
ensured by the brand and celebrity names, which promise to guarantee the 
8 Especially his conversations with Palakon and Jamie Fields (406-7, 421-6) and finally 
the videotape (475). 
9 He wants to help the French prime minister's son (321-2) and Felix (349-53). 
10 Bentley (416-9), Jamie Fields (421), Chloe (426-30). 
11 Bobby's murder (432-6), a (hopeless) attempt to prevent the explosion of the 
airplane (436-8). 
12 "On the radio: something emblematic of where I'm at this moment, something like 
'Don't Fear the Reaper' or 'I'm a Believer.' " (342) 
13 "How many warnings had I ignored?" (477). 
14"[... ] on that afternoon [... ] a few decisions had to be made [... ] I had to accept this if 
I wanted to get anywhere. [...] I [...] made a promise to myself [...] The future started 
mapping itself out [... ] But [... ] at that point I had no way of understanding one thing: if 
I didn't erase this afternoon from my memory [...], sections of this afternoon would 
come back to me in nightmares. [...] I faded away and my image overlapped and 
dissolved into an image of myself years later [...]" (480-1). Further on: 403,467-8. 
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exclusiveness of meaning even only by the notion of trade mark. This mode of 
signification appears in its clearest form in the specific listings of the register 
at the club opening party. They would represent the most steady parts of the 
text concerning signification and the most compact ones concerning 
meaningfulness.15 
These texts are built up by identical sequences which are in principle 
supposed to represent identical semantical contents (the invited celebrities). It is 
impossible to interpret them referentially because most of them (justly) refers to 
an unknown signified, and how they differ from each other is not specified. 
Since in the text, most of the sequences do not appear twice either (apart from 
the names of the main characters and one or two determinant exceptions), they 
cannot be interpreted inside the fictional world either because they cannot be 
recognised as signs. So, although their difference is given, this only allows each 
sequence to create a unit of empty space equivalent to the others behind itself. 
Though it is clear that not all of the names are unfamiliar (and it is very likely 
that they can all be referencialised), the intertextual signs themselves (known 
from other texts of the referential world) cannot be interpreted either. On the one 
hand, because the sequences referring to known signifieds correlate semantical 
contents which do not belong together,16 and hence the lists can only be 
regarded coherent (Victor surely considers them as such) if—in this context— 
they do not mean what we may relate to them in the referential world. On the 
other hand, provided that meaning formation is the result of the given system of 
differences, the known signs—transferred to a system considerably based on 
equivalency—cannot function in any other way either, just according to the 
same system. Consequently, they can only be interpreted as linguistic elements 
homonymous with particular known proper names, but without known 
meanings. However, since in the language of the novel the rule that difference is 
conceived as identity (and vice versa)17 seems to be quite a general one, even the 
15 The metaphoric of cognition told by Victor when part of the list is being read out: " 
'Yes' [...] 'Fine' [...] 'I am shuddering with pleasure.' [...] 'Somebody needs to hose— 
me—down.' [...] 'Fan-fucking-tastic.' [...] 'Faster.' [...] 'More, more, more—' [...] 
'Oh boy, we're in the hot zone now.' " (70-2). The same in the next chapter from Buddy 
Seagull when Victor is selling the Hurley Thomson gossip to him: " 'Now I'm vaguely 
enthralled.' [...] 'I'm getting a little hot.' [...] 'You're stroking my boner' [...] 'I'mrock 
hard. Continue.' ", etc. (75-6). 
16 ££ "Nike [... ] Beavis and Butt-head [... ] Jeff Koons, Nicole Kidman, Howard Stern 
[...] Huckleberry Finn [...]" (185). 
17 Cf. the utterances with definitive value, e.g. " 'Shit' [...] 'Um, I mean that in a good 
way.' " (8);" 'No, in is out. Out is .in.' " (15);" 'I want something unconsciously classic. 
I want no distinctions between exterior and interior, formal and casual, wet and dry, 
black and white, full and empty [...]' " (51); " 'Jesus, it could apply to anything,' I 
mutter. 'So ultimately it's like meaningless.' " (105). With reference to causality cf. " 
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theoretical assumption of the difference of meaning is questionable. So, this 
pseudo-language does not have any designates. 
After all these, the fact that alter egos and actors are/can be made to 
appear on the scene in such a quantity is hardly suprising. At the same time, by 
the introduction of the filmic levels, another operation emerges in the language 
of the text, which works just in the opposite direction as the one—which may be 
identified as a horizontal merging—mentioned above. (The structure of the film 
levels with the apperance of actors and alter egos as signifiers in the first place 
can also be approached as a semiotic model.) The filmic narratives below each 
other get repeated endlessly. At particular points (where the characters join 
them), they intersect, but never cover each other. As the objects of cognition, 
some figures (subjects) are signifieds on their own. Yet, as actors (alter egos), 
they stand in the position of signifiers; they serve as the signifiers of the played 
characters (roles). Nevertheless, showing this acting from a different 
perspective; moreover, showing this shooting from an even newer perspective, 
the signified (the played character) becomes a signifier (an actor), etc. The 
filmic narratives intersecting each other construct the structural model of 
postponement. The (self-) identities (characters, roles) get differentiated (cf. 
differance); the meanings (scripts) disseminate. Hence, the centre of the 
conspiracy system necessarily disappears in the fabric of the script and film 
levels, which can be comprehended as the metaphor of the postmodern 
(deconstructive) understanding of signification. 
It is as if we had the chance to understand Victor' story as a linear one by 
following the transformation of his relation to this kind of language. This 
narrative is anticipated in the metaphoricality of the following question (NB 
during the journey, ergo unavoidably during the Journey): " 'Really—there's 
fog?' I ask, having assumed that I had been staring at a giant gray wall but 
actually it's a huge window [...]" (215). At the beginning of the story, Victor 
disseminates and merges meanings;18 he does not understand or know 
anything;19 he cannot and does not want to say anything. Contrary to him, the 
characters (lovers, movie makers, agents, etc.) around him possess some kind of 
knowledge and attempt to put it into his mouth (in the form of warnings, 
'[...] in no particular order [...]' " (14 and the same later on pp 66, 139, and 307). 
18 " 'Jesus. As usual, you're so literal-minded.' " (24); " 'Literally or figuratively?' 'Is 
there a difference with you?' she asks. 'How can you be so dense?' " (35);" 'I want some 
kind of answer from you,' she says calmly. 'Don't free-associate. Just tell me why' " 
(176); " 'Did you...understand the question?' [...] 'Maybe you've misunderstood my 
answers.' " (142), etc. 
19" 'I don't know anything, JD. Nothing, nada. Remember that. I... know...nothing. Never 
assume I know anything. Nada Nothing. I know nothing, not a thing. Never—' " (7). 
104 
cautions, instructions, etc.)20 again and again. Despite the fact that Victor's 
idiocy is obvious for everybody, regarding the signifying rules of the fictional 
world, it is only he who practises language adequately since in this world these 
exact kinds of statements—e.g. "I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I KNOW 
WHAT YOU'RE DOING" (105 and from that page till the end)—are 
impossible, even if they are true. However, the virtuosic word-plays and 
misunderstandings/misinterpretations together with Victor's wisdoms are 
abating as the story advances, and by the end of the novel, they give their place 
to a naive, unreflected, meaning-centred usage of language.21 By this time, it is 
Victor who would strive to communicate in possession of a wider knowledge, 
but the addressed ones do not understand him.22 
Victor first problematizes the relation of language and the possibilities of 
cognition directly in the opening lines of the novel. The reading of the "specks"— 
which appear on the "third panel" (accidently right at the beginning of the thirty-
third chapter, in pt. 1), which "look like they were somehow done by a machine" 
(5), and which seem to be "glowing", what is more "spreading" (6)—does not tell 
us more than metafiction tells us any other times, i.e. that only the space of 
language and signification can be taken for granted. Victor's own "story" (i.e. the 
"who, what, where, [and] when" of the story [5]) itself is the process of 
signification. As a subject, he wholly shares the language that this world speaks, 
thus his constant characteristic cannot be anything else, but meaninglessness, 
misunderstanding, self-contradiction, and instability. However, after his metaphor 
(the alter ego) takes over his place in the level of signifiers, and because he 
himself does not have the opportunity to appear on the scene in a new role as a 
signifier,23 his existence (captivity) as the—hypothetic—object of cognition (as a 
signified) becomes inaccessible for the usage of language. The meaning, i.e. the 
direction from which he speaks (the intention of help) and himself, of whom he 
20 " 'No,' he says. 'It's all clear to us.' [...] 'It's only sketchy to you.' " (165); " 'See, 
Victor, the problem is you've got to know things,' she says. 'But you don't.' " (173); " 
'Everything you know is wrong.' " (176); " 'It's what you don't know that matters most 
[...]' " (283), etc. 
21 Cf. " 'At first I was confused by what passed for love in this world: people discarded 
because they were too old or too fat ot too poor [...], they weren't hip, they weren't 
remotely famous. This was how you chose lovers. This was what decided friends. [...] 
On the verge of tears—because I was dealing with the fact that we lived in a world 
where beauty was considered an accomplishment—I turned away [...]' " (480-1), or cf. 
the sentence quoted under footnoote 12. 
22 The son of the French prime minister and Felix (footnote 9), the sister (468-9, 476), 
the evoking and reinterpretation of the sentence "7 know who you are and I know what 
you 're doing" by him at this time (437). 
23 " 'Your role is over, Victor,' " says the director of (one of?) the French crew(s) (471). 
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wants to give news (the telephone calls to his sister) are profound secrets, and both 
remain unuttered and unutterable. By the end of the novel, Victor's and his 
company's usage of language, following the change-over of the alter egos,24 
occupies a chiastic opposition in relation to each other. 
He reflects on this in the closing chapter while he is most likely to be shot 
in the back of the neck25 by that certain Uzi which has been loaded earlier, in pt. 6, 
ch. 13, precisely when the reality and the unfathomability of the conspiracy gain 
final proof. The mountain is always a probable scene for forming connection with 
the sacral. Life flows in the valley, on the fields, on the highways just like in the 
picture. The mountain is unknown, a secret,26 and at its feet lies language itself: 
the "villagers [...] celebrating in a field of long grass" on the hither side and the 
"highway" lined with "billboards" on the farther side, behind the mountain. 
"The stars are real." If I understand it literally, Victor talks about some 
figures of the picture. If he means celebrities, he says a figure of speech. It is 
only representation that is real. 
"The future is that mountain." In this sense the metaphoric mountain is 
either unreachable, or one can only saunter off from it to the highway, back to 
the territory of language. The questions and the promises of the answers are 
there somewhere, "[at] any point beyond [the mountain]". 
To sum up, the alter ego signifies something, but not what is really there. 
Falling out from the signifying process, Victor remains unuttered. It is only 
substitution that is real; what is really there, cannot be worded. 
The text represents the concepts of language and cognition as both the 
postmodern and the metaphysics of presence conceive them by the trope system 
of a complex metaphoric allegory based on structural analogy. The annihilation 
of reality (the explosions, the murders, etc.), the apocalyptic narrative itself stem 
from the inner, metaphoric logic of allegorization, and in the reading of the 
novel it is conceived as the ground state of Creation. 
Certain motifs of the text obviously offer themselves for this approach. (As 
a matter of fact, sometimes with even too suspicious an obviousness.) The smell 
of shit and flies: the collateral accessories of decay. Cold, hoar, ice: they are all 
associated with distance, isolation, atomization. Teutonic cross and pentagrams at 
24 As the file names prove, by that time—expectedly—both the father and the sister 
are alter egos (358). 
25 Watching the "mural", he says, "I'm falling forward but also moving up toward the 
mountain [...]" (482, italics mine). Earlier: " 'Someone is going to extract you from this 
sooner or later,' the director says."—ambiguously, specially as a few lines later he 
presumably apostrophes the same person as a war criminal (471). 
26 "The question about the hat will never be asked. The question about the hat is a 
big black mountain and the room is a trap. " (341). 
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the beginning and the ending of the novel (16, 415-6): the symbols of apocalyptic 
ideas. Confetti: occupying, covering up, legitimizing something. Victor's alter ego 
as the "wolf in a lamb's clothing" (cf. Matthew 7.15 and Revelations 13.11-2) is 
the anticipation of the antichrist.27 However, instead of the horsemen of the 
apocalypse, we persistently come across the Japanese and rugby-player hippies 
taking their Pekineses for a walk. 
The numbering of the different sections of the text in this approach can be 
interpreted as follows. The numbering of the parts—which starts and increases 
from one (1)—would be the apocalyptic narrative itself, inside which perpetual 
destruction and the reaching of the endpoint is taking place. This is an onward, 
never-ending count-down. Thus, the chapters would mean the chain of the 
moments of devastation, the gradual narrowing down (of the opportunities and 
the scope of motion), the falling back, the annihilation. Nevertheless, these two 
numberings are not simply the opposites of each other. So far as the chapters 
within a part always arrive at zero (0), the apocalyptic narrative can only count 
with something already existing, i.e. with Creation, with the one (1) since it 
exists from the beginning. The last chapter joins the two numberings; in it the 
numbering of the chapters is already increasing, but from zero (0). The final 
annihilation (0) as the condition of the advancement of the apocalyptic narrative 
is here already running parallel with the forward movement. 
The interpretation of the mottos28 can be the following. The sentence 
attributed to Krishna is a revelation signed as coming from God and states the 
meaning of the ultimate substance, an identical meaning (you, I, these) being 
present behind and in everything. This utterance reveals and attempts to make us 
see29 a knowledge which is beyond the interrelations (language, causality) the 
secular world can see. In the extract ascribed to Hitler, Hitler provides the 
27 « 'Don't f e a r the reaper, Victor,' Deepak says [...] 'I am the fucking reaper, 
Deepak,' [...]" (445-6). (Cf. footnote 12.) 
28 "There was no time when you nor I nor these kings did not exist.—Krishna. You make 
mistake if you see what we do as merely political.—Hitler" 
29 In spite of the fact that this text structurally resembles to the "out-is-in"-like parts of 
the novel and in its meaning to the appearance of alter egos, from this point of view the 
East can be set in paralell both with the postmodern concept of language (regarding its 
conception about the signifying process) and with the metaphyisics of presence 
(regarding its conclusion). (Every difference is the result of the deceptive operation of 
consciousness and language; in fact everything is The Same; none of them is That.) This 
conception occurs only once in the novel, but at a distinguished point. In pt. 5, when we 
confront with the unnarratibility of the narrative of cognition, the Indian guru, Deepak 
makes a similar statement to Victor's alter ego: " 'You see that bench?' [...] 'It's also 
you,' [...] 'You, Victor, are also that bench.' " (445). The invoking of the East in this 
case seems to open the door to the blending of the logocentric and the postmodern 
concepts of language. 
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indirect interpretation of his and his supporters' deeds as an alternative for a 
different interpretation. What these deeds would exactly be is not known, but on 
the one hand, in case they can be confused with politics—because though they 
are not „merely" political, they obviously bear that quality as well—they are 
necessarily acts (a text) which own(s) an unfixed centre and have (has) no 
inherent meaning. On the other hand, these deeds evoke apparently apocalyptic 
notions. The first motto, disrupting the linguistic and causal relations, points 
from the sacral towards man. The second points from man, through language, to 
the desacralized world. The first states the existence of meaning and faces us 
with the impossibility of a linguistic-causal cognition. The second implies a 
meaning which is in continuous motion and gives its linguistic-causal-natured 
interpretation. 
The two texts occupy the same chiastic opposition in relation to each 
other as Victor and his alter ego do. If we treat the opposition as a question, this 
question refers exactly to the most important moments of the novel: to the 
exsistence or the lack of meaning, to the possibility or impossibility of 
cognition, to the role of language within that, and to the sacral references of 
these; i.e. to the rereading of the postmodern discourse of cognition—itself 
rereading the metaphysics of presence—which, in my aproach, is finally the 
central problem of the novel. 
I think that the main concern of Glamorama is not the nature of textual 
operations, but the nature of reality, which the novel conceives as a text in the 
widest sense. Principally, the work is not interested in the theoretical problems 
of signification, but in the practice of signification and interpretation proceeding 
in the referential world. It regards the whole postmodern discourse (particularly 
deconstruction) as a tradition having been read into topi, and thinking over 
tradition taken in this sense, it creates its own patent absurdity. It re-evaluates 
the most productive theoretical commonplaces by inserting them into a structure 
which can be understood as some kind of synthesis of the inseminative and 
disseminative text models. It does not presume an accessible ultimate signified, 
but it considers certain pseudo-meanings to be inherent. It treats the 
impossibility of referential representation as an evidence; nevertheless, it seems 
to conceive itself as a mirror capable of showing reality in its totality. And what 
can be gathered from this mirror is above all not some kind of (trifling) 
metaphysical moral, but the existence of this complex (combined) textual 
pattern itself as the primary principle underlying cultural motions. 
Translated by Zsuzsa Maczak 
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THE GLAMOR AM A AS SIMULACRUM1 
The 1998 Glamorama2 bespeaks well those textual features which might 
be familiar from earlier works as the trade-marks of the author. Comparing it 
with the author's previous novels and short stories, indeed, the similarities strike 
us first: the main character due to the first person, present tense narration is a 
narrator at once; the characters are primarily individualized by the well-known 
brands of consumer society; and the recurring enumeration of the stratum of the 
represented entities evokes the feeling of familiarity, authenticity, and accuracy 
in the recipient. From the point of view of the Ellisian novel-poetics, the 
common features in connection with the above-mentioned and also with e.g. the 
contradictious nature of the main characters' disposition are especially relevant 
in the parallel of Glamorama and American Psycho.3 From our standpoint, 
however, the differences are more important. Can Glamorama confront us with 
something new in comparison with the earlier texts, or is it simply a further 
combination of the usual narrative panels? The question is justified all the more 
since the reception of the novel strongly reminds us of the reception of the 
previous one. This time, years after the scandalous reception of American 
Psycho, the author had to refute in interviews again that Victor Ward would in 
fact be him and that his private life and the events of the novel would be 
identical in any way.4 Although such an uncritical application of referential 
1 The present and the following study of the volume summarize observations concerning 
Glamorama which originate in a common project investigating the aspects of Bret 
Easton Ellis's prose. Apart from their several parallels, the two studies, of course, come 
to different conclusions. 
2 Bret Easton Ellis, Glamorama (New York: Vintage Books, 1999). All subsequent 
extracts are from and all subsequent references are to this edition. The relevant page 
numbers always appear in brackets right after the given reference or extract in the text of 
the paper. 
3 Bret Easton Ellis, American Psycho (London: Picador, 1991). 
4 Cf. "[...] I really believe that the readers are smart and sophisticated enough to realize 
that the author is not the narrator of his novels. Writing fiction is an act of imagination 
and fantasizing, and it's not relating in prose what you've been doing for the last two or 
three years." (Joshua Klein, "Interview with Bret Easton Ellis," available: 
www.avclub.com/content/node/24229, access: 15 March 2006.) Nevertheless, an extract 
from another interview in which Ellis originates the character of Patrick Bateman in his 
father and in himself seems to contradict the afore-cited thought: "I identified with 
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reading has already been considered out-of-date for a long time, we cannot 
under-estimate such an attitude since it informs us about that fundamental 
interpretative uncertainty articulated even by a certain fraction of professional 
readers claiming that the quality of the novel is at least problematical. 
In one of his interviews, Ellis pointed out that the chief novelty of 
Glamorama is the plot, more precisely, the fact that "it has a plot, or at least an 
identifiable narrative that [his] other novels really don't have", which, according 
to him, is in connection with the choice of topic, in particular with the theme of 
conspiracy.5 With full knowledge of the novels proceeding Glamorama, it is 
obvious—though it does not become evident from the context of the interview— 
that the point here is not that a metafictional practice gets replaced by a story-
centred, linear poetics;6 the change could be rather measured by the fact that in 
Glamorama, an expansive narrative (a conspiracy) organizes the plot in contrast 
with e.g. American Psycho, whose subject (the "confessions" of a serial killer 
yuppie) favours a minimalist novel-structure based on loosely-joint 
micronarratives.7 The atmosphere of the conspiracy is inherently characterized 
by a certain mysteriousness, enigmaticness. Perhaps we do not say anything new 
if we presume that the reader's expectations concerning a novel which 
thematizes a conspiracy is going to be organized around the actual enigma; or to 
put it in other words, the reception is going to be motivated by the promise of the 
unravelling of the enigma. Thus, what Catherine Belsey asserts about the plot in 
classic realism is going to be true just the other way round in the case of 
Glamorama, which is about conspiracy. While those texts narrating murder, war, 
journey, or love only employ enigma as one of their possible means,8 it is the 
enigma itself that makes the main subject-matter here, and all the other themes 
get subordinated to this in service of the exposition, the narrative. 
Patrick Bateman initially because in a lot of ways he was like me. He was young, he was 
successful, he lived a certain kind of lifestyle, and so in that respect I saw him often as 
myself. That's why I consider the novel autobiographical. At the same time, I think it 
was a criticism of the way my father lived his life because he did slip into that void." 
(Jamie Clarke, "An Interview with Bret Easton Ellis," available: 
http:/Avww.geocities.com/Athens/Forum/8506/Ellis/claikeint.html, access: 15 March 2006.) 
5 Cf. "An interview with Bret Easton Ellis," available: 
http://www.randomhouse.eom/boldtype/0199/eIlis/interview.html, access: 15 March 2006. 
6 Such as in case of Paul Auster, at whom we can detect a similar tendency after his New 
York Trilogy (fondon: Faber and Faber, 1999). 
7 For the definition of minimalism cf. Zoltán Abádi-Nagy's study. "Minimalism vs. 
Postmodernism in Contemporary American Fiction," Neohelicon 1 (2001): 129-43. 
8 Cf. Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice (London-New York: Methuen, 1980), 70. 
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Right at the very beginning of the novel, we come across a self-reflexive 
part referring to such an enigmaticness: 
[...] so I don't want a lot of description, just the story, streamlined, 
no frills, the lowdown: who, what, where, when and don't leave out 
why, though I'm getting the distinct impression by the looks on your 
sorry faces that why won't get answered—now, come on goddamnit, 
what's the story? (5) 
The sequence "what's the story?" refers to the events of the text in a way 
that at the same time it also indicates the distance between the narrator and the 
narrated. This gesture is interesting because it repeats one of the immanent 
functions of the present tense narration. The present tense here implicitly 
expresses that each event is happening 'right now' at the moment of our 
reading;9 therefore, the narrator does not have an overlook on the whole story; it 
can only reflect on the current events. The afore-cited question "what's the 
story?" creates the same relation; its meaning is 'I don't know the story, 
somebody tell me'. All the same, in a paradoxical way, it also undermines the 
narrator's ignorance allowing for that 'right now'. How can it be that a person 
who can possess knowledge concerning exclusively the past and the present 
knows a story which assumes the knowledge of the future? Thereby, the relation 
between narrator and narrated suggested by the present tense gets shattered in its 
base. The fore-mentioned distance comes into being, which makes it possible 
that we attribute such level to the text where the how of the text's/the reception's 
operation is coded. In the narrative structure of the novel, we can find more 
similar discrepancies when the motivated first person narrator gives evidence of 
such knowledge to which he cannot have access through his own experience, 
through the reports of witnesses, or through the technics of reading-off, i.e. when 
the narrator infers information from external sources: the characters' appearace, 
acts, words. The discrepancy at issue is well represented by the following 
example: 
I hop on the Vespa, kick it into gear and speed up Park without 
looking back, though if I had been I would've seen Lauren yawning 
while she waved for a cab. (128, italics mine)10 
9 Dorrit Cohn emphasizes three functions of the present tense: it can mean a single, 
momentary action, a repeated action, and generalizations or eternal truths. Dorrit Cohn, 
Transparent Minds (Princeton-New Yersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), 190. 
10 In the Hungarian translation (Bret Easton Ellis, Glamoráma, trans. Miklós M. Nagy, 
[Budapest: Európa Könyvkiadó, 2000]), the other place in the text which testifies the 
unreliability of the narrator is the consequence of an evident negligence on the part of the 
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The frequent recurring of the questions concerning the circumstances of 
the story in the first part of the novel propounds that the text sooner or later will 
provide the answers. Part one—which embraces the organization of a club 
opening and the events of the first party (what) in New York (where) in the 
1990's (when)u—ends on a note that seemingly gives all the answers, which 
then gradually ease the process of reception and foster the understanding of the 
story. According to these, Victor's (who) career (why) would stand in the focus 
of the novel since we have got over almost half of the text. To understand the 
plot of the first part, which parades hundreds of celebrities, and Victor's 
existential, power position, the reader's familiarity with popular culture, with its 
events (conceived as a text or intertext), illustrious participants and discourses 
will be a basic requirement, and the comparison of the signifiers demands an 
intertextual strategy. According to the model of popular culture taking shape in 
Glamorama, this space cannot be divided into active and passive consumer 
levels. Everybody is a potential producer and consumer at the same time: from 
door-keepers, waiters, through models on their way to the top, to 'real' stars. 
While American Psycho presented merely the endless enumeration of objects 
and items, Glamorama lists the actors/actresses, sportsmen/-women, models, the 
individuals of the media, and other important people literally (cf. the list of the 
invited for the opening party). Practically, they extinguish each other's 
weflra«g(fulness) because they gain their sign- and newsvalue not in comparison 
to other celebrities in a hierarchy fixed from an external point of view, but in the 
judgements of their currency given by this culture's consumers.-On the other 
hand, only those signifiers mingle with the reliable signifiers, owning 
denotatum, which possess a designate, i.e. such signifiers whose signifieds do 
not exist in our actual world: 
People told us that they either were vampires or knew someone 
who was a vampire. (102, italics mine); 
translator: the Hungarian equivalents of the sentences "She looks over at where I'm 
shivering, slumped in a giant white chair." (202, italics mine) and "[...] I say, panting, 
sitting up in the giant white chair." (203, italics also mine) are "Rám néz, ahogy ott 
reszketek, összegörnyedve egy óriási, fekete [black] székbea" (Glamoráma, 253, italics 
mine) and "[...] mondom zihálva, és felülök az óriási fehér [white] székben." (ibid., 256, 
italics also mine). 
11 The problems in connection with the handling of time unintentionally break down the 
diegesis of the present: there can be antinomies between the reader's knowledge and the 
informational base of the text, e.g. 2pac Shakur, the rapstar, who appears in the text as a 
living character, died in a street gun-fight after the publication of the novel (120). 
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[...] and in the main room the director, assistant director, lightning 
cameraman, gaffer, chief electrician, two more assistants, Scott 
Benoit, Jason Vorhees' sister, Bruce Hulce, Gerlinda Kostiff, 
scenic ops and a Steadicam operator stand around a very large egg 
[...] (113, italics mine); 
[...] Henry Rollins, Nike, Kim Deal, Beavis and Butt-head, Anita 
Hill, Jeff Koons, Nicole Kidman [...] O. J. Simpson, Michael 
DeLuca [... ] Bruno Beuilacqua di Santangelo, Huckleberry Finn, 
Bill Murr (212-3, italics mine). 
Because the proper names referring to existing people and the names of 
the figures familiar from different fictional worlds become parts of the same 
semiotic chain (besides the so far mentioned, the characters appearing in Ellis's 
previous works also belong to the latter ones), and because in principle, every 
name can be substituted for any other due to the unarticulatedness12 of their 
difference, the interpretative process of the referencialization of the signifiers 
splits, and the referential reading comes to a halt. 
In spite of the fact that not only the products and objects of popular 
culture can be reproduced, duplicated, or substituted, but also the institutions 
and the participants of the cultural happenings,13 from the point of view of the 
characters, it is still possible to actually set up various hierarchies since they 
themselves are active interpreters of the cultural events presented by the novel. 
These hierarchies are built around currency, which, however, never means 
constant positionedness. The momentously changing conditions of the ratability 
of currency vary so fast, they are so relative that it is impossible to follow the 
rules of the game unless one adjusts oneself to the movement determined by 
persistent change not free from contradictions either. A conversation being 
formed between Victor and one of his subordinates, JD clearly demonstrates 
that the token of currency does not call for comprehension, but for fast 
adaptability to the conditions: 
12 Apart from a few exceptions, the names of the invited celebrities show up only once. 
13 Examples for similarity: "[...] and we're all eating muesli and have sideburns and 
everything would be flat and bright and pop if it wasn't so early." (50) and "All the guys 
basically look the same: cute head (one exception), great body, high hair, chiseled lips, 
cutting edge, naughty or however you want us." (66-7) and "[...] all the guys are so 
similar-looking it's getting tougher and tougher to tell them apart." (72). 
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"I mean," JD continues, "I think comparatively it's pretty in." 
"But in is out," I explain, squinting to see where we're heading. 
[...] 
"What are you saying, Victor?" 
"Out is in. Got it?" 
"In is... not in anymore?" JD asks. "Is that it?" 
I glance at him as we descend the next flight of stairs. "No, in is 
out. Out is in. Simple, non?" 
[...] 
"See, out is in, JD." 
"Victor, I'm really nervous as it is," he says. "Don't start with me 
today." 
"You don't even have to think about it. Out is in. In is out." 
"Wait, okay. In is out? Do I have that down so far?" 
[...] 
"Right. Out is in." 
"But then what exactly is in?" JD asks, his breath steaming. 
"Out is, JD." 
"So... in is not in?" 
"That's the whole p-p-point." It is so cold my biceps are covered 
with goose bumps. 
"But then what's out? It's always in? What about specifics?" 
"If you need this defined for you, maybe you're in the wrong world," 
I murmur. (16-7). 
At this point, Victor Ward appears as an expert of the laws of the fictional 
world, i.e. as an authoritative person. As not a paticular class of things appear to 
be trendy ("in"), but everything that is not trendy ("out"), we get an ostensibly 
simple logical formula based on contrast and inversion for the definition of the 
notion of trendiness. However, JD's question, "What about specifics?", from 
this aspect, does not only tell us about incomprehension and methodical 
disorder, but also about an arbitrariness lying in the determination of the quality 
of trendiness and untrendiness, and about the fact that the rule is actually that 
there are no rules, only subjects with more or less power, who attempt to 
obscure this fact precisely by their rule-forming activities. Victor has the right to 
declare what is "in" while JD's inferior position does not allow him to do that. 
Although Victor is not always able to articulate verbally this power of his in 
relation to everybody (e.g. he begs for pocket money from his father in vain; his 
boss, Damien humilates him again and again; in the interview he gave to Music 
Television, it is his cultural obtuseness which gets revealed; and Lauren strives 
to make herself independent from the values of the presented world), due to the 
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pretences, lies, cheats, what is more, occassionally to his own idiocy, he obtains 
such an advantage which provides predominance or at least an equal position for 
him in relation to those people who are interested in the events of this 
subculture. The turn of the plot is precisely anticipated by the unveiling of the 
arbitrariness and eventuality of this power, i.e. by the fact that more and more 
characters begin to turn his own reasoning against Victor: 
"You think you know everything, Chloe." 
"I think a fuck of a lot more than you do, Victor", she says. 
"Everyone knows a fuck of a lot more than you do and it's not 
cute." (182); 
[...] and Hurley's [...] hissing into my ear, "I know what you did, 
you fuck, I know what you said, you dumb fuck," and then he steps 
on my face [...] (189); 
He [Damien] sighs, studying me, rubs a hand over his face. "You 
act very hard to be cool, Victor, but really you're very normal." 
Pause. "You're a loser." He shrugs. "You're an easy target with a 
disadvantage." (196). 
After Victor's moral, professional, and private-life fiascos, according to 
the traditional "up-and-down" moral of the career novels, it is Victor's rise that 
should follow due to F. Fred Palakon's commission, worth $300,000, according 
to which Victor has to travel to London to search for the lost Jamie Fields, 
whom he dated as a college student. Besides the concretization of the conspiracy 
(it turns out that a group consisting of models organizes different terror actions 
all around the world), one of the most important development of the second 
content unit is that Victor is not only compelled to gradually give up his power 
postions, but he also loses his autonomy in his role as a narrator. 
The presence of the different crews, film-makers, photographers 
determines the layer of the stratum of the represented entities in Glamorama 
from the very beginning: owing to his job, the visual media ab ovo has a great 
influence on Victor's life; under the title THE MAKING OF A CLUB, they 
shoot a videofilm about the details of the club opening (6); Victor struggles to 
get a role—among others—in the movie called Flatliners II (31); he gives an 
interview to Music Television (203-6), etc. Moreover, the frequent use of film 
jargon—besides the importance of a permanent presence in the media, which is 
one of the standards of trendiness—also testifies that the differences among the 
rules working in the fictional worlds presented by the media, in the empirical 
world presented by the media, and in the empirical world experienced by the 
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characters are unimportant in Victor's approach: "The whole point of Super 
Mario Bros, is that it mirrors life." (25). By the end of part 1, this metaphorical 
equivalence becomes literal: the crews quasi take over the control of the plot. 
The first unequivocal reference to this reads as the following: "[...] and the 
director leans in to me and warns 'You're not looking worried enough,' which is 
my cue to leave Florent." (194). 
The logic of the simulacrum—in Baudrillard's words, "to simulate is to 
feign to have what one hasn't"14—becomes noteworthy from this point on. Here, 
every boundary gets utterly abolished between the original and the model, the 
represented and the representen Of course, simulation does not become the 
upmost feature of the fictional world at one blow, right from the given page; 
rather, this possibility gains a contextual support from this point on, i.e. those 
references which were so far incomprehensible, or seemingly comprehensible 
merely in connection with the opening of the party and with Victor's intricate 
private life, obtain new meanings in the light of the conspiracy. Although we 
previously treated the scenarios as sources, which, of course, suggests the 
validity of the above oppositions, the changing scripts and crews (the latter ones 
even liquidate each other), the actors playing themselves, the actors' alter egos 
(or rather, the actors playing the actor alter egos?) who perform their deaths, 
finally convince us that neither the conspiracy, nor the narration has a definite 
starting point. 
That is, as soon as we assign the people or group responsible for the 
conspiracy, it emerges almost immediately—by the same or even by different 
reasons—that those in belief of being able to manipulate others are also wire-
pulled. Hence, in chronological order, we could presume the following people to 
be the potential heads of the conspiracy: (i) those who know more compared to 
Victor (Alison, Chloe, Hurley Thomson, and Damien); (ii) the scenarist, 
cameraman, producer, and director of every crew, who provide Victor with scripts 
and (sometimes inconsistent) instructions (Felix and the American crew, the 
members of the French crew, and other not named crews); (iii) Bobby Hughes and 
his gang of models; (iv) acquaintances, friends from the years spent at Camden 
College (Sean Bateman, Jamie Fields, Lauren Hynde, and Bertrand Ripiéis); (v) 
the Japanese; (vi) F. Fred Palakon; (vii) the mysterious Mr. Leisure, who 
organizes Victor's last journey, to Milan; (viii) and finally the senator father. 
Although it is very likely that the father settles Victor's European stay in the inte-
rest of his own political career, on evidence of the allies of the originally hostile 
forces, the betrayals, the operations of the double or triple agents, we can come to 
the conclusion that no source, no defined objective, or any kind of regularity can 
14 Cf. Jean Baudrillard's study: "Simulacra and Simulations," in Mark Poster ed., 
Selected Writings (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 166-84. 
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be attached to the conspiracy. This is fully supported by the fact that after the 
pseudo-Victor's appearence in New York, who is in full service of the father's 
political reputation, the murders, outrages, explosions, memorizations of codes 
and passwords still go on. 
Nevertheless, as the conspiracy is getting more and more complicated, it 
is not purely the illusion of Victor's existential autonomy that gets wrecked, but 
his narratory competence also becomes questionable. Therefore, the narrative 
structure of Glamorama practically gets exposed to the earlier mentioned forces. 
From the point on that Victor starts to act according to directorial commands, 
his narration for the most part confines to the repetition of scenarios, i.e. to 
something that has been worded by someone else earlier. Although we can 
appreciate the descriptions of the shootings, rehearsals, dropped scenes, and 
shooting breaks as Victor's narratory achievements, the source of this kind of 
narration will be the text of the scenarios.15 Thus; Victor not only proves to be 
an unreliable narrator because occassionaly he turns out to know more than the 
present tense narration would allow him, but also because in other cases he 
pretends that his knowledge is enough for the comprehension of the conspiracy, 
whereas it seems that most often, he cannot even understand the meaning of the 
most elementary-level happenings. 
Simulation for the second time can arise in relation to Victor's drug 
addiction, which makes the story of the conspiracy appear as the endless float of 
Victor's psychedelic hallucinations: Victor gets prepared for his European 
journey with a plastic bag of magic mushrooms. According to the report of 
Albert Hoffman, the researcher of LSD and other hallucinogenic drugs having 
approximately the same effect, 
in the LSD state the boundaries between the experiencing self and 
the outer world more or less disappear, depending on the depth of 
the inebriation. [...] A portion of the self overflows into the outer 
world, into objects, which begin to live, to have another, a deeper 
meaning. This can be perceived as a blessed or as a demonic 
transformation imbued with terror, proceeding to a loss of the 
trusted ego. [... ] In both conditions, which often last only for a 
timeless moment, a reality is experienced that exposes a gleam of 
the transcendental reality, in which universe and self, sender and 
receiver are one. (italics mine).16 
15 E.g. "That just isn't an acceptable scenario, baby, but I'm at an automated teller right 
now with my Vespa [...]" (19); "Pause, while I consider this scenario [...]" (20); "The 
music in the background is mid-period Duran Duran." (24). (Italics mine.) 
16 Cf. Albeit Hofmann, LSD - My Problem Child, Jonathan Ott trans., in Flashback, 
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From this aspect, the occassional shifts of narration into second and third 
person can be derived from the self-perception of the experiencing self in this 
narcotic state. Likewise, the narcotic experiences could account for the last 
chapter, recounting the moment of death. 
One day a normal-looking rainbow appears and you vaguely notice 
it [...] (217, italics mine); 
A shot of Victor forcing a smile, looking down, a subtle refusal, a 
small movement of the head, a gesture that says I'm not interested. 
(365, italics mine) 
The third significant factor which unsettles the reality of the fictional 
world is Victor's memory since on his own confession, he does not only suffer 
from short-term, but also from long-term memory disfunction. Although in the 
original context, by the admission of his deficiency, he only wants to evade an 
uneasy situation, and though a few chapters later, he recognizes every pop song, 
citing the performer of the hit, the title of the record, the name of the publishing 
company, furthermore, even the length of the song to the second, suspition 
arises that Victor has real problems with recalling the past supposedly because 
of the damage of his autobiographical memory, which helps us reconstructure 
the events of our life.17 Nonetheless, his amnesia is not complete; according to 
the present state of memory research, he rather shows similarity with those 
suffering from autobiographical confabulation. The intellect of these 
individuals—in comparison with other amnesic patients—usually remains 
integral, and they are able to relate their past fluently, with remarkable 
detailedness; however, these reports appear to be very bizarre due to their 
countless contradictions.18 The reason for this lies in the fact that these patients 
have difficulty in separating their real memories and the associations created by 
their fantasy, and instead of the obscure real memories, they frequently choose 
fantasy.19 Insofar we conceive the narration as the series of an extensive unit's 
unadjustable story segments which overwhelms the reader with a book of 
unreliable information due to the clouded autobiographical memory, the novel 
available: http://www.flashback.se/archive/my_problem_child/, access: 03 May 2006. 
17 Cf. Alan Baddeley, Human Memory: Theory and Practice (Massachusetts: Allyn and 
Bacon, 1990), 293. 
18 For the concepts of 'clouded autobiographical memory' and 'autobiographical 
confabulation' cf. ibid., 315-8. 
19 Cf. ibid., 316. 
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tells us the story of a character's search for identity and its various 
constructions. Since eternal youth, the ideal of Victor's generation, appears to 
be achievable only through the acts of a continuous presence excluding any 
other time aspects (i.e. being present on the covers of magazines, on MTV, in 
the movie Flatliners II, etc.), Victor denies his past and his identity. 
However, at the point where one of the conditions of staying alive is the 
understanding of the system of the conspiracy, and thus inevitably self-
comprehension as well, the past drifts back to Victor's life, giving him a chance 
to reach self-identity, which is nothing else, but the knowledge of the vanity of 
his existence since the father wants the alter ego. So, in quite a paradoxical way, 
comprehension becomes possible during such a narration whose moral refuses 
the sense of the desire for comprehension. In Foucault's view, every kind of 
narration is at once the procrastination of death.20 Here, however, as the 
procession of the narration places the attainment of identification or 
reidentification within the frames of the understanding of the conspiracy, the 
situation is exactly the reverse. The narration postpones death, but self-
comprehension, which gets completed quite slowly and quite imperfectly, 
precisely finds its subservience in a destiny which has been temporarily 
eliminated. The changes of condition in the novel correlate with the changes of 
consciousness, which can come to rest exclusively if this consciousness ceases 
to exist. The ultimate reference of the text is thus nothing else, but the certainty 
of death, passing away, which, on the other hand, due to the logic of 
substituteability and exchangeability arises as a persistent presence, repetition, 
eternal recurrence. This is referred to by the last reminiscence, which tells us 
about the moment of release over non-existence and about the intentional erasure 
of this moment from memory. (Cf. 542) All this means that despite the fact that 
there remained loose threads in the conspiracy, the text allows the possibility 
that there are answers for the posed questions; however, it is obvious that the 
locus of those is situated outside the space of the text, or from Victor's point of 
view, in a dimension beyond this world: 
I'm drinking a glass of water in the empty hotel bar at the Principe di 
Savoia and staring at the mural behind the bar and in the mural is a 
giant mountain, a vast field spread out below it where villagers are 
20 <<y0 speak 0f heroes or as a hero, to desire to construct something like a work, to 
speak so that others speak of it to infinity, to speak for 'glory,' was indeed to move 
toward or against this death maintained by language; to speak as a sacred orator warning 
of death, to threaten men with this end beyond any possible glory, was also to disarm 
death and promise immortiality." Michel Foucault, "Language to Infinity," Donald F. 
Bouchard and Sherry Simon trans., in James D. Faubion ed., Aesthetics Method and 
Epistemology (New York: The New Press, 1998), 94. 
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celebrating in a field of long grass that blankets the mountain dotted 
with tall white flowers, and in the sky above the mountain it's 
morning and the sun is spreading itself across the mural's frame, 
burning over the small cliffs and the low-hanging clouds that encircle 
the mountain's peak, and a bridge strung across a pass through the 
mountain wjll take you to any point beyond that you need to arrive 
at, because behind that mountain is a highway and along that 
highway are billboards with answers on them— who, what, where, 
when, why—and I'm falling forward but also moving up toward the 
mountain, my shadow looming against its jagged peaks, and I'm 
surging forward, ascending, sailing through dark clouds, rising up, a 
fiery wind propelling me, and soon it's night and stars hang in the 
sky above the mountain, revolving as they burn. 
The stars are real. 
The future is that mountain. (543, italics mine). 
By committing the elaboration of the answers to the readers in the long 
run, Galmorama, even if not in a traditional way, still relieves tension deriving 
from the theme of alter egos, conspiracy, the alternation of time levels and 
focalization. 
Furthermore, besides the so far covered cases of simulation, one more is 
still left to discuss. It does not concern the plot or the mode of narration, but the 
person of the author. The last, sixth part of the text—where the numbering of the 
chapters, differing from the other parts, is an increasing one—does not only 
relate the unnarratable end. In the retrospective chapter 0, Victor gets authorial 
functions when a girl gives voice to her appraisal concerning his short story he 
read out in one of the workshops of the college (529). Although no other place in 
the text justifies Victor's being as an author, yet owing to the simulative logic of 
Glamorama, to Victor's unreliability as a narrator, and to the positioning of all 
these moments to one of the most emphatic places of the novel, we can rightly 
regard Victor as the author of the text, the plot, i.e. the story or the short story, 
namely as a person who is responsible for the produced text as its composer, 
creator. If we attempt to understand the allegory of the quest of the self or of 
(re)identification from this point of view, we always find the traces of an 
authorial presence which reveals itself only indirectly, which is the most difficult 
to recognize when it is the most apparent (cf. "Who the fuck is Moi?", 5), and 
which can become perceivable only when it tries to cover, abolish its own 
operation, cf. Victor's application as a narrator, who is at once termendously 
foolish, dumb, ignorant, but all the same, has kowledge about the whole story. 
Therefore, in Glamorama, the formation of the text concerning the imagined 
future gets realized in a way that metafiction originating from different 
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simulacra and simulative acts gains its most probable explanation in a concept 
having been considered invalid for a good while—at least within Hungarian 
literary convention—i.e. in the incalculability of the authorial intention, or if you 
choose, in the arbitrariness of the author. 
Translated by Zsuzsanna Maczák 
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When we start talking about television, we always have to keep in mind 
that the most important thing that defines a programme is the markers of the 
number of viewers. This is all the more important in the case of telenovels, not 
only because popularity is the force that makes it live or die, but also because of 
the interactive character of this genre, that allows the audience to change the 
story itself according to its interest. Beside the economic factor, we have to 
examine the cultural importance of these programmes, as well. The interaction 
of these two levels determines telenovels. In my study, I would like to empha-
size the importance of this interaction in telenovels, a genre that provides an 
excellent example of the cultural role of television. 
Itamar Even-Zohar in Literature as Goods, Literature as Tools1 describes 
her concept about the functions of literature. She sees the basic functions of lit-
erature in two characteristics: literature as goods means that the elements of 
literature (texts, authors etc.) signify wealth and prestige. The things that cannot 
function as goods, cannot be characterited as culture. "Goods which cannot be 
evaluated by an accepted market cannot conseqently have value, and therefore 
are not labeled - in this conception of culture - as »culture«. In this conception, 
one is therefore allowed to speak of entities as »having no culture«, if they are 
diagnosed as not being in possession of a defined set of required goods."2 
Literature as tools means that the pieces of culture can be used as tools for 
the organization of life. They have two types: "passive" and "active" tools. "Pas-
sive" tools "are procedures with the help of which »reality« is analyzed, 
explained, and gets to »make sense« for human beings."3 "Active" tools "are 
procedures with the help of which an individual can handle any given situation, 
as well as produce any such situation. As Swindler puts it, culture is »a reper-
toire, or 'toolkit' of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct 'strate-
gies of action'«".4 
1 Itamar Even-Zohar: Literature as Goods, Literature as Tools. In: Neohelicon XXIX 
(2002) 1, 75-83. 
2 ibid, 76. 
3 ibid, 76. 
4 ibid, 76. 
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Even-Zohar stresses that in her concept literature should be understood 
not only as texts, but also "as a network, a complex of activities", "one must be 
freed from the conception of »literature« as only a collection of texts, chiefly 
canonical."5 "In this conception, »literature« does not figure either as an »aes-
thetic« instrument or amusement for the privileged. It is, rather, conceived of the 
other way around, namely as a powerful social institution, one of the most basic 
instruments of most human societies, which has served to order and handle their 
repertoires for organizing their life."6 
This concept of culture allowes us to speak about telenovels as part of 
literature, and as an action that is in close connection with other parts of the 
literary institute, maintaining dialogue with them and functioning in collabora-
tion with them. This point of view helps us not only notice the classical refer-
ences of telenovels, but also recognise their special role in our culture. 
I would like to stress that there is a big difference between telenovels and 
soap operas. There is a geographical distance between them (soap opera is the 
American, telenovela is the Brazilian - Latin-American name of television 
series), and there are also some elementary characters of the genres. The most 
visible difference is that telenovels have an end, while soap operas can be con-
tinued for years. This is in connection with the origin of the series. Soap operas 
were developed from commercials, the first of which appeared in the radio. One 
of them was Amos and Andy, a popular series about two African-American men, 
that was a toothpaste ad. Procter and Gamble saw the opportunity in this project, 
and started to advertise their products the same way. This is why they are called 
soap operas. Nowadays we can also find commercials in series, not only in soap 
operas, but in other films, as well. 
The roots of the telenovels can also be find in the radio series. The differ-
ence is that when the genre was adapted to TV, the subject was not submitted to 
a consumer ideology but to a social one. The first telenovels were adaptations of 
classic and popular novels, so as to bring literature to those Brazilians, who can-
not buy any books or cannot even read. 
The classical literary roots of the telenovels signifies those first adaptations of 
novels, and they appear in the main characteristics of the genre. Rose Calza7 drew 
attention to the connection between the structure of the telenovels and the way the 
great novels of the 18th and 19th centuries were read. Ferenc Pál8 speaks about their 
5 ibid, 77. 
6 ibid, 80. 
7 Rose Calza: O Que é Telenovela. Editora Brasiliense, Sao Paulo, 1996. 
8 Ferenc Pál: The Novel of the Future; Is Itt he Telenovel? In: 
www.filmkultura.iif.hu/articles/essays/telenove.en.html 
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connection with the medieval romance. These similarities appear in the structure of 
these narratives: the conflicts of the story have to be organised in a way that keeps 
the reader/viewer on reading/waching tv. The story has to keep their interest awake, 
so as to get die viewer to sit in front of the television next day same time. 
This heritage of the serial literary classics in telenovels strengthens the 
function of goods, the concept of Even-Zohar. Telenovels have to use the classi-
cal instruments of serial narratives, to get more viewers and keep those who 
already watch them. The valuability of a programme depends on the number of 
its viewers. But the connection with the classical litrature gives other functions 
to the telenovels, that enrich their function as tools. 
When the first telenovels appeared in Hungary, Zoltán Rózsa9 noticed that 
although they created a new visual genre, they satisfied old claims of the audi-
ence. They gratificated the need for collective literature, such as the epic, the 
myths, the medieval tale of chivalry, the picaresque, the serial novels of the 18th 
and 19th century or the popular folk books. Rózsa thinks that telenovels saved 
these genres onto the screen. 
Rose Calza describes telenovels as a mixture of the heritage of different 
genres: "Most of the time the result is a mixture of the tradition of radio, a cab-
bage of literature, and stereotypes of cinema, subordinated to a number of 
chematic rules specified less by aesthetic options and more by economic pres-
sure, or rather the needs of commercial TV."10 She says, telenovel is an "inter-
semiotic entertaining spectacular^',1! 
This description underlines both functions of telenovels as goods and as 
tools. To be valuable goods, telenovels have to serve as perfect tools. Nowadays 
they have to satisfy not only the needs of the illiterate audience, but also other 
layers of TV viewers (the medium class, male viewers, etc.). Because of this 
need, telenovels have a special timetable: the one at six o'clock for grandparents 
and children, the one at seven o'clock is for teens, and the one at eight o'clock is 
for adults. Especially these last ones have to satisfy not only the needs of house-
wives, but also that of a wider group of viewers. To be able to serve these 
claims, they use the toolkit of other genres. In the followings, I would like to 
show an example of how telenovels use elements of classical pieces of literature, 
and how they communicate with them in order to satisfy their huge number of 
viewers. 
9 Zoltán Rózsa: Száznyolcvan folytatásban csúcsidőben. In: Filmvilág, 1982/12. 59-61. 
10 „na maioria das vezes o resillado é urna mistura de tradigao do rádió, sucata de 
literatura e clichés cinematográficos, submetida a um conjunto primário de regras 
esquemáticas impostas menos por opiles estéticas e mais por pressöes económicas, ou 
seja, pelas necessidades da TV comercial." Rose Calza, 8. 
11 „espetáculo intersemiótico de entretenimento" Rose Calza, 13. 
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This connection between telenovels and classical novels is very explicit in 
the characters of the stories. Many times, they are borrowed from literary texts, 
mostly from classical, but 'popular' texts. 'Popular' here means well-known, but, 
not necessarily well-read. These elements do not function as literary texts, but as 
topoi, so that the audience doesn't have to know their origins to be able to recog-
nise that the character has been borrowed, and has its own story, that is brought to 
the actual narrative by them. 
To see this function clearly, I collected some examples from a telenovel 
rather interesting. Padre Coraje12 is an Argentine series, a quite perfect one, not 
only because of its technical professionalism, but also because of its energetic, 
compact, clear-cut story, interesting characters and primarily because of its 
fascinating communication with literary texts, which is clearly seen in its char-
acters. Here are the characters that refer most explicitly to a literary traditition. 
Coraje (Gabriel Jauregui, Padre Coraje), the 'Saviour' 
The protagonist of this series has three names, because of his quite com-
plicated life (what else could be the basis of a telenovel?). He was an orphan and 
used to be an honest bandit with his closest friends, Santo and Mercedes. His 
nickname is Coraje (meaning brave), and nobody knew them, because they 
always wore a long, hooded coat and looked like a monk's cowl. 
Coraje resembles Robin Hood, he is an honest bandit, who helps the poor, 
a kind of out-of-law hero. But he is never called by this name, only his friend, 
Santo (see below). But he is also called 'The Pilgrim' by Manuel Costa (the 
main villain, his biggest enemy). Manuel knows about a sacred book, in which 
the story of 'The New World' (La Cruz) is written, and in which the coming of 
'The Pilgrim', who brings new order is mentioned. Manuel is the lord of La 
Cruz, so he thinks he should find this Pilgrim, and kill him. 'The Pilgrim' is 
Coraje, so Manuel's main motivation during the whole story is to kill him. 
Coraje is a character inheritated from the Bible: he is a special trans-
formation of Jesus Christ, the savior of the world ('The New World'), the healer, 
the embodiment of the good. Coraje cured Ana, who lived in a wheelchair until 
Coraje came into the town. He also resuscitated a woman, who had died in 
childbirth, cured Ana's face, which was burned in a fire. And he saved his own 
child's life in the bellie of his mother, Clara, when she almost lost the baby. 
These miracles were done by a pray, while Coraje put his hand on the 
patient/dead person. 
12 Padre Coraje. Pol-ka, Yair Dori Communications. Argentina, 2004. 
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The theme of the Saviour is strengthened by the element of sacrifice, as 
well. Coraje leads a revolution in La Cruz, and when military forces arrive in the 
town, they plan to execute Coraje. Naturally, in the last moment he is saved by 
Juan Peron. Coraje almost dies for the town, being the saviour of the 'New 
World'. The act of Sacrifice connects his character with the figure of Jesus. 
Coraje has a sign, that makes this connection clearer: he wears a cruciform scar 
on his back. This parallel between Coraje and Jesus Christ becomes explicit in 
the last episodes, when Manuel Costa (the infernal protagonist, see below) pre-
pares a crucifix for Coraje, captures him and tries to kill him in the same way as 
Jesus was killed: Manuel scourges him, tortures him, puts a thorn crown onto his 
head and crucifies him. Coraje almost dies, when a miracle saves his life. 
Manuel Costa, 'Faust' 
The sacral character of Coraje is emphasized by his counterpart, Manuel 
Costa, who is the infernal protagonist of the telenovel. He is the owner of the 
sacred book, that includes the prophecy of "The Pilgrim' (reference to the book of 
the Bible), and he is in connection with the Devil, who helps him (or, as it 
sometimes looks, who is helped by him) to destroy Coraje. He enters into a con-
tract with the Devil, who promises that he gives him Coraje, if Manuel kills three 
people. After Manuel signes the contract with his blood, he always sees a dog 
snarling at him when Coraje is near him. The same dog shows him the persons he 
has to kill. Manuel does not use any weapons for his murders, exept for his teeth. 
In these murders Manuel identifies himself with the Devil, that appears in the form 
of a dog. In Goethe's Faust the Devil also appears in the shape of a dog. 
Manuel Costa represents the Faust theme in this telenovel. The contract 
with the Devil has been written up in literature many times, in many forms, but 
this telenovel does not try to fit to one adaptation. The most important in this genre 
is to refer to literary themes, not to texts.They bring topoi onto the screen. The 
viewers can recognize Faust by those special elements from which this character is 
built. There has to be an embodiment of the Devil, a contract that should be signed 
with blood, and other small elements that can be borrowed from other adaptations 
of the theme. 
The embodiment of the Devil, as I have mentioned earlier, is usually 
realized in the shape of a dog. But when the act of signing the contract happens, 
the figure with whom Manuel has a discussion is in a human shape, but does not 
have a visible body, because it appears in a monk's cowl with a hood so big, that 
we cannot see his face. This embodiment refers to the character of Coraje, the 
divine figure of the story, and emphasises his sacredness and his connection with 
Jesus, by showing him in perfect opposition with the Devil. In Marlowe's 
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Doctor Faustus Mephistophilis also appears in monk's clothes, because when he 
first appears in his infernal shape, Faustus asks him to leave and come back in a 
monk's figure. 
"I charge thee to retume, and change thy shape, 
thou art too ugly to attend on me: 
Go and returne an old Franciscan Frier, 
That holy shape becomes a devill best."13 
In Padre Coraje this action leaves the ironic taste of the original text by 
the explicit opposition with Coraje, that it refers to. 
The place where the agreement is made is significant, as well. Manuel and 
his friends, the nobles, who established La Cruz had a secret sect, and the place, 
where they had met is a huge hall, a rotunda under the town's main square. From 
the house of each members of the sect a tunnel leads to this rotunda. In the 
middle of the room there is a round table sectioned for the members, with a sign 
of the crucifix in each section. This is a sacral place, where the most important 
actions of the story happen. In each telenovel we can find a place like this. It 
may be the house, where the protagonists' parents live (an archetipical mother 
and father), a house, where the characters meet, etc. As Timea Antaloczy sais, 
"an archetipical place, that can be identified as the geographical and psychic 
center of energy, the meeting point of the strings of the story, and last but not 
least a dramaturgical center, at the same time."14 
In this series the rotunda emphasizes the sacrality of this central point. 
The circle is a shape, that protects from the Devil. For example, in Goethe's 
Faust the witch stands Faust into a circle, when she gives him a magic drink, 
because Faust would be destroyed by the immense power of the infernal action 
whithout the protection of the circle. When Manuel 'fights' with 'The Mother', 
Amanda, the protective force of the circle can be seen very expicitly. Amanda is 
tempted by the Devil, but she resists, and kills herself instead of accepting the 
Devils offer of a happy and long life. Interestingly she sticks a knife into her 
chest sitting on the round table, and then falls onto it. In the last picture of this 
scene, we see Amanda on the table and Manuel on the floor lying next to each 
other: Amanda inside and Manuel outside the circle. 
13 Christopher Marlowe: The Tragedie of Doctor Faustus (B Text, 1616) Ed: Hilary 
Binda. www.perseus.tufts.edu/Texts/fasustus.html, 1/3. 
14 „archetipikus hely, ami egyszerre tekinthető a cselekmény földrajzi és lelki 
energiaközpontjának, a meseszálak találkozási pontjának s nem utolsósorban 
dramaturgiai központjának. Tímea Antalóczy: A szappanoperák virtuális világa. In: 
Jelkép, 2001/2. 74. 
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The character of Manuel brings classical elements into the telenovel, but 
as Rose Calza mentioned it, a telenovel is a mixture of different cultural spheres. 
When Manuel is under the force of the Devil (when he murders or speaks about 
the murder), his eyes change their colour: they become white. This is a heritage 
of the cinema: the popular films about innocent persons occupied by the Devil 
offer many typical visual effects for these scenes. With the use of these schemes, 
the audience would be sure about what they are watching. If Manuel has white 
eyes, like the protagonist of a recent horror film, one could easily recognise the 
presence of the Devil. 
Santo Tomini, 'Robin Hood' 
Santo is one of Coraje's best friends, he used to be a member of the bandit 
group. He was also an orphan, he is like a brother of Coraje. He is always next to 
him, helps him, but he is not a heroical protagonist, he is much more a kind helper 
of Coraje. As I have mentioned before, the bandit group of Coraje reminds to the 
group of Robin Hood. But this name is used only in the case of Santo: his wife, 
Messina says to him sometimes: "You're like a real Robin Hood." 
The legend of Robin Hood is written in some ballads and is also men-
tioned in Walter Scott's Ivanhoe, but this figure has never appeared as the 
protagonist of a classical, canonised piece of art. We can say that this figure is 
much more of a popular legend, than a reference to the so called high-art of lit-
erature. This opinion might sound too brave, but I would only like to underline 
the difference between the origins of the last two themes (the Saviour and Faust) 
and the topic of Robin Hood. All these figures are popular enough to be used in 
a film like this. But it is important, that in the first two cases the origins of the 
themes were from a 'higher' literary tradition than the figure of Robin Hood. 
This difference of the original texts appears in the role of these characters 
in this telenovel. While Coraje and Manuel constitute the sacral, misterious level 
of the story, Santo as Robin Hood is on the level of the adventure. The literary 
origin is on a 'lower' level, and the character is on a lower level of the story. 
Santo represents a lower level of the story by the actions he is part of (he is not 
the part of the main story line, but some other accessory events), this is strength-
ened by his connection to the theme of Robin Hood. 
Pedro Olmos Rey, Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde 
Pedro is the husband of the third person of Coraje's bandit group, Mer-
cedes. Pedro is ill, he has a split personality: in one moment he is a kind person, 
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in the next moment he is an agressive murderer. These two personalities are 
fighting with each other very expressively: in these scenes we can see two 
Pedros: the good one is frightened, while the bad one is rude and he is always 
smoking. When Pedro is 'alone', but his agressive self is ruling him, he is 
smoking, too. This small gesture makes it easy to realize, who is acting. 
Doubled personality also has a literary tradition. The best known text is 
Stevenson's The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde}5 Pedro's status in the 
story (he is a supporting character) and his literary origins connect him with 
Santo. Here we can see the same situation: the popular register of literature is 
adapted into the 'popular' level of the telenovel.16 
There can be found many other literary elements in other characters as 
well. I have here presented only those, in which the literary roots appear in the 
most explicit way. These characters function as literary themes, and they have 
this same property in each episode. In the other characters we can recognise 
literary elements too, but it depends on the actual scene, so it's not a permanent 
characteristic of them. 
We can say, that literary roots are quite important in the characters. Padre 
Coraje is a very good example of this phenomenon, but we can find examples in 
other series, too. For example, in the Mexican telenovel, Las Vias del Amor}1 a 
young prostitute is called Lolita. She has a relationship with an old man, but 
nothing else could be found in her character that connects her with the figure of 
Nabokov's Lolita. But her name and her relationship with the old man is enough 
to connect her with the literary theme, and to recognize her character in the first 
moments of the series. 
The characters refer to a literary topos, and by this reference the audience 
can easily identify them, they know their main characteristics by it and know the 
ending of their story. These characters are built up on the basis of their relation-
ship with the literary tradition. We know in the first moment, that Lolita has 
sexual importance (she is a prostitute in the series), and is connected to an old 
man; we know that a man whose sign is a crucifix is a kind of Saviour (Coraje), 
and that his main enemy is the Devil, or a force that is in close connection with 
the infernal forces (Manuel). 
15 Robert Louis Stevenson: The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Dover, 
New York, 1991. 
16 'popular' level of the telenovel: meaning that the subordinated story lines usually satisfy 
more popular needs than the main story. The supported characters can be comical, vulgar, 
etc. In this case they represent the adventure (Santo) and the thriller (Pedro). 
17 Las Vias del Amor. Televisa, Mexico, 2002. 
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Dialogues have special importance in telenovels. "the persons »are« only 
because they »speak« in many modes, to get emotions and information to us."18 
- sais Rose Calza. The characters 'are', because they 'speak', because they 
maintain a dialogue with each other, and, as we can see from the examples, with 
the literary tradition. These characters exist in relations, they are only a collec-
tion of literary patterns. 
The audience of the telenovels, of course usually does not know (and does 
not have to know) the literary origins of the recited themes. However, they know-
that they are cited. These themes have such a great popularity, that one does not 
have to know the origin of it in order to understand the intertextuality, or in a 
Genettien system, its hypertextuality. One only has to know that an old story of 
a character exists (Faust for example), which is used in the telenovel. (The refer-
ences to the Bible are different, of course, where the origin of the borrowed texts 
is well-known.) Recognising known figures and the completion of their stories 
in the expected way can give gratification to the audience. If they like watching 
it, the commercial markers of the telenovel will rise, giving a financial base for 
the telenovel. 
The important for us is that these series mediate literary themes to the 
audience, and by this action, keep these stories alive. Stephen Greenblatt19 
calls these cultural elements the pieces of social energy, that is represented on 
the stage, and by that action the stage renews this energy and circulates it back 
to the audience. 
If we watch this cultural action from the point of view of Itamar Even-
Zohar, we can say that the tool function of telenovels is this circulation of 
literary themes. They circulate them not only through ages (what Greenblatt 
talks about), but also among cultural levels. The first telenovels brought litera-
ture to the illiterate audience. By now, this function has been changed, but it has 
not died: they transform literary texts and bring them to their immense audience. 
In the case of Padre Coraje this action is very explicit. The main charac-
ters can be understood by the tradition, but at the same time, the themes are 
transformed, given new life, and circulated to the audience. Telenovel is a very 
important genre of television culture that it appears in the whole world. It has a 
huge group of audience, its cultural role is incontestable. The economic power 
that gives life to this genre and its function as goods determines the character-
istics of it, and by this action it can occupy its role as a cultural tool. 
18 „os personagens só »sào« porque »falam« de muitas maneiras, fazendo chegar até nós 
emoçâo é informaçâo." Rose Calza, 32. 
19 Stephen Greenblatt: Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in 




ANTALÓCZY, Tímea: A szappanoperák virtuális világa. In: Jelkép, 2001/2. 
CALZA, Rose: O Que é Telenovela. Editora Brasiliense, Sâo Paulo, 1996. 
EVEN-ZOHAR, Itamar: Literature as Goods, Literature as Tools. In: 
Neohelicon XXIX (2002) 1. 
GOETHE, Johann Wolfgang Von: Faust, ford.: Jékely Zoltán. Magyar Helikon, 
Budapest, 1971. 
GREENBLATT, Stephen: Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of 
Social Energy in Renaissance England . Berkeley: University of 
California Press; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. 
Las Vias del Amor. Télévisa, Mexico, 2002. 
MARLOWE, Christopher: The Tragedie of Doctor Faustus (B Text, 1616) Ed: 
Hilary Binda. www perseus .tufts.edu/Texts/fasustus.html, 1/3. 
Padre Coraje. Pol-ka, Yair Dori Communications. Argentina, 2004. 
PÁL, Ferenc: The Novel of the Future; Is Itt he Telenovel? In: 
www.Filmkultura.iif.hu/articles/essays/telenove.en.html 
ROZSA, Zoltán: Száznyolcvan folytatásban csúcsidőben. In: Filmvilág, 1982/12. 
134 
Tamás Medgyes 
MINIMALISM AND ITS CULTURAL CONTEXT 
IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS / FINAL REPORT 
FOR THE JAPAN FOUNDATION 
Background: No description of the cultural landscape of today's post-indus-
trial societies can be complete without a detailed explanation of how sub-cultural 
differences add up to what is generally seen as global uniformity. This more or 
less coherent intertextual net of sub-cultural signs and signifying practices is what 
has been in the centre of my research into literary and cultural studies for more 
than a decade now. Dealing with this topic has had one major conclusion: the 
experience that contemporary urban culture is a diverse sphere posing questions 
that need to be addressed from a comparative point of view in order to understand 
its complexity. This post-structuralist comparative technique in my practice has 
proven to be useful in theorizing contemporary fiction, fashion, popular music, 
and a variety of other phenomena characteristic of contemporary culture, or, rather 
cultures. Different topics as they might seem, a comparative approach brings these 
aspects of culture together and enables one to study and describe the intertextual 
structure, which provides meaning and form to these expressive practices and 
performances of everyday urban life. My four research trips to North-America and 
field trips to all major cities in Europe have provided me with first-hand experi-
ences and in-depth knowledge of the urban sub-cultures of the Western world, 
their distinctive role and constitutive place in what is usually conceived as global 
culture. Published in English language studies and presented on conferences in 
Budapest, Cluj Napoca, and Szeged, the findings of this large-scale research have 
drawn academic interest. These findings, however, also led to the conclusion that 
most forms of contemporary urban art may be observed in, and, sometimes, indeed 
originate from, the urban environments of the East, particularly, Japan. It was this 
conclusion that highlighted Japanese urban sub-cultures as symbolic discourses of 
great interest, and, starting with an intensive research at the Istituto Orientate 
Universita' degli Studi di Napoli, I have studied the origins of global cultures in 
detail for the last five years. 
Aims of achievement: In order to broaden my focus and gain a better 
understanding of the characteristics of representative practices at work in the 
contemporary urban cultures of Japan, I intend to carry out an intensive field 
135 
research into how the processes of meaning generating through non-verbal signs 
(fashion, brand names, style, etc.) are employed in urban cultures of Tokyo as well 
as how Japanese minimalist art interprets post-modern realities. My aim is to 
observe the differences, and, to interpret the similarities of how Western and 
Japanese urban sub-cultures and their art symbolize realities. Comparative studies 
on the subject are rare, and, for the most part, do not draw on first-hand 
experiences and observations. My research will describe components of 
contemporary culture in Tokyo not studied before, and it will detail how Japanese 
minimalism transforms and articulates the experiences of those living in urban 
Japan. Symbolic meaning generating processes in the dynamics of urban social 
interaction will be central areas of attention, and urban art will also be part of the 
examination of social life in Tokyo. These aspects of Japanese society and culture 
are little known in Eastern Europe, let alone in Hungary, yet there can be no doubt 
about it that a more detailed picture of contemporary urban cultures in Tokyo will 
contribute to a better understanding of Japan as a whole. 
Research plan: Describing the ways in which discourses of popular culture 
position the consumer subject, and create subject-positions to identify with in 
contemporary Tokyo will be the most important aspect of the research into the 
signifying practices and interpretive strategies of the semi-institutionalized 
cultures in urban Japan. The objective of this research is to detail the differences 
in post-industrial urban societies and to describe the origins of the dominant 
symbolic meaning generating processes observed in global cultures. I will study 
the representative works of post-modern Japanese urban art, and my objective 
will be a detailed research into minimalism and other relevant forms of 
contemporary art in Japan. I will describe the forms of intertextuality in, and, the 
rhetorical characteristics of, the socio-cultural phenomena observed, and account 
for the role of these features in the meaning generating processes. In order to 
understand these phenomena I will carry out a detailed interpretation of Japanese 
minimalism with special attention to its intertextual characteristics by analysing 
dominant non-verbal signifying systems. Attending libraries and visiting 
professionals of the field at the Tokyo Daigaku, Waseda Daigaku, and Sophia 
Daigaku are also part of my research plan. 
Significance: Semantic structures of ever-changing discursive strategies 
and sub-cultures characterised by a dynamic signifying relation with the socio-
cultural sphere of post-modernism are multileveled, complex sets of reference. 
This phenomenon has crucial consequences for the signifying practices and 
interpretive strategies of urban youth sub-cultures. This territory has always 
proved to be a border zone, even for cultural criticism. The sign-structures and 
meaning generating processes to be studied in Tokyo, for the most part, have 
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been described only in North-American and European urban environments so 
far, and their detailed analysis in Tokyo will be an invaluable asset to our 
understanding of how intertextual sign-sets are structured in contemporary urban 
Japan. The analysis of Japanese minimalism will be based on a comparative 
interpretation of intertextual characteristics of non-verbal art with references to 
other symbolic activities (advertisements, comics, etc.). This technique will 
enable me to interpret Japanese minimalism in a broader theoretical context, thus 
opening up the category of Japanese minimalism to the concepts of 
postmodernism and post-industrial culture. This will help me draw a general 
picture of contemporary urban cultures and art in Tokyo, most of which are 
unknown to professionals, let alone the general, public. The findings will be 
published in English and in Hungarian in European literary and cultural 
periodicals (printed and web based), they will be presented on conferences, and 
will be added to my teaching practice. 
Outline of the project carried out in Tokyo 01.09.05-30.09.05: In the 
initial phase of the project I postulated that no description of the cultural 
landscape of today's post-industrial societies could be complete without a 
detailed explanation of how sub-cultural differences add up to what is generally 
seen as global uniformity. In order to broaden my focus and gain a better 
understanding of the characteristics of representative practices at work in the 
contemporary urban cultures of Japan, I carried out an intensive field research in 
Shibuya, Shinjuku and Ikebuhiro, and to a lesser degree in Kawasaki and 
Yokohama, in order to learn how the processes of meaning generating through 
non-verbal signs (fashion, brand names, style) are employed in urban cultures of 
metropolitan Tokyo. My aim was to observe the differences, and, to interpret the 
similarities of how Western and Japanese urban sub-cultures and their art 
symbolize realities. Symbolic meaning generating processes in the dynamics of 
urban social interaction were central areas of attention, and urban art was also 
part of the examination of social life in Shibuya and Shinjuku. Describing the 
ways in which discourses of popular culture position the consumer subject, and 
create subject-positions to identify with in contemporary Shibuya were the most 
important aspect of the research into the signifying practices and interpretive 
strategies of the semi-institutionalised cultures in urban Japan. The objective of 
the research was to detail the differences in post-industrial urban societies and to 
describe the origins of the dominant symbolic meaning generating processes 
observed in global cultures. The main objective of die trip was to describe the 
forms of intertextuality in, and, the rhetorical characteristics of, the socio-
cultural phenomena observed, and account for the role of these features in the 
meaning generating processes. Attending libraries and visiting professionals of 
the field were also part of my research activities. 
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Results: Let me first state that it is hard to conclude a study of this kind at 
such an early stage: while the phase for obtaining data is over, organizing the 
material gathered and analysing the results will take months. It is nevertheless 
possible to put forward certain preliminary results (A-E). 
A) The sign-structures and meaning generating processes studied in Tokyo 
(including fashion brands, leisure activities, reading and listening habits) 
are for the most part different from those studied in Western European 
environments mainly due to their reliance on traditional cultural forms 
(mostly those of the expressive practices of minimalism) not readily 
available, and relatively new to Western urban subcultures. Traditional 
forms reinterpreted provide for much of what is seen as invention: a 
characteristic to be understood before the structure of meaning generating 
can be studied in youth subcultures. While "recycling" has been a key 
concept of most studies in the field, practices of "reinvention" remain to be 
fully understood: one aspect, which the publications resulting from my 
research will detail. 
(B) The intertextual net of reference between traditional meanings and 
contemporary signifying systems is very much present in Japan, and - as 
many scholars of the field note it - hampers comparing Western and 
Japanese youth sub-cultures. Understanding, and appreciating the conse-
quences of which will result in inevitably linking a number of western 
signifying subsystems to Tokyo, as the intertextuality of these systems 
becomes evident. 
(C) The artistic freedom and intuitive play at work in subject constitution 
through style (especially vivid in Shibuya) form the base of several Western 
sub-cultural signifying systems and semi-institutionalised cultural 
structures. Most of these seem to originate from a certain sense of liberty in 
self-representation rarely seen in the West. It is indeed safe to say that 
strategies of subject constitution through style follow more intuitive paths 
in Tokyo than in New York, even if differences may be observed within 
Tokyo as well. 
(D) It is in the abovementioned respect that the projection of style takes place 
between the different subcultures, and it is through this projection that 
Japanese minimalism finds its ways to (seemingly discreet) subcultures of 
Japan (e.g. those of Osaka), and across the Western world. 
(E) Observation of non-verbal sign systems apparently used and perhaps 
invented by the target groups (youths between 15 and 30) led to the 
conclusion that in order for Tokyo youth subcultures to project style, it is 
indeed necessary to redefine traditional uses and values of signs readily 
available to them, and finally to relocate its meaning within a totally 
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different context. This shift could be very well observed in Shibuya, and 
consequent papers to be published on this aspect of post-industrial 
signification will discuss these results of the field research carried out there 
in detail. 
Data collection: Data collection took place on three levels. 
(A) 1. Focus group interviews in Ikebukuro (2005. September 3 - 2005 
September 5.) 50 interviews were conducted at and around Ikebukuro 
station in the said timeframe. Questions included those inquiring about (a) 
clothing choices /brand names, styles/; (b) listening habits; (c) reading 
habits; (c) anything else of interest /e.g. pastime activities/. The focus group 
was youths living in Ikebukuro aged 15-30. Male - female ratio: 42 - 58%. 
2. Focus group interviews in Shibuya (2005. September 13, - 2005 
September 17.) 104 interviews were conducted at and around Shibuya 
station in the said timeframe. Questions included those inquiring about (a) 
clothing choices /brand names, styles/; (b) listening habits; (c) reading 
habits; (c) anything else of interest /e.g. pastime activities/. The focus group 
was youths living in or passing through Shibuya aged 15-30. Male - female 
ratio: 50 - 50%. 
3. Focus group interviews in Shinjuku (2005. September 20 - 2005 
September 24.) 62 interviews were conducted at and around Shinjuku 
station in the said timeframe. Questions included those inquiring about (a) 
clothing choices /brand names, styles/; (b) listening habits; (c) reading 
habits; (c) anything else of interest /e.g. pastime activities/. The focus group 
was youths living in or passing through Shinjuku aged 15-30. Male -
female ratio: 45 -55%. 
4. Interviews in Kawasaki, Yokohama, Ueno, Roppongi (2005. September 
27 - 2005 September 30.) 20 interviews were conducted at and around 
* ' Kawasaki, Yokohama, Ueno, Roppongi stations in the said timeframe. 
Questions included those inquiring about (a) clothing choices /brand names, 
styles/; (b) listening habits; (c) reading habits; (c) anything else of interest 
/e.g. pastime activities/. The focus group was youths living or passing 
through these stations aged 15-30. Male - female ratio: 50 - 50%. 
(B) 1. Data collection from libraries (2005. September 7-2005. September 11.) 
2. Data collection from professionals (2005 September 2; 2005 September 12; 
2005 September 19; 2005 September 26.) 
(C) 1. Field study in Ikebukuro (pastime activities, shopping habits) 2005. 
September 6. Photo and film documentation. 
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2. Field study in Shibuya (pastime activities, shopping habits) 2005. 
September 18. Photo and film documentation. 
3. Field study in Shinjuku (pastime activities, shopping habits) 2005. 
September 25. Photo and film documentation. 
Further plans: As for my academic interests I would like to continue 
carrying out field research in urban environments with special attention on the 
characteristics of representative practices at work in contemporary urban 
cultures. My aim is still to observe the differences, and, to interpret the 
similarities of how different urban sub-cultures and their art symbolize realities. 
Symbolic meaning generating processes in the dynamics of urban social 
interaction will be central areas of attention, and urban art will also be part of the 
examination of social life in Eastern and Western metropolitan areas alike. 
I would like to express my gratitude for the help of the staff at the Japan 
Foundation both in Budapest and in Tokyo; they gave me assistance whenever I 
needed: I appreciate their help and kindness - domo arigato gozaimasu. The 
Japan Foundation grant was an invaluable asset to my work, and the opportunity 
to do field research in Tokyo was indeed an excellent chance for me to gain a 
better understanding of the post-modern. Also, I had a great time in Japan... 
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